

**Sergey Kremlev 7
victories of Beria. For the glory of the USSR!**

See you in the USSR! -



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"Kremlev S. 7 victories of Beria. For the glory of the USSR! »: Yauza-press; Moscow; 2013

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annotation

NEW BOOK from the author of the bestseller "Beria. The best manager of the 20th century", not a single word repeating him! This is not an abridged version of the previous edition, but a completely original study. Taking the legendary "Short Biography of Stalin" as a model, Sergei Kremlev writes about Beria in the same concise, clear and simple way. After all, no matter what the anti-Stalinists lied about, in the life of Lavrenty Pavlovich there were no dirty secrets, no "black spots" - the line of his fate is straight as an arrow.

*From the battle for Caucasian oil, without which there would have been no Stalinist "economic miracle", to the reform of the NKVD, and from the Great Patriotic War and the post-war Renaissance of the state to the atomic and missile triumphs of the USSR, this book is dedicated to the seven greatest victories of **L.P. Beria, his seven deeds for the glory of the Motherland**. All his life he went from triumph to triumph, without failing a single task that was entrusted to him, and was defeated only once - not in a fair fight, but with a vile stab in the back. But even this single defeat of Beria, which cost him his life, today turns into a moral victory!*

"Stalin foresaw that a lot of rubbish and dirt would be put on his grave, but the wind of history would sweep away everything superficial, and the pure truth would remain about how in just a quarter of a century Russia, under the leadership of the Leader, went from a plow to an atomic bomb. The same wind of history blows away the lie about Lavrenty Beria. In the end, he still won. correct death by death!"

Sergei Kremlev

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Address to the reader

Dear reader!

In 2008, my first book about Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was published - "Beria. The best manager of the 20th century. Then I wrote a thick volume of 46 author's sheets (about 800 pages of small text, about 2 million printed characters with spaces), and today I could without much difficulty supplement it with new materials up to 50, or even 55 sheets ...

Since then, I have done a lot of work on the study of the fate and historical role of Beria, and today my personal "Beriad", including the publication of the diaries and materials of L.P. Beria with my comments, is eight books. **And yet the new book, which I wrote at the request of the Yauza publishing house, is not an abbreviated version of the "capital" book. Even those readers who are familiar with my previous works on Lavrenty Pavlovich will be able to find a lot of new things here.** After all, now I understand Beria more precisely and deeper than six years ago, and even - than a year ago.

Moreover, as I hope, the new book should be interesting for those who are little acquainted with the life of Beria or "familiar" with her through a number of mediocre and deceitful serials about him - supposedly artistic or supposedly documentary. However, even in these serials, their authors are sometimes forced to speak the truth about Beria through gritted teeth.

In his not very long - only fifty-four years - Beria's life is almost

he has always been a kind of "multi-station operator", so to speak - both a Swiss, a reaper, and a player on the pipe. Therefore, a somewhat complete story about Beria, and even with analysis, cannot but be voluminous.

However, a capacious in terms of information content, but a small book in volume about Stalin's brightest employee is also needed. Another thing is that writing it is not so easy. In one of the letters, Chekhov informed his brother: "Sorry, there was no time to write briefly ..." Any writing person understands well how exactly this is said.

So, knowing much more about Beria than when I was working on the first book of my Beriada, I realized that I could take on this difficult task - to write about Beria a book that is fundamentally smaller in volume, but not in terms of coverage of the topic.

I am sure that such a book will also find its reader.

So, my book is conceived as a fairly complete, but brief account of Beria as one of the most active figures in the history of the Russian state ...

A simple list of only the most important posts that Lavrenty Pavlovich held in his life speaks for itself: Chairman of the Georgian Cheka, Chairman of the OGPU of Transcaucasia, First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Georgia, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, from the beginning of the war - a member of the State Defense Committee and then - Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Chairman of the "Atomic" Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, member of the Politburo Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU ...

Only Molotov was closer to Stalin, but only Stalin did more for the power of Soviet Russia than Beria.

In recent years, much has been written and said about Beria, but interest in him is constantly growing, and this is understandable. It always happens when a person is lied to for a long time and vilely, and then it suddenly turns out that he is not a "monster", not a "bloody executioner" and not a "moral freak", but quite the opposite - a smart girl with quite normal, lively human reactions.

It immediately becomes interesting - what's the matter? Why was a man so slandered, whom does he interfere with even after the grave? Moreover, Beria did not have a coffin and no grave, as there is still no exact date of his death ...

Although somewhere, after all, it is recorded - in the most secret, still undisclosed archives, the very fact of the existence of which is officially far from a fact.

Beria was killed - vilely killed by his own, in 1953. That is, in the same year as Stalin. However, it is not the same year of death that unites Beria and Stalin - they are united by a huge common work to create a powerful and democratic (that is, in Russian, people's rights) Russia.

Stalin was killed in the seventy-fourth year of his life, not having time to do everything he planned, including not having time to democratize Soviet society with a parallel purge of the snickering part of the Soviet "elite". Cleaning this time not with a bullet in the forehead, but with a kick in the ass - from warm, well-kept chairs.

Beria died at the age of fifty-five and, moreover, did not have time to do everything he could and wanted to do...

But he did a lot.

Moreover, everything that Beria did did not weaken the state, but strengthened it. And it strengthened not just as a powerful state, but as a state where the masses themselves turned out to be the creators of their confident and prosperous future.

So it really was.

In 1946 - after the devastating war - people ate rats in some places, and Stalin knew about it. And three years later, the famine was a thing of the past, and in 1949 Russia liquidated the nuclear monopoly of America, which threatened the Soviet Union with a sizzling nuclear

bombardment.

And in all the great achievements of our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers - and in the fact that the USSR in a matter of years after the war independently restored the national economy, and in the fact that the USSR in a matter of years ensured its military and economic security, Beria's merit is great ...

As already mentioned, today it becomes clear that more Beria for the benefit of the peoples. In the developed era of Stalin, only one person worked in the USSR - Stalin himself.

RUSSIAN history is rich in the bright destinies of historical figures who created and created great Russia.

Before Peter, some centuries were richer for major events and major figures, some - poorer ... Since the time of Peter the Great, each new Russian century has given us its glorious cohort of new Russian heroes.

At the beginning of the "Petrine" XVIII century, the names of Peter, Menshikov, Sheremetev, Apraksin, Nikita Antufiev (Demidov), Bering shone ...

The middle of the same century put forward Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, Potemkin-Tavrichesky, Lomonosov...

The end of the 18th century is Suvorov, Ushakov, Derzhavin...

The Russian 18th century had two outstanding national leaders - Peter the Great and Catherine the Great ... The 19th century turned out to be scarce for great sovereigns - none of the Russian tsars received the title of "Great" from history in this century. But the 19th century is the century of the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Crimean War, the century of Mordvinov and Golovnin, Krusenstern and Ferdinand Wrangel, Kutuzov and Bagration, Lazarev and Nakhimov, Nevelsky, Przhevalsky, Mendeleev ...

All of them, both those mentioned above and those not mentioned, were not only heroes and children of their century, but also by its creators. And I mean here only statesmen-creators, and I mentioned the same Derzhavin, Lomonosov, Mendeleev not as a poet and scientists, but as statesmen who made a great contribution not only to the culture and science of Russia, but also to its **state** building .

The poet Felix Chuev once wrote well: "And I thought about the wealth of Russia, which has enough spares for everything ..."

Yes. Russia was rich in large statesmen, even in the most dashing and inglorious years - even the time of "Bironism" was marked not only by infamy.

But the big people in Rus' really worked when it was headed by big personalities with a state mind, leaders ...

In our new history, Peter became the first Russian leader, in a good way, greedy for smart and active comrades-in-arms and employees. In the 20th century, he was called "the first Bolshevik on the throne", and this comparison is not so wrong in the sense that after Peter, only the Lenin-Stalin party managed to organize everything active and healthy in Russia for joint creative state and social work ...

After Peter, Lenin was able to do this, together with Lenin and after Lenin, Stalin.

The classic Stalinist "team" was very strong. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Zhdanov would do honor to any government of any great power. But even against this background, Lavrenty Beria not only did not get lost, but moved forward, in the end, as the most talented and successful employee of Stalin.

Is it possible to give a person a higher historical assessment?

LAVRENTY Beria always went from one height to an even greater height, from victory to victory. He not only did not fail a single case that he was entrusted with, but, on the contrary, more than once or twice he pulled out of the "breakthrough" what others failed. In a matter of years, or even months, he dramatically improved the situation in entire industries - not with a stick, not with a carrot, but with the right selection of personnel and faith in the capabilities and abilities of these personnel - from

people's commissars to factory directors.

Today, it is also important for us to understand that wherever the hero of this book worked, he worked, ultimately, for the benefit of the Soviet Union, all of Russia.

Thus, when Beria cleared the Transcaucasus of counter-revolution and foreign agents, he not only ensured the peace of Georgia. After all, without the Baku oil fields, the security of which was kept by Chekist Beria, the successes of the whole country in the first five-year plans would have been simply impossible!

And, say, chiatra manganese? Having headed Georgia as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Beria did a lot to develop its production, but this manganese was needed not by Georgia itself, but by the all-union metallurgy, the all-union economy!

Hundreds of millions of citrus fruits and thousands of tons of Georgian tea were produced in Georgia, developed by Beria, also for the entire Union. Abkhazian mandarins were known in Ukraine, and in Moscow, and in the Urals, and in Siberia ...

And is it possible to forget that the Black Sea coast of Georgia, through the efforts of Beria, became an all-Union health resort by the end of the 30s, and during the war - one huge hospital?

Everything that Beria did, while already working in Moscow, naturally had an all-Union scale, was important and necessary for all of Russia.

But what Beria did in Georgia and for Georgia was also done for Russia, and This is what we need to understand today!

BEFORE Beria took over the leadership of Georgia, nationalist sentiments were very strong in the Georgian leadership. A striking example is the "old Bolshevik" Budu Mdivani. In form he was a communist, but in essence he was an amazing mixture of a nationalist and a Trotskyist (it's only oil and vinegar that don't mix, and in politics it's not uncommon to go to the left and come to the right).

In the early 1920s, just when Beria was sent to Georgia, Mdivani and his supporters made up the majority in the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. **Majority!**

In fact, they hindered the economic and political unification of the Transcaucasian republics and sought to preserve the isolation of Georgia. At first, the Mdivani group was generally against the formation of the USSR, and after the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided on the creation of the USSR in October 1922, the Mdivani group began to seek Georgia's direct entry into the union state, and not through the Transcaucasian Federation.

In the comments to the 54th volume of Lenin's Complete Works, it is clear says:

"This position of Mdivani and his supporters played into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists, the Georgian Mensheviks, and the communists of Georgia at their congresses, conferences and meetings of party activists rightly regarded it as a deviation towards nationalism" ...

So Mdivani objectively became a very attractive figure for all anti-Soviet and anti-Russian Georgian forces. He was also fit for the fanfaron of Trotsky, who even then could not stand the businesslike Stalin.

Many years after the events described, when other, very sad events of the late 80s were already taking place in the country, the writer Felix Chuev in his book "Thus Spoke Kaganovich" cited the following conversation with Stalin's former "iron commissar":

"Kaganovich: And what is happening with Georgia is a nightmare!

Chuev: Georgians need trade directly with the West. Of course simple people will get nothing from it.

Kaganovich: What Mdivani demanded under Lenin. And they want to get away from us.

Chuev: But the Abkhazians don't want to.

Kaganovich: Abkhazians are not Georgians.

As we can see, even in his declining years Kaganovich did not forget Mdivani and his claims.

Later, in my place, I will dwell in more detail on the 1922 conflict between Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Budu Mdivani, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, but for now I will report the following.

Ordzhonikidze then headed the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b), to which the national Central Committees, including the Georgian Central Committee, were subordinate. Sergo was a firm supporter of the united Union, but he was also a hot-tempered person, and his conflict with the Mdivani group also acquired a "hot" character. Moreover, the party mass of Georgia was on the side of Sergo.

It came to Sergo's famous slap in the face to one of the opponents from the Mdivani group.

The conflict was then outwardly settled, but in fact it was only driven inside. And in 1928, Mdivani was expelled from the party for Trotskyist opposition activities. In 1931, he allegedly repented and was restored, but in 1937, already under Beria, he was arrested and sentenced to death.

Shot Beria Buda Mdivani for the cause. After hearing the "execution" sentence, Mdivani declared: "It's not enough to shoot me, I need to be quartered! After all, it was me, I brought the eleventh army here, I betrayed my people and helped Stalin and Beria, these geeks, enslave Georgia and bring Lenin's party to its knees.

People's Georgia flourished, more and more decorating the all-Union "bouquet" republics, but what was before Mdivani. Anger and envy are always blind...

This is who Beria had to fight with both at the head of the Transcaucasian Cheka, and at the head of the Transcaucasian and Georgian party organizations. At the same time, Beria fought in Georgia with enemies for the power, integrity and future not only of Georgia, but of the entire Soviet Union.

Therefore, the fair rejection of the current "Saakashvillian" Georgia, where hostility towards Russia is intensively cultivated, should not obscure for the modern reader the undoubted fact that the Caucasian period of Beria's activity is also important for us.

Actually, it is even especially important now, because **everything that Beria created in Georgia - from new factories to new health resorts, closely and inextricably tied Georgia to Russia, made Georgia part of a large country.**

In this sense, the figure of Beria today directs us to the future, which may be for all the peoples that made up the Soviet Union, stable only with their new unification.

Beria the winner was diverse, but I singled out seven large blocks from Beria's many victories, and I won't hide why exactly seven. I like the number seven sonorous, traditionally associated with luck, with victory, with power ...

But it's not only that. Reflecting on the life of Beria, weighing and evaluating his biggest deeds and achievements, I was convinced that they quite naturally fit into the "magic of the seven": Chekist of Transcaucasia, reformer of Georgia, reformer of the NKVD, one of the creators of the Victory, curator of the Atomic and Missile problems, organizer post-war economic and scientific and technological development, the "father" of the Moscow "skyscrapers" ...

The conspiracy of silence around the figure of Beria was so powerful and lasted so long, not receding into the past to this day, that even today only one of the major victories of Beria won by him for Russia is best known - the solution of the Uranium problem in just four years, that is, - the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb and the elimination of the US atomic monopoly. And it is practically unknown, for example, that Beria did a lot for our missile programs.

They admit through their teeth the fact that Beria led the defense work during the war, but this is far from always the case. But Beria was - as a public figure - multifaceted. And as a result, his life shines with just seven facets, it had seven outstanding achievements, seven outstanding victories.

And with all this - only one defeat ... And although it cost Lavrenty Pavlovich not only his career, but also his life, this defeat cannot be called mediocre. After all, the blow was delivered not even from around the corner, the blow was in the back.

And in the back they always beat their own - betraying.

So Beria was betrayed.

But even this only defeat of Beria turns into a victory today - his last victory, albeit not material, but only moral.

Khrushchev believed that he not only got rid of a competitor, but also crossed him out forever from the history of the country, or at least provided Beria with only Herostratus glory.

And what happened in reality?

How does an increasing number of people who want historical truth look at Khrushchev today?

And how does an increasing number of people look at Beria?

Stalin foresaw that a lot of rubbish and dirt would be put on his grave, but the wind of history would sweep away everything superficial and leave the bare, undisguised truth about those days when, in three decades, Russia under Stalin's leadership went from a plow to an atomic bomb.

But after all, the cleansing wind of history that is now rising dispels garbage not only on Stalin's grave. This wind sweeps to the dustbin of history and lies about Stalin's comrades-in-arms, about the leaders of national victories.

This means that the wind of history is also blowing away the lies about Lavrenty Beria. He won a lot and often due to his mind, energy, faith in people, and only once was he defeated, or rather, betrayed. But in the end, he won anyway - he trampled down death with death!

Beria did not fly to the Canary Islands, did not go on cruises, did not go to trendy ski resorts ...

And even - although this is attributed to him over and over again - he did not have personal harems from the "stars" and top models...

But Lavrenty Beria lived a real, active, exciting life ...

Truly masculine.

This is what I will talk about in my book.

Prologue

Young Beria and his autobiography

Although there has been an increase in archival documents on Beria in recent years, they are declassified to this day with particular reluctance. In addition, the archives of Beria have been destroyed since the Khrushchev era with more brutality than the rest of the archives. Unless the Stalinist archives were destroyed even more brutally and savagely ...

Actually, the falsification of the meaning and essence of Beria's activities for the benefit of Russia began immediately after his arrest on June 26, 1953 - at the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU held in early July 1953, which was completely devoted to "revelations" of Beria.

As a result, even today Beria is "documented" much more sparingly than, for example, Kaganovich or Molotov.

Today we have at least partially published correspondence between Molotov and Stalin in the 30s, and almost complete correspondence with Stalin in the 30s of Kaganovich ... We have nothing of the kind in the case of Beria and, as I guess, we will not have. The documentary truth about Beria has in many ways turned into smoke and ashes long ago.

They say that manuscripts do not burn... Well, maybe this is so with respect to literary manuscripts, but historical archives are on fire for a sweet soul. They burn, among other things, because there are always more people who want to burn inconvenient documents ...

Little is known about the YOUNG years of Beria, and therefore it is of particular value

is his autobiography, which the young Beria wrote in 1923 on an occasion, the essence of which is clarified in the final lines of the document.

The literary style of the autobiography is quite good even for a natural hare, and even more so for a young Mingrelian of twenty-four years old, who had lived all his life before that in the Caucasus.

However, Beria learned the Russian language early - at the Sukhum Higher Primary School, where Lavrenty studied for eight years and graduated with honors, great attention was paid to the Russian language - six hours a week. And the teachers there were not bad, to say the least - like his fellow students at the Sukhum school, Beria was lucky, Dmitry Gulia himself taught at the school at that time. People's poet of Abkhazia, the founder of Abkhaz fiction and the Abkhaz literary language, awarded the Order of Lenin in Soviet times, Gulia was a humanist and had, of course, only positive influence on his students ...

When Beria began his studies, Gulia was thirty-three years old - the age of Christ and the first maturity. One can only guess whether Gulia singled out young Lavrentiy from the crowd, but later he paid tribute to him. So, volume 13 of the 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, signed for publication exactly one year before Beria's arrest - June 27, 1952, in an article about Dm. Gulia reports that "G[ulia] dedicated inspirational poems to the great Stalin and his colleague - L.P. Beria "...

Oddly enough, but this information was not removed from such an authoritative, normative source in the USSR as the TSB, even after the fall of Beria, and was quietly hidden in the thickness of the 13th volume all the years of Beria's silence ...

I must say that with the cutting out of the name and merits of Beria from Soviet history, the story turned out to be amusing - almost comical, if not for the tragedy of the fate of Lavrenty Pavlovich ...

After 1953, Khrushchev's apparatchiks cut Beria out of history literally, in the truest sense of the word - with a razor blade! In 1953, subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia received a package by mail, inside of which there were several typographical sheets of the 82CH108/16 format and a quarter sheet, where the following was typographically stated:

TO A SUBSCRIBER OF THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA

The State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" recommends removing pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 from the 5th volume of the TSB, as well as a portrait pasted between pages 22 and 23, in exchange for which pages are sent to you with new text.

Use scissors or a razor blade to cut off the indicated pages, keeping the margins near the spine to which new pages should be glued.

State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia"
What almost all subscribers did.

But, as has long been said, the severity of Russian laws is moderated by their faulty enforcement. So it happened here too ... The Khrushchevites ordered to cut out a huge article about Beria on pages 21 to 24, as well as his portrait ... But certain references to Beria were, after all, not in one, and not in two, but in many volumes of the 2nd edition TSB, and this was out of sight.

For example, the cutters forgot to look at the very first volume of the TSB, signed for publication on December 15, 1949, in the article "Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic". So even after 1953, anyone could read on page 449 of the 1st volume of the 2nd edition of the TSB that "the direct conductors of Lenin's and Stalin's instructions on the liberation movement in the Transcaucasus were their faithful students - G.K. Ordzhonikidze, S.M. Kirov, A.I. Mikoyan, L.P. Beria..."

Of course, the role of Beria in the revolution is not even close comparable with the role of Mikoyan, not

speaking of Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, so that the name of Beria was "turned up" here by the authors of the TSB, as they say, retroactively, although ...

Although "in terms of the integral", what was said was not so wrong, because in the end, the role of Beria in the development of Soviet Azerbaijan turned out to be more than comparable with the role of the first three major Bolsheviks mentioned in the TSB. Therefore, the name of Beria - in connection with his very real deeds - was mentioned in the article about the AzSSR and on pages 450, 452, 454, 455th ...

Yes, it was not easy to black out the name of Beria from everywhere ...

That is why, even after the total defamation of Beria became a good political tone in the post-Stalin USSR, incidents like the one that took place in the encyclopedic article about Dm turned out to be possible. Gulia...

At the same time, young Beria was taught not only by him, among the Sukhumi teachers Lavrenty there were other well-known intellectuals in Abkhazia - Eshba, Chochua, Jananiya ...

Russians also taught at the school, so it is not surprising that the Russian the language of the autobiography of young Beria is quite literate and free ...

The authenticity of the text of the autobiography (that is, its belonging to L.P. Beria) is not questioned even by the most dirty and unscrupulous slanderers of Lavrenty Pavlovich, and I quote the text of the autobiography from the anti-Beria collection of Politizdat of 1991 "Beria: the end of a career" (pp. 320– 325), where it is reported that this document by L.P. Beria was "discovered ... in his personal file."

Looking ahead, I will inform you that during the initial interrogation of the arrested Beria on July 8, 1953, the prominent Khrushchevite, Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko also referred to this autobiography.

And one more thing - **everything that Beria wrote in his autobiography, without a doubt, is true, that is, to put it simply, it is true.** After all, everything that he wrote was then simple and easy to verify - those who read the lines written by young Lavrenty were themselves not only witnesses of the events, but also their participants, creators ...

Beria obviously wrote his autobiography with great care and diligence, just because he sent it to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, and the result of consideration of his application determined his future fate. That is, we are dealing with a text not written and edited more than once.

From the autobiography it is clear that already the first twenty-four years of L.P. The Berias were so active that even in that turbulent era, such a biography would have been enough for many for the rest of their lives. And for Beria, everything he did by the autumn of 1923 cannot even be considered as a "launching pad".

Ahead of him were such accomplishments that in comparison with them paled and bright, rich of his own biography as of the end of October 1923.

Here she is...

I was born on March 17, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli (15 versts from the city of Sukhum) into a poor peasant family. In view of the fact that my education was a burden to my parents, while still a student of the Sukhumi city school, I prepared elementary school students, thus helping the family, and this continued intermittently until 1915. In 1915 he moved to Baku; From that moment my independent life begins. Since then, while studying at a technical school, I have an old mother, a deaf-mute sister and a niece of 5 years old as dependents.

My teaching, which began in 1907 in the city of Sukhum, after completing the course of the higher elementary school (in 1915), with my moving to Baku, continued here and proceeded as follows: having arrived in Baku, I enter here the secondary school of mechanics and construction, where I have been studying for 4 years. In 1919 I completed a course at

school, and in 1920, with the transformation of the technical school into a polytechnic institute, I entered the latter. From that moment on, regular education ceased and my studies at the institute continued intermittently until 1922. However, during all this time I did not lose contact with the institute, and only in 1922, in connection with the transfer of me by the Regional Committee of the RCP from Baku to Tiflis, did I stop teaching, being listed by that time as a student of the 3rd year.

This is how my studies in Baku, which began here in 1915 and continued intermittently until 1922, are interrupted.

In the same year, 1915, my participation in party life began for the first time, at that time still in its infancy. In October of this year, we - a group of students from the Baku Technical School - organized an illegal Marxist circle, which included students from other educational institutions. The circle existed until February 1917. In this circle I was the treasurer. The motives for creating the circle were: the organization of students, mutual material support and self-education in the Marxist spirit (reading abstracts), analysis of books received from workers' organizations, and so on. At the same time he was elected headman of his class (illegally). In March 1917, together with Comrade. V. Egorov, Pukhovich, Avanesov and another comrade (I don't remember my last name) are organizing a cell of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks), where I was a member of the bureau.

In 1916 (summer holidays) I served as a trainee in the main office Nobel in Balakhny, earning a living for his family and himself.

In the course of further events, beginning in 1917, in Transcaucasia, I became involved in the general course of party and Soviet work, which throws me from place to place, from the conditions of the legal existence of the party (in 1918 in the city of Baku) to the illegal (1919– 1920), and is interrupted by my departure to Georgia. In June 1917, as a trainee technician, I entered the hydrotechnical organization of the army of the Romanian front and leave with the latter to Odessa, from there to Romania, where I work in the forest detachment of the village of Negulyashty. At the same time, I am elected from the workers and soldiers, chairman of the detachment committee and a delegate from the detachment, I often attend district congresses of representatives of the districts in Pascani (Romania). I remained at this job until the end of 1917 and at the beginning of 1918, upon my arrival in Baku, I continued to work at a technical school at an accelerated pace, quickly making up for what was missed. In January 1918, I entered the Baku Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies, working here in the secretariat of the Council as an employee, doing all the current work, and I devote a lot of energy and effort to this work. Here I remain until September 1918, but October of this year finds me in the liquidation of the commission of Soviet employees, where I remain until the occupation of the city of Baku by the Turks. During the first period of the Turkish occupation, I worked in the White City at the Caspian Partnership factory as a clerk. In connection with the beginning of intensified studies at a technical school and the need to pass some transitional exams, I was forced to leave the service. From February 1919 to April 1920, being the chairman of the communist cell of technicians, under the guidance of senior comrades, he carried out individual assignments from the district committee, himself working with other cells as an instructor. In the autumn of the same 1919, from the Gummet party (a Muslim organization of the Bolshevik orientation, created even before the revolution on the initiative of Stalin and others - S.K.), I entered the counterintelligence service, where I worked together with Comrade Mussevi. Approximately in March 1920, after the assassination of Comrade Mussevi, I left my work in counterintelligence and worked for a short time in the Baku customs.

From the very first days after the April coup in Azerbaijan, the regional committee of the party (Bolsheviks) from the register (Registration (intelligence) department. - S.K.) of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army was sent to Georgia for underground work abroad as an authorized representative. In Tiflis, I contact the regional committee in the person of Comrade. Hmayak Nazaretyan, spreading a network of residents in Georgia and Armenia, establishing contact with the headquarters of the Georgian army and guards, regularly sending couriers to the register of the city of Baku. In Tiflis they arrest me together with the Central Committee

Georgia, but according to the negotiations between G. Sturua and Noah Zhordania, they release everyone with a proposal to leave Georgia within 3 days. However, I manage to stay, having entered the service under the pseudonym Lakerbaya in the representative office of the RSFSR to Comrade Kirov, who by that time had arrived in the city of Tiflis. In May 1920, I went to Baku to the registry office to receive directives in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Georgia, but on the way back to Tiflis I was arrested by a telegram from Noah Ramishvili and taken to Tiflis, from where, despite Comrade Kirov's troubles, I was sent to Kutaisi prison. June and July of 1920 I am imprisoned, only after four and a half days of a hunger strike declared by political prisoners, I am deported to Azerbaijan in stages. Upon arrival (August 1920), the Central Committee of the RCP requested me from the army and appointed me as the manager of the affairs of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan. I remained in this position until October 1920, after which the Central Committee appointed me Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers. Comrade Sarkis (chairman of the commission) and I carried out this work in shock order until the liquidation of the Commission (February 1921). With the end of my work in the Commission, I managed to persuade the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue my education at the institute, where by that time I was a student (from the day it was opened in 1920). According to my requests, the Central Committee sends me to the institute, giving me a scholarship through the Baku Soviet. However, not even two weeks pass before the Central Committee sends a demand to the Caucasian Bureau to send me to work in Tiflis. As a result, the Central Committee removes me from the institute, but instead of sending me to Tiflis, by its decision, appoints me to the Azerbaijan Cheka as deputy head of the secret (April 1921) and soon - the head of the secret operations department - Deputy Chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka.

I will not dwell on the tense and nervous nature of work in the Azerbaijani Cheka. As a result, such positive results soon affected. Stopping here on the defeat of the Muslim organization "Ittihat", which numbered tens of thousands of members. Further - the defeat of the Transcaucasian organization of the right SRs, for which the GPU (VChK), by its order of February 6, 1923, No. 45, announces gratitude to me with the award of weapons. The results of the same work were noted by the Council of People's Commissars of the ASSR in their commendation list of September 12, 1922, and in the local press. Working in the Azerbaijan Cheka, at the same time I am the chairman of the Azmezhkom (Azerbaijan Interdepartmental Commission) from VII-1921 to XI-1922. Then in the commission of the Supreme Economic Council (Supreme Economic Council) and in the commission for the inspection of the Revolutionary Tribunal. On the party line, I am attached from the BK AKP to the working cells, and later, for convenience, to the cell of the Cheka, where I am a member of the bureau, I have been elected to almost all congresses and conferences of the AKP, I was also a member of the Baku Council. In November 1922, I was recalled by the Transcaucasian Regional Committee from the Azerbaijan Cheka to the disposal of the Central Committee of the KKE, which appointed me head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia. Here, taking into account the seriousness of the work and the large object, I devote all my knowledge and time to it, as a result, in a relatively short time, it is possible to achieve serious results that affect all branches of work: such is the elimination of banditry, which had assumed grandiose proportions in Georgia, and the defeat of the Menshevik organization and the anti-Soviet party in general, despite the extreme secrecy. The results of the work achieved were noted by the Central Committee and the CEC of Georgia in the form of awarding me with the Order of the Red Banner. In Georgia, while working in the Cheka, I am also a member of the bureau of the communist cell and a member of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

During my party and Soviet work, especially in the bodies of the Cheka, I lagged far behind both in terms of general development, and I still did not complete my special education. Having a vocation for this branch of knowledge, having spent a lot of time and effort, I would ask the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue this

education in order to complete it as soon as possible. Completed special education will give me the opportunity to give my experience and knowledge in this area to Soviet construction, and the party - to use me as it sees fit.

1923 22/X (signed)"

In the 1991 Anti-Beria collection cited above, the publishers of L.P. Beria, someone B.S. Popov and V.T. Oppokov, write: "... window dressing, self-praise, exaltation of trifles to a large scale - this, apparently, is a character trait that, due to circumstances, has received a development that threatens others ..."

The reader can decide for himself whether such an assessment is fair ...

I will draw his attention to what was accurately noticed - obviously, for the first time, by Yuri Mukhin, who did a lot to clear the name of Beria.

What self-praise! Especially - taking into account what the author of the autobiography asks the senior comrades in the party. Indeed, according to the apt definition of Mukhin, Beria asked "from generals to students."

Only a sincere and morally sound person is capable, occupying a very high position in the state hierarchy, to ask again for a student's bench.

This is how Beria started. And the early autobiography of L.P. Beria is certainly bright and convincing document of the era.

And she shows her author - no matter how you look - from the best side.

And so it went on, year after year, three decades - from one victory to another.

As he grew up politically and humanly, Beria played more and more significant roles in the new country with the name "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and the significance of his activities became more and more widespread within the entire Big Country ...

Until the early 1930s, Beria was a "pure" Chekist, and people of such occupations not only do not advertise themselves, but, on the contrary, try not to be seen. And the main victory of Beria in those years: the calm inside the Transcaucasus, the most important strategic region of the USSR, and the security of Baku oil, remained outside public attention and recognition. But even before the war, the Baku oil fields produced up to 75 percent of the all-Union oil production, and this is not counting the oil refineries of Transcaucasia!..

Therefore, the Chekist activities of Beria in the Transcaucasus, of which he undoubtedly was Chekist No. 1, can be defined, by and large, as a struggle for oil for socialism.

This struggle took on a different form at different times - sometimes oil receded into the background and even the third plan, but it was always present among the problems solved by Chekist Beria, because, after all, the opposite side - the secret services of the West, white and nationalist emigration, Western politicians and businessmen - also considered the problem of Caucasian oil as the most important and most important.

Let's start with Baku...

Chapter 1

1921–1931 Chekist of Transcaucasia No. 1: struggle for oil for socialism

At first glance, the Caucasian period of Beria's life and work is of less interest to us today than, for example, his work in the Soviet Atomic Project. There, in the most obvious way, he worked for the entire Union, and the result of his "atomic" efforts keeps Russia to this day ...

And the Caucasus? Well, he caught bandits there, well, he fought with agents of Georgian emigration ...

And what about us?

But this, of course, is not true! I have already said this, but I will repeat something ...

Firstly, the Caucasus has always been the most important region for Russia, and Beria's work in the Caucasus was important for the whole country. As already mentioned, Beria's KGB activities in the Transcaucasus can be defined in a sense as a struggle for oil for Russia.

Secondly, is it possible to understand a person without knowing how he started, how and on what basis he was formed? The origins of the present and the future go into the past. As clichéd as this statement may seem, it is true...

Before the revolution and in the first years of Soviet power, the importance of the Caucasus was primarily geopolitical, but in economic terms, only oil was important for the whole of Russia - the oil of Baku.

Smelling of oil, international Baku became a special part of his biography for the Georgian Mingrelian Beria, who was born and grew up in Abkhazia. In Baku, Lavrentiy received a good professional education, his very first, albeit poor, but serene youth in a youthful way, passed in Baku ...

In Baku, he came to the revolution, worked underground there and became a Chekist there. And his KGB activities in Transcaucasia became the first major, not only personally, but also socially significant victory for Beria.

He started as a scout and security officer even before the Sovietization of the Caucasus, but he was drawn to something else - this has already been said. It was also said that Beria was torn from "Chekist generals" to students.

And this is where clarification is needed...

Even the chairman of the GruzChK in the early 1920s was in all respects not the same as the chairman of the KGB of the Georgian SSR in the Brezhnev years, for example, or the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, whose post was held in those same years by the renegade Shevardnadze ...

In the 1920s they lived modestly, and the Chekists - even the leading ones, including.

Beria also lived modestly. So the Soviets were not very satisfying and profitable then. "gendarme bread" ... But after all, the students did not live more satisfyingly, and Beria also had a family.

Little so far - he and Nino's wife, but the family.

The students survived from kvass to water, but the engineers, due to the shortage, were provided relatively well.

I mean that it was not so tempting - from a purely worldly point of view - to be a Chekist "general" then. On the other hand, it was tempting to get what is called a strong profession that gives a reliable piece of bread.

By the age of 24, Chekist Beria had reached a completely stable growth prospect, but was ready to risk his success for the sake of an uncertain fate ... A polytechnic student, becoming a civil engineer, could in that turbulent time find a bright fate in a new field, but he could get lost.

So why did Beria ask to be let go to study?

For a morally sound person, the answer is obvious: yes, because Beria was a builder by nature, a creator and wanted to become one - a builder and creator by profession.

In itself, such a warehouse of thoughts, aspirations and feelings refutes all insinuations about Beria's supposedly sadistic inclinations. The secret service in any society provides for such inclinations a much wider field of development than a construction site.

And besides, the aspirations of the young Beria show and prove that all accusations of his alleged careerism are also nonsense! If he were a careerist, he would hold on to his teeth, albeit a tough one, but a "leading" chair in the Cheka.

And he, as we see, did not hold on to him.

The aspirations of young Beria also reveal his undoubted self-confidence. He is not afraid to turn his fate around abruptly - to change a reliable job and go to

unknown twist of fate.

However, Lavrenty himself did not have to choose his fate in the new Russia - neither then nor later. With all the strength of character, Beria's entire conscious life passed under the sign of choosing the path not by himself, but under the sign of fulfilling the instructions of the party, the state, and later Stalin personally.

HOWEVER, in the 20s, Beria's path to Stalin's personal "team" was just beginning, and no one, including Lavrenty himself, knew that the path paved not by personal predilections, but by party duty, would lead the young Caucasian to the Kremlin, to the sovereign Stalinist cabinet, and will bring not a rare guest, but an indispensable participant in all serious meetings and discussions in this high office.

Beria did not work long in Azerbaijan, but he did a lot. Moreover, it was in Baku that he could go and went through a good school as a counterintelligence officer, at the same time getting acquainted with the craft of intelligence. Baku had all the possibilities for that. It is unlikely that in the USSR there was another such knot of various secret interests - both the political interests of different powers, and the specific interests of their special services.

And interests were limited, ultimately, to oil. Before the Nobel revolution, Baku oil was owned by the famous Deterding, the founder of the Shell oil empire...

Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York, Gulf and Company Francaise...

The local magnates Mantashevs and the Armenian-Turkish oil "king" Calouste Sargis Gulbenkian had their own "barrel of oil" in Baku.

And all this powerful pack was not inclined to give oil to Baku to the new, Soviet Russia ... Moreover, it was most convenient to act in the Caucasus through the nationalists. Those had hands, connections, knowledge of local conditions, the oil magnates - money. Therefore, even if the Caucasian Chekists uncovered outwardly purely nationalist conspiracies, then, ultimately, on the scale of a large country, it was still a battle for oil.

Indeed, in the event of coming to power as a result of a successful anti-Soviet coup there would be nothing to pay the nationalists with their "sponsors" except for oil.

I will not dwell on the Baku and Transcaucasian tangle of political vipers in general, but I will say that there was a tangle, and a solid, experienced, well-deserved tangle ...

Moreover, the problems of the entire Caspian region, the entire coast of the Caspian Sea were intertwined in Baku. On both sides of the Caspian there were enough potential "clients" of the Chekists! One Right Social Revolutionary Funtikov was worth something!

He and his "colleagues" - both Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks - became professional conspirators during the civil war. In July 1918, Funtikov, together with the Cadets (Count Dorrer), Turkmen nationalists, officers of the Teke cavalry units and others, raised the Ashkhabad rebellion ... As a result, the Trans-Caspian Provisional Government headed by Funtikov was organized.

Everyone knows about the 26 Baku commissars who were shot in September 1918 on the 27th verst of the Trans-Caspian railway between the stations of Pereval and Akhcha-Kuyma. The "technical" side of this murder, prepared in Baku by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and English interventionists, was taken over by the Trans-Caspian Provisional Government, which Funtikov later admitted in writing to Chaikin, a former member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

But the execution of 9 Ashkhabad (Ashkhabad) commissars, who were shot on the night of July 23, 1918 between the stations of Annau and Gyaurs, 18 kilometers from Ashgabat, is almost forgotten.

The "handwriting" of both crimes was the same, and it is understandable - both executions were organized by the same forces.

The fall of the Baku Commune in 1918 was also prepared by the right SRs

together with the Mensheviks, while they warmly melded immediately with both the Musavatists and the British, who were represented by Major General Dunsterville. The general's memoirs were published in 1925 in Tiflis, and he wrote there how he recruited Colonel Lazar Bicherakhov of the Terek Cossack army, who commanded a detachment of Terek Cossacks in one and a half thousand sabers. Dunsterville wrote:

“Bicherakhov decided to become a Bolshevik... He telegraphed this to the Bolshevik Committee, admitting frankly that only Soviet power... can save Russia”...

Bicherakhov's detachment was entrusted with the defense of Baku from Turkish troops in one of the sectors of the front. On July 29, 1918, the “frank-hearted” colonel opened the front to the Turks and left for Dagestan ...

On July 31, Soviet power in Baku fell, on August 4, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Armenian Dashnaks, strong in Baku, formed the so-called Dictatorship of the Central Caspian, and on August 4 a small group of British entered Baku. On August 17, General Dunsterville himself showed up with the main forces.

After the capture of Baku, Bicherakhov was awarded two high British orders. and received the rank of general of the English army - he later fled to England.

And here is another Transcaucasian character - Colonel Bicherakhov's brother Georgy Bicherakhov, engineer, Menshevik, organizer of the anti-Soviet revolt of the prosperous Terek Cossacks and the mountain elite in the summer - autumn of 1918 ...

This dangerous rebellion is known in history under the name "Biccherahovshchina". And he was inspired by the British mission in Vladikavkaz, associated with Denikin.

One, as they say, to one!

The patron and resident of Lazar Bicherakhov, General Dunsterville led the preparations for the overthrow of the Baku Commune from Persia and did not hide in his memoirs

What:

“Communication with Baku ... was established through almost daily couriers; our friends, the social revolutionaries, were able to ... establish a new form of government in Baku and invite the British to help ... I have repeatedly negotiated with representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, whose program is much more in line with our goals ... ”

The goals of the British corresponded, however, to the program not only of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Musavatists, Dashnaks, pan-Islamists from Ittihad-islam, radical mountain nationalists, political bandits and just bandits - all of them suited not only the British, but also the Turks, Germans, Poles, Americans, just because this motley trash was hostile to the Bolsheviks. With all the mutual quarrels and disagreements, they were similar in two main points: in their hatred of the Soviets and in their readiness to sell to anyone, subject to payment in hard currency.

After the restoration of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, the leading masters of conspiracies and rebellions went into exile, but they did not stop their subversive work, and it was carried out by local "cadres" who had gone underground. Someone legalized, allegedly repentant, but often the "frankness" of the recognition of Soviet power was, alas, of the "Biccherakh" type.

Beria, who since April 1921 became deputy head of the secret operations department of the Azerbaijan Cheka, had to deal with such a “public”. A month later, he “went on promotion”, appointed head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka.

The CHAIRMAN of the AzChK at that time was Mir Jafar Baghirov (1896–1956).

Shot in Baku three years after the assassination of Beria, Baghirov left an ambiguous memory of himself in history. But no one can deny that for the development of Soviet Azerbaijan, Mir Jafar, heading the republican party organization from 1933 to 1953, did a lot of useful and sensible things.

At the same time, this figure was not deprived of an insidious oriental flavor. So, having been very close with Beria for many years, at the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953, Bagirov renounced him in the most energetic terms.

I mean, it is usually believed that at first Bagirov allegedly patronized Beria, and only later, when Beria "grew up" a lot, Bagirov became "Beria's man."

Such statements seem primitive ...

Baghirov led the AzChK (GPU) until 1927, then he was chairman of the board of the Transcaucasian Rural Union for two years, and in 1929 he again became chairman of the Azerbaijan GPU. Beria at that time worked in Tiflis as the chairman of the GPU of the Georgian SSR and could hardly influence the appointment of Bagirov.

Yes, and for the transfer of Bagirov in 1932 by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the AzSSR, and for his appointment in 1933 as the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan - also.

Of course, since October 1932, Beria became the 1st secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), that is, the leader of the entire Transcaucasus, but Stalin made the final decisions on Caucasian affairs, and then, as I understand it, first of all Ordzhonikidze and Kirov had influence here ...

Another thing is that Beria and Bagirov worked together for a long time and closely. It is possible that Beria also got into the AzChK thanks to Bagirov, who, during the struggle for Transcaucasia, was in 1920 deputy chairman of the Military Tribunal of the 11 Army of the Caucasian Front, and Beria worked in the Registration, that is, intelligence, department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11 Army .

But there is, perhaps, a subtle point here ...

Even if it was not Bagirov who "recruited" Beria to the Chekists, all the same, from the very beginning of his work in the AzChK, and even in a responsible position, Beria could not help but fall into Bagirov's field of vision as the chairman of the AzChK. And, of course, Bagirov could not help but like Beria, as evidenced by the imminent promotion.

And what was next? Why did such an intelligent worker of the pre-AzChK Bagirov so easily yield to the GruzChK?

Was it because Beria was transferred from Baku to Tiflis that Bagirov, who was prone to intrigue, quickly saw in Beria an unwitting, but dangerous rival, able to bypass the boss?

One way or another, a year and a half later, from November 1922, the head of the Secret Operational Unit and deputy chairman of the AzChK L.P. Beria is transferred to the same position in the GruzChK.

However, perhaps everything is explained objectively, although in this case, the same activity and intelligence of Beria lies at the heart of the motivation for the translation. The Chekist operational situation in Azerbaijan was not easy, but in Georgia it was generally very bad. Suffice it to say that even when all over the USSR the bodies of the Cheka were transformed into bodies of the GPU, it was *the Emergency Committee* that still continued to work in Georgia.

commission to combat counter-revolution - that's how difficult the operational situation was there.

BERIA left Baku forever, and one can understand how he worked in Azerbaijan from two documents.

Here is the first one:

"Azerbaijani
socialist
Soviet Republic
Azerbaijan Council

People's Commissars

The Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars, in commemoration of the execution by the head of the secret-operational department of the Azerbaijan Extraordinary Commission, comrade. Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich of his duty to the proletarian revolution, expressed in the skillful leadership of the brilliantly executed on a state scale, the work of liquidating the Transcaucasian organization of the P. S. R., rewards him with a gold watch with a monogram.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars G. Musabegov

Here is the second one:

"Extract from the order of the GPU of 1923 No. 45

For the energetic and skillful carrying out of the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization of the p. s.-r. early s.o.h. Baku Provincial Department comrade. Beria and early secret department comrade. Yossem are awarded weapons - Browning revolvers with inscriptions about what to put on their track records ...

Deputy Chairman of the GPU (Unshlikht)"

Documentary evidence that positively characterizes Beria has long turned into an archival curiosity. But something remained ... For example, the "Certificate ...", signed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Akhundov, was preserved, which said:

"This is given to the responsible party worker comrade. Beria L.P. in the fact that he [possesses] outstanding abilities, manifested in various apparatuses of the state mechanism ... Working as the Manager of the Central Committee of Az. Communist Party, the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Registrar of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army and the Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers, he, with his inherent energy, perseverance, completed all the tasks assigned by the party, giving brilliant results with his versatile work, which should be noted as best, valuable, tireless worker, so necessary at the moment in Soviet construction ... "

The certificate was given in 1923, when Beria was already working in Georgia. Now it is impossible to say for sure - why did Beria, who works in Georgia, need a reference from Azerbaijan?

Perhaps Beria, trying to leave the Cheka to study, needed confirmation that he would be quite useful in party or Soviet work, which is why Akhundov's attestation does not contain a word about Beria the Chekist.

However, we also have an assessment of Beria by Kirov, who was then the secretary of the Central Committee in Baku: "... comrade. Beria is a good and energetic Chekist, he showed himself in the Chekist work on the good side "...

SO, Beria was escorted to a new job with honors. On the eve of the transfer, he was marked with a list of commendation by the Council of People's Commissars of the ASSR, local newspapers wrote about him. But this is in Baku, where young Beria managed to become the Chekist No. 2 of Azerbaijan.

In Tiflis, where he was to eventually become Chekist No. 1 of the entire Transcaucasus, even more intense and nervous work awaited him.

It has already been said in passing that Georgia was, perhaps, the most difficult republic for the Chekists in Transcaucasia, and if you think about it, even the entire USSR. To begin with, the Soviet power was finally established in Georgia in the very last place. The Azerbaijan SSR was formed on April 28, 1920, the Armenian SSR on November 29, 1920, and

Georgian SSR - only February 25, 1921.

At the same time, the Mensheviks were traditionally strong in Georgia - before the revolution and during the years of the civil war, there were much more of them in the republic than the Bolsheviks, and this was also a Georgian feature.

For example, the Azerbaijani nationalist Musavat (Equality) party originated in Baku in 1911 and its activity was naturally limited to the Caucasus.

The Armenian "Dashnaktsutyun" ("Union") was formed even earlier - in 1890, by the way - in Tiflis. By the way, in Tiflis even at the beginning of the 20th century there were more Armenians than Georgians. But the Dashnaks also limited their activities mainly to the Caucasian region.

That is, in Tver and Zhmerinka there were neither Musavatists nor Dashnaks, but the Mensheviks were an all-Russian party. And the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks Noi Zhordania and Akaki Tsereteli were also among the leaders of the all-Russian Menshevik wing of the RSDLP. Bolshevik Stalin in 1907 called them "our Caucasian clowns", which the same Zhordania ("comrade An"), of course, could not forgive him.

From 1918 to 1921, Zhordania headed the Menshevik government of Georgia, and now he was in exile and wished only one thing for Soviet Georgia - death, like his supporters in Georgia itself. They carried death: during the evacuation to Turkey, the supposedly "national" government of Georgia removed from Georgia the entire supply of quinine, then an indispensable remedy against malaria. And malaria was then the scourge of Georgians - it is enough to recall "Colchis" by Konstantin Paustovsky.

The emigrant ties of the Georgian Mensheviks, as parties with an all-Russian potential, were, of course, weighty and extensive. The Dashnaks in Transcaucasia were strong because there was a strong and influential Armenian diaspora in the world. The same international oil "king" Gulbenkian was, I remind you, an Armenian.

That is, the complexity of the situation in Georgia and the importance of Georgia, as well as Azerbaijan, were, not least, also in the problem of oil.

So in Georgia, Chekist Beria had enough to do.

SOME prepared conspiracies behind the cordon, others tried to implement out-of-the-cord directives in mutinies and uprisings, not neglecting either sabotage, or sabotage, or vulgar espionage in favor of the West.

Banditry of all sorts was developed. Beria immediately became actively involved in the fight against banditry, and in 1923, the first year of Lavrenty's work in the GruzChK, out of 31 gangs established by the Chekists on the territory of Georgia, 21 were destroyed. During the fighting, 123 bandits were killed, 377 were captured alive.

The Dashnaks, who at one time moved from already Soviet Armenia to still Menshevik Georgia, turned out to be a separate concern. Beria knew this public well from Baku and acted against them with knowledge of its weaknesses.

At the beginning of 1923, the main backbone of the Dashnak activists in Georgia, including the entire composition of the Tiflis Committee, was arrested. From the secret warehouse in Akhaltsikhe, 11 machine guns, 33 boxes of grenades, 70 rifles, 30 bags of artillery powder, 70 dynamite plates, 500 pounds of cartridges were seized ...

But the main pain was, of course, the Georgian counter-revolutionaries. Their mass base was quickly undermined by the actions of the Soviet government in favor of the working majority. From August 25 to August 30, 1923, a congress of Georgian Mensheviks was held in Tbilisi quite legally, the delegates of which represented 11,235 members of the party. The congress announced the liquidation of the party, but even before that, about 17 thousand workers and peasants left it.

The address of the congress said:

"Comparing the behavior of the Menshevik government in Georgia with the behavior of the Soviet government that succeeded it, we became convinced that the former was driving the proletariat under the yoke of the bourgeoisie, while the latter was leading it to a wide

road to socialism. Therefore, and only therefore, we decided to leave the ranks of the Menshevik Party.

Approximately 2,000 people remained on the side of the former Central Committee of the Mensheviks, mainly from noble and bourgeois circles. And abroad, a "Georgian government in exile" was formed, headed by Noah Zhordania, Noah Ramishvili and Irakli Tsereteli.

In Georgia, representatives of five parties that went underground - the Social Democrats (Mensheviks), Socialist-Federalists, Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries - concluded an ^{independent} agreement on the establishment of an "Independence Committee" - "parity" ... The "parities" were led by a member of the Central Committee of the Georgian Menshevik Party who arrived from behind the cordon, former Minister of Agriculture Noy Khomeriki. An uprising was being prepared in Georgia.

And here Beria carried out a brilliant operation, which became known as the "case parity."

In the person of the "Committee of Independence", Lavrenty had a serious opponent, but the committee members in the person of Beria also had in front of them far from a mouthpiece. In 1924, Khomeriki, members of the Menshevik Central Committee Chkhikishvili, Nodia ...

Chkhikishvili was found to have a letter from Noah Zhordania, who instructed the "fighters" as follows:

"Russian tsars fought Dagestan alone for more than 30 years. And it is easy to imagine how many years the Bolsheviks will need to fight not only with Dagestan, but with the whole of Transcaucasia. The transfer of a military base to the Caucasus Range and the strengthening of all our armed forces there is a guarantee of our victory. Only in this case will Europe pay serious attention to us and help".

On August 6, 1924, the GruzChK arrested the emissary of Zhordania - Valiko Dzhugeli, who was supposed to lead the direct preparations for the uprising.

By that time, the Georgian Chekists had detailed information about the activities of the "Independence Committee".

What would a careerist do if he had most of the threads of the conspiracy in his hands? The best way for a careerist to curry favor is to start arrests, regardless of the scale of losses, both others and their own. And the greater the losses, the more weight can be given to victory.

Beria behaved in exactly the opposite way. He let Dzhugeli make sure that the Cheka knew everything even without his confessions. And then Dzhugeli was asked to turn from prison to the leaders of the upcoming speech with a recommendation to abandon - as he was convinced - adventures.

Jugheli did just that - he did not want wasted blood.

But Beria did not want her either!

Dzhugeli's letter was published in Soviet Georgian newspapers, and this is what he wrote, among other things:

"I experienced for myself... the influence of the Cheka air, and I realized that the whole strength of this air lies in the fact that it is here that you get to know the reverse side of our work, with all its shadow sides."

Dzhugeli stated that it was not cowardice and cowardice that led him to give up the fight, but hopelessness of the conceived enterprise.

But after all, it was necessary to be able to prove this to Dzhugeli, to convince him. Beria managed this, and that was precisely what was in his style - to try to influence even the enemy by the power of persuasion and logic.

And only if the enemy did not break, he had to be destroyed.

A widespread uprising was thwarted, but on August 28, 1924, a group of Prince George Tsereteli captured Chiatura and formed the "Provisional Government of Georgia". There were minor performances in Senak, Seberinsky, Zugdidi, Dusheti districts, in Guria ...

By August 31, 1924, everything was completed with the support - in most places - the population itself. In Adjara, 1,500 peasants came to strengthen the protection of the border with Turkey.

On September 4, 1924, employees of the GruzChK tracked down and arrested the main composition of the "Parity Committee" headed by Prince Kote Andronikashvili.

The organizers of the uprising, among whom were 17 princes, were shot, but, as often happens, the elimination of the "head" of the conspiracy did not eliminate all its participants.

The struggle did not stop, it just changed. And its usually hidden now, from an outsider's view, the character only complicated the situation.

The establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus, despite the end of the civil war, was not easy. On March 12, 1922, at a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Transcaucasian Federation was established - a federative union of the three Soviet republics of Transcaucasia.

The idea of the Federation was the only reasonable one, and on December 13, 1922, at the 1st Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in Baku, the Federation was transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and on December 30, 1922, the ZSFSR merged with the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR and BSSR into a single union state - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In Transcaucasia, the restoration of the destroyed and the construction of a new one began. This economic construction had to be protected from sabotage and sabotage from outside and inside the country, but the calmer it became in Transcaucasia, the more difficult was the work to ensure this calmness.

In addition, another "invisible front" began to form - among the Caucasian Bolsheviks themselves. The idea of the Federation was opposed not only by bourgeois nationalists, but also by quite a few national Bolshevik leaders. Mdivani, Dumbadze, Kavtaradze, Okudzhava, Tsintsadze in Georgia, Akhundov, Huseynov, Khanbudagov in Azerbaijan believed that each republic should maintain its own army, have its own currency, enjoy freedom of foreign trade and enjoy party autonomy from the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Caucasian Bureau Central Committee.

In October 1922, the Mdivani group sent a direct wire to Moscow with a complaint against Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who was then secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b). At the same time, members of the Georgian Central Committee from the Mdivani group resigned "in protest". The so-called "Georgian question" arose.

On October 21, Lenin sent a cipher to Tiflis, where it was said:

"I was surprised by the indecent tone of the note over the direct wire signed by Tsintsadze and others, for some reason handed over to me by Bukharin (N-yes! - S.K.), and not by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee ... I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and insist on transferring your conflict in a decent and loyal tone to the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP ... ".

On November 25, the Politburo decided to send a commission from Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, headed by Dzerzhinsky, to Georgia to urgently work out measures "necessary to establish lasting peace in the Communist Party of Georgia."

Dzerzhinsky and Stalin worked in Tiflis for about two weeks (December 12, Felix Edmundovich reported to Lenin on the results of the trip), and the work proceeded rapidly. Let me remind you

that Ordzhonikidze slapped one of Mdivani's supporters. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky took this calmly, while Lenin was very indignant. But he was indignant all the same in vain - this company did not deserve anything else!

And just in November 1922, Beria arrives in Tiflis! He arrives in the midst of a fight (as we see - even in the literal sense of the word) between real Leninists and "Leninists" in quotation marks. And immediately takes the side of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze ...

One can imagine how much Lavrenty Beria immediately earned on this one not only enemies, but mortal enemies!

What is there! Mentioned in the cipher of Lenin, Tsintsadze was also an old Bolshevik, since 1904, under the tsar he worked with Mdivani in Kutais, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku. And after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, he became ... a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, a member of the Central Executive Committee of Georgia and ... chairman of the Cheka of the Georgian SSR.

That is, the Trotskyist Tsintsadze (in 1927 he was expelled from the party precisely for this) for some time was the direct superior of Beria!

I do not envy Beria - with his principles!

Almost all of the above "Bolsheviks" were repressed in 1938, and then, in the 1920s, their political degradation was just beginning. Nevertheless, for the Chekist Beria, this became another, and very delicate, concern. After all, a blow can now be expected not only from the "right", but also from the left, not only from below - from the underground, but also "from above" - from the leadership.

A bright nature, Beria always knew how to work efficiently, and such people make enemies automatically, regardless of whether they want to have them or not.

Gradually, Beria also made enemies, and they spoiled him a lot of blood alive, and after his death they tried with might and main to slander him, using the classic methods of slanderers: "I remember ...", "from the words of the name I became aware ...", etc. But documents, confirming lies and slander, cannot be brought - after all, only the truth can be documented!

Documents are genuine, of course, and not falsified - always and in everything - for Beria.

For example, the 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee Myasnikov (Myasnikyan), who died in 1925 in a plane crash, a very intelligent manager, managed to leave the following description:

"Beria is an intellectual. He declared himself in Baku as a capable security officer in the post of deputy chairman of the Cheka of Azerbaijan and head of the secret operational unit. Now the beginning SOC of the Georgian Cheka.

Then standardly smooth characteristics ("... a true party member, in connections discrediting him, was not noticed ...", etc.) were not in vogue. Then they wrote what was. So from the standpoint of that time, Myasnikov's assessment is worth a lot.

We also have at our disposal a much later characterization given to Beria by his former boss Pavlunovsky, a member of the party since 1905. But first, a little explanation.

Ivan Pavlunovsky (1888–1937) had an uneven fate and ended badly - being one of the closest employees of Ordzhonikidze in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, he contacted the Trotskyists and was shot in October 1937. He was guilty, but this is not the place to prove it. I'll just let you know that back in October 1933, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich: "The situation with artillery is very bad ... Pavlunovsky has confused and is ruining the business of artillery. Sergo (Ordzhonikidze. - S.K.) needs to be inflated because, having entrusted a big deal to two or three favorites, he is ready to sacrifice the interests of the state to these fools ... even elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

On September 7, 1926, by order of the OGPU No. 190, Pavlunovsky was approved

Chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR. And on June 25, 1937, apparently, at the request of Stalin, he wrote the following letter: (spelling and syntax preserved):

"To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin

About Comrade Beria

In 1926 (the original was a typo "In 1936." – S.K.) I was appointed in Transcaucasia the Chairman of the Zak GPU.

Before leaving for Tiflis, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the head of the OGPU, summoned me to his office and briefed me in detail on the situation in Transcaucasia. Comrade Dzerzhinsky immediately informed me that one of my assistants in the Transcaucasus, Comrade Beria, worked with the Mussovatists in the Mussovatist counter-intelligence. Let this circumstance in no way embarrass me or put me on guard against comrade Beria, since comrade Beria worked in counter-intelligence with the knowledge of the responsible comrades. Transcaucasians and what does he, comrade Dzerzhinsky and comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze, know about it.

Upon arrival in Tiflis ... I ... went to comrade Sergo (then the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee. - S.K.) ... T. Sergo Ordzhonikidze told me that indeed comrade Beria ... carried out this work on behalf of the party workers and what about this is well known to him, comrade Ordzhonikidze, comrade Kirov, comrade Mikoyan and comrade Nazaretyan. Therefore, I must treat Comrade Beria with full confidence, and that he ... completely trusts Comrade Beria.

During the two years of work in Transcaucasia, Comrade Ordzhonikidze told me several times that he highly appreciated Comrade Beria as a growing worker, that Comrade Beria would develop into a big worker and that he, Sergo, reported such a description of Comrade Beria, etc. Stalin.

<...>

About two years ago, Comrade Sergo once told me in a conversation, but you know that right-wing deviators and other riffraff are trying to use the fact that he worked in Mussovat counter-intelligence in the fight against Beria, but nothing will come of it .

I asked Comrade Sergo if Comrade Stalin knew about this. Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze replied that Comrade Stalin knew about this and that he, too, had spoken to Comrade Stalin about it.

Candidate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Pavlunovsky

June 25, 1937"

However, the riffraff - both right-wing and counter-revolutionary - acted against Beria not only with words. In the autumn of 1925, Beria, with a group of Chekists in two cars, was returning along the Georgian Military Highway to Tiflis. An ambush awaited them at the mountain pass.

Beria was driving the first car. One Chekist was killed, two were wounded. But Beria is not my assessment - "did not lose his presence of mind" and, shooting back, covered the rest.

What is there to complain about here? The hero did not abandon his wounded comrades, he covered them with fire. But the slanderer will always find where to bite ... And the well-known detractor of Stalin and Beria, Antonov-Ovseenko, Jr., later asked about this: "How did Beria survive if he was driving the first car, and even shot back?"

This "still shot back" is just great! According to Ovseenko, it turns out that if Beria did not shoot back, then he would have had more chances to survive! ..

From DECEMBER 1926, the activities of Chekist Beria began to cover the entire Transcaucasus - on December 2, 1926, he was appointed deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and deputy chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU, while also remaining head of the Secret Operations Department (SOU) of the OGPU Plenipotentiary in the ZSFSR.

In November 1928, Stanislav Redens (1892–1940), a party member since 1914, took over as chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU. He replaced Pavlunovsky.

Redens was married to Anna Alliluyeva, the sister of Stalin's wife, that is, he was Stalin's brother-in-law, but I do not advise drawing far-reaching conclusions here. Nepotism Stalin never

I didn't work out, and I didn't even attach my own sons and daughter to warm places.

The new chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU was an experienced security officer, but he did not know the specifics of the Caucasus, since he had previously worked in Ukraine, in the Crimea, in Moscow ... That is, with the formal championship and Redens, Beria remained the "workhorse" of the Transcaucasian GPU. And another question - who then led whom more often!

At the turn of the 20-30s, the Chekists had two constant headaches: sabotage in industry and economic counter-revolution, as well as problems collectivization.

This is not the place to prove much that conscious wrecking and sabotage were real and very essential features of economic life in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s... This plague was (more or less!) put an end to only by the beginning of the war, although it again began to strike our economic organism after the seizure of power by the Khrushchevites, who were increasingly manipulated by hidden agents of influence.

However, the latter is said so - by the way.

Bearing in mind the situation of the first five-year plans and knowing the archival documents now published, only notorious falsifiers of history can deny the phenomenon of sabotage, moreover, multifactorial.

Some of the old "specialists" and simply "formers", agents of the secret services of the West and spiteful fools, Trotskyists who went underground and "rightists", who were then enough in the management of the economy, tried to harm the new life and harmed ...

In 1928, the "Shakhty case" was uncovered - by no means invented by the OGPU, like the case of the "Industrial Party" in 1930. In 1929, the largest malfeasance of tax officials in Astrakhan was revealed - state losses were estimated at 10 million rubles ... There were enough other cases, including in Transcaucasia, but the "highlight of the program" here was, of course, sabotage in the oil industry. And the fight against him occupied a significant place in Beria's Chekist activities in the Transcaucasus.

Transcaucasia is Georgia, Armenia and...

And Azerbaijan... And what was Azerbaijan then - first of all - on the scale of the USSR?

Azerbaijan, as has been said more than once, is Baku's oil.

Here the enemy hit on oil.

In 1929, Beria begins an investigation into the case of sabotage and sabotage in the Azneft trust ...

The Azneft Trust is the State Association of the Azerbaijan Oil Industry, established on the basis of a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 10, 1924 and directly subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR.

Azneft included six fields, three groups of oil refineries, two power plants, a number of auxiliary enterprises, its own railways, rail, road and sea transport.

Before the revolution, all this was scattered among almost two hundred owners, and on May 28, 1920, it was nationalized. So there were enough people in Transcaucasia and outside of it who wanted to either "privatize" huge material values again, or, if they failed, at least play a dirty trick on "these Bolsheviks".

The maximum production level reached in the Baku region before the revolution was approximately 10 million tons per year. By the end of the 20s, Azneft again reached this level, but slowly and, so to speak, reluctantly ... The reasons were not so much technical as political. Working on the Azneft case, Beria wrote to Ordzhonikidze in Moscow on September 1, 1929:

"... тов. Redens recently returned from vacation, but I decided not to go on vacation yet, but to go to Baku. It is necessary to press hard on this oil business and not allow it to take on a protracted character, as was observed in relation to the "Shakhty case", etc. All the more so that Comrade. Soso (Stalin. - S.K.) in a conversation with Comrade. Redens...

expressed doubts whether we would be able to cope on our own ... I will stay there for a month, and if necessary, even longer, but I will finish the job and reveal all the threads of sabotage. We do not let go of the initiative of the case and we will not let go ... "

Someone might think that Beria went to Baku to break bones under investigation, but he went there to work vigorously. And everything turned out to be more complicated and confusing than he thought. Not a month, and not three, but eight months passed, but even on May 13, 1930, in a letter to Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Beria reported: "The investigation of sabotage in Azneft is advancing at an accelerated pace ...".

Saboteurs from Azneft got their way, and during the third five-year plan, oil production in the Baku region tripled compared to pre-revolutionary levels. But in all these "oil" and other similar cases, there was one more thing that is usually forgotten, but in vain ...

Beria managed to "clean up" the Transcaucasus so that during the war there were no problems in Baku, not only with oil production and the production of petroleum products. There was no serious sabotage, no serious sabotage. But without a stable supply of Baku oil to the country, there would be no counteroffensive near Moscow, no Stalingrad, no victory on the Kursk Bulge ...

For this alone - for the battle for military oil long before the war, Beria deserved from Russia, if not a gold, then a bronze monument - for sure!

ANOTHER painful problem was the reaction of the Caucasian peasantry to excesses in agriculture...

If we look into the future, when Georgia's agriculture acquired obvious all-Union importance after reorientation to citrus fruits, tea, valuable industrial crops, it becomes clear that the mood of the Georgian peasants mattered not only directly for the region.

Loyal, trusting the Soviet government, realizing the beneficialness of the collective farm system for it, the peasantry of Georgia in the future had a large all-Union meaning.

But so far it was far from that ... On August 17, 1931, Stalin in a letter to Kaganovich wrote:

"Now it is clear to me that Kartvelishvili (Secretary of the Zakkraykom. - S.K.) and Gruzdek's secretariat, with their reckless "grain procurement policy", brought a number of regions of Western Georgia to starvation ... Hundreds of people are being arrested, including party members who clearly sympathize with the disaffected and do not sympathize "politics" of the Georgian Central Committee. But arrests won't get you far..."

So, mass unrest was programmed by the "politics" of the Georgian "politicians", and the Chekists had to take the rap. Here is part of the note of the chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU S.F. Redens and head of the secret operations department L.P. Beria, sent on March 11, 1930 to the First Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G.G. Berry on a straight wire:

"Owls. secret

Moscow, OGPU - comrade. BERRY

As a result of the insufficient coverage of a huge number of newly created collective farms, the excesses made, intra-collective farm shortcomings and the general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak forces, mass anti-collective farm demonstrations that take on political overtones have intensified, a number of districts have been engulfed in ferment ... There is a rapid disintegration of collective farms, accompanied in a number of cases by the defeat of the Village Councils, beatings and the expulsion of party members and soviet activists. The demonstrations that have taken place have so far been liquidated by peaceful means and persuasion, and only in rare cases by a demonstration and an insignificant military force, the initiators and direct participants in the rout and

violence, with a few exceptions, was not arrested ..., all this was interpreted by the population as a sign of the weakness of the authorities and contributed to even greater insolence of those who spoke under the influence of anti-Soviet forces ... "

Gangs were again formed in mountainous Georgia. And Redens and Beria requested the Center's sanctions for more vigorous action - when a fire broke out, it had to be extinguished.

But it was the then political leadership of Georgia that kindled the fire... At the same time, it also stirred up internal squabbles - more on that later. Beria was tired of all this worse than a bitter radish - it was not for them to glue broken pots. And in the same letter to Ordzhonikidze dated May 13, 1930 year he writes:

"Dear Sergo, more than once I have raised the question of my studies before you. Time passes, people around grow, develop, and those who were far from me yesterday, today have gone ahead. I know that I am way behind. Indeed, with our Chekist work, we often do not even have time to read a newspaper, let alone engage in self-education ...

Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to bring up the subject of education. But what to do ... I feel that I can no longer ... "

Perhaps when he wrote these lines, Beria was also thinking about a blonde with blue eyes - Nino's wife, who graduated from the economics department of the university, was preparing a dissertation. All this was as far away from him in 1930 as it was in 1922, in 1923...

Beria then went to the thirty-second year, he was the chairman of the GPU of Georgia and the deputy chairman of the GPU of the Transcaucasian SFSR. And, even occupying such positions, he wanted to learn.

Although it is possible that now, if he had the opportunity to choose the profile of education, he would choose not the Faculty of Architecture, but, say, the Industrial Academy, which trains cadres of economic managers.

After all, Beria always had the makings of a brilliant leader and a major organizer. And before his arrival in Georgia, and after his departure to Moscow, in all the posts he held, he showed obvious competence and even super-competence.

There were also such lines in the May letter:

"I have carefully considered everything. My departure at work will not be reflected. The apparatus of the Georgian [Indian] GPU is organized and works so well that any comrade who heads it after me will cope with the situation.

The apparatus of the Azerbaijani [Erbaian] GPU in the center is also well established. The apparatus of the Armenian [Janian] GPU is now also being strengthened. Tov. Redens is already sufficiently oriented in our environment and can freely cope with his work ... "

And here is another passage from that long May letter:

"I think that my departure from the Transcaucasus will even serve the best. After all, during ten years of work in the organs of the GPU in the conditions of the Transcaucasus, I had enough of an eyesore not only to all anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements, but also to some of our comrades. How many people will downright welcome my departure, so I have become boring to them with my constant awakening and revealing the existing shortcomings. They wanted everything to be covered, but here, if you please rejoice, there are shortcomings and blunders all around ...

I feel like I'm definitely tired of everyone. They are already working on it, but I don't know what will happen next. All the stories that have ever been in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus in general are beginning to be associated with me ... In the minds of many comrades, I am the root cause of all the troubles that have befallen comrades in recent times, and appear almost as an informer.

Is it possible to work in such conditions and will there be any benefit from this work? I think not..."

Well, a comprehensive assessment of the situation and leadership "on the ground" was part of the direct official duties of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU of Transcaucasia. The Chekists very quickly began to play the role of an objective "sovereign's eye" in the system of Soviet power. And Lavrenty Beria never neglected his duties.

And he didn't let others do it either.

They are not liked either in the "smoking rooms", and even more so in most bosses' offices. It happens differently only when the owner of the office himself is an active leader, whose main "hobby" is his business, which takes up twenty-four hours a day, and not the prescribed "attendance" hours.

A strong leader and a team selects on his own - a strong one. Stalin was phenomenally strong, so could he - sooner or later - not take the hard-working clever Beria into his personal team?

Bearing in mind the letter dated May 13, 1930, I will draw the reader's attention to one of its characteristic features: Beria does not specifically try to blame anyone, although objectively there were enough reasons for this, and Beria's transition to the offensive would receive Moscow's support ...

But, no, Beria only "urgently" asks to take him from the Transcaucasus, and "if it's impossible to send him to study, then at least transfer him to another job in some of the regions of the USSR" ...

It also characterizes the person.

And characterizes, as in my opinion, with dignity.

In MAY 1931, Redens was transferred to Belarus - the chairman of the GPU of the BSSR, and the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU of the USSR in the ZSFSR - the thirty-two-year-old Lavrenty Beria was appointed chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU.

From April 1931 to December 1931, Beria served as plenipotentiary. On August 5, 1931, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved him as a member of the collegium of the OGPU. Even before that, on March 30, 1931, the order of the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky No. 154/93 was issued:

"March 30, 1931

Secret

Gor. Moscow

March 21 marked the 10th anniversary of the existence and heroic struggle of the organs of the GPU of Georgia...

The work of the GPU of Georgia was difficult, many glorious fighters fell out of action, but the achievements are enormous: the Menshevik Party of Georgia, one of the most powerful and organized anti-Soviet parties in the USSR, was crushed, dozens of members of its Central Committee, hundreds of local committees, thousands of active members were seized; lines of communication were smashed, and as a result, the 80,000-strong Menshevik Party, which had the support of the interventionists and the entire 2nd International, was reduced to the position of a miserable group of counter-revolutionaries exposed to the working masses.

Also, major anti-Soviet
bourgeois parties of national democrats and socialist-federalists.
Defeated banditry ... "

But who, **permanently** working in Georgia and Transcaucasia, ensured this in the first place? Well, on this score, the order was expressed quite clearly:

"The Board of the OGPU notes with particular satisfaction that all this huge hard work has been done mainly by our national cadres,

grown, educated and tempered in the fire of combat work, under the permanent leadership of Comrade. Beria - who managed with exceptional instinct, always to clearly orient himself and, in the most difficult circumstances, politically correctly solving the tasks set ... at the same time, infect employees with personal example and, passing them his organizational and operational skills, educate them in unconditional devotion to the Communist Party and its Central Committee...

Chairman of the OGPU V. Menzhinsky "

Of course it was a confession. Clear, recorded in the lines of an official document, the recognition of Beria's first major victory, his recognition as Chekist of Transcaucasia No. 1.

None of the major Chekists who worked in the Transcaucasus, both those who were repressed later and who continued to work after 1938, neither possessed the potential of Beria, nor "in fact" did as much as Beria in all areas of Chekist work.

At the same time, Beria, working not in the Center, but in the region, was able to train personnel in his Caucasus of such a level that, after being appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he could without hesitation take more than a dozen people with him, not just for his own convenience, but because they fully met the requirements of the central apparatus.

Together with Beria, they brilliantly carried out the reform of the NKVD, but this will be said in due time and in its place ... And in the early 30s, Beria's Chekist activities were soon to end.

And it turned out like this...

IN THE SUMMER of 1931, Stalin went on vacation. In fact, this meant just a gentle mode of operation in comfortable climatic conditions - nothing more. But now he was closer to the Georgian problems, and he, among other things, dealt with them closely.

And immediately discovered a real political barn, the Augean stables. Above, I quoted Stalin's letter to Kaganovich dated August 17, 1931, where Stalin was indignant at the "politics" of the Georgian "politicians" depriving Georgia of bread, and demanded that Mikoyan be obliged to "increase the supply of grain to Western Georgia." But everything rested on the lack of warehouses necessary for storing grain, which should have been built, but were not built.

On August 19, Stalin sent another large encrypted message to Kaganovich. ended she is as follows:

"Fourth. I propose to place the whole business of building new grain warehouses for tea growers and tobacco growers in western Georgia under the control of the RKI (People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. - S.K.) , send people to the places, involve the Zakchek (Transcaucasian GPU. - S.K.) , in particular Beria, and ensure that all new warehouses are built and put into operation no later than the beginning of November.

On August 20, the Politburo considered Stalin's telegram and instructed the chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU, L.P. Beria "organize maximum assistance to the construction of new warehouses so that all new warehouses are built and put into operation no later than November 5."

The work began, but the Georgian "politicians", led by the then 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee Lavrenty Kartvelishvili (1890–1938), a member of the party since 1910, became alarmed and reached out to Stalin - since Stalin has arrived, then let him judge us.

Stalin reasoned. On August 26, 1931, he wrote to Kaganovich:

"Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!

I am writing about Transcaucasian affairs. The other day I was visited by members of the Regional Committee, secretaries of the Central Committee of Georgia, some workers of Azerbaijan (including Polonsky). Their squabble is incredible, and apparently it will not end soon...

I reconciled them somehow, and the matter has been settled for the time being, but not for long. Almost everyone lies and cunning, starting with Kartvelishvili. Beria, Polonsky (1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. - S.K.), Orakhelashvili (then - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the ZSFSR. - S.K.) *do not lie*. But on the other hand, Polonsky admits a number of tactlessness and mistakes. The most unpleasant impression is made by Mamulia (Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia) ... The pre-SNK of Georgia Sukhishvili, a hopeless dunce, makes a comical impression ...

If you do not intervene in the case, these people can foolishly ruin the case. They have already ruined business with the peasantry in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Without serious intervention by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Kartvelishvili and the Zakkraykom in general are powerless to improve things, if we assume that they want to improve things.

How to be?

The question "How to be?" was, however, rhetorical, that is, not requiring an answer, because further Stalin himself answered him:

"Necessary:

- 1) Appoint ... at the end of September (for my arrival) a report to the Organizing Bureau of the Zakkraykom, Gruzdek and the AzCC on the state of affairs;
- 2) Clean them thoroughly at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau and remove a number of people like Mamulia;
- 3) Appoint the third secretary of the Zakkraykom (I suggest Meyerzon, giving him the appropriate order ...)
- 4) Etc. like that.

Without such measures, the business in Transcaucasia will rot.

I. Stalin

26/ VIII-31"

Beria was then already in Stalin's field of vision, and Stalin already appreciated him - otherwise he would not have instructed the Chekist Beria to build grain warehouses. But, as we see, back in the summer of 1931, Stalin did not see the need to transfer Beria to party work.

In September 1931, the main change in the Transcaucasus was expressed in the replacement of Mamulia as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia by Lavrenty Kartvelishvili, who still remained the 1st Secretary of the Zakkraykom ...

But in October, Stalin returned to Moscow and took up Caucasian affairs there. On October 19, a meeting of the Orgburo was held with a hearing of the "Caucasians", and on October 31, the Politburo adopted a number of personnel decisions on the Transcaucasus.

The first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Transcaucasia M.P. Orakhelashvili (he was already in 1926-1929), the third secretary - V.I. Polonsky.

But the Chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia L.P. was appointed the second secretary. Beria. He he also became concurrently the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia.

WE WILL NOT speculate - why, for example, in October, Stalin, who had not considered Beria as the head of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Meyerzon, suddenly stopped at Beria in October?

Yes, and with such a sharp increase!

It must be assumed that Stalin had reasons for such a choice, and good ones. He thought a lot about the situation in the Caucasus, after sending a letter dated August 26, he stayed there for more than a month. That is, Stalin had time to clarify and correct his opinion.

So he corrected it.

The next year, Stalin went on vacation unexpectedly early - on June 1, and was absent from Moscow for almost three months - until August 27, 1932. It is possible that the reason for the early departure to the south was some kind of illness that took Stalin in the spring. Then rumors spread, including abroad, that Stalin was bad ...

On March 25, 1932, a representative of the Associated Press telegraph agency turned to Stalin with the question of whether the rumors circulating in the foreign press were true that the well-known Berlin doctor Tsondek was invited to Moscow to treat Stalin.

On April 3, Pravda published Stalin's reply:

"Mr Richardson.

This is not the first time false rumors about my illness have been spread in the bourgeois press. There are obviously people who are interested in me getting seriously ill for a long time, if not worse. Perhaps this is not entirely delicate, but, unfortunately, I do not have data that can please these gentlemen. Sad as it may seem, but nothing can be done against the facts: I am quite healthy. As for Mr. Tsondek, he can take care of the health of other comrades, for which he was invited to the USSR.

I. Stalin»

But something, perhaps, was - perhaps even an attempt at poisoning. From the beginning of 1932, Stalin worked in the Kremlin almost daily, sometimes making gaps in reception for two or three days, but from March 19 he did not receive anyone in the Kremlin until March 25 - the break was as much as five days! Yes, and on the 25th he received for 25 minutes one Primakov, the North-Western Military District, and on the 26th for only 12 minutes - Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Yenukidze.

And just on March 25, Richardson turned to Stalin with a question ... That is, there is something dark in this episode ... After all, there were, there were people both in the West and in the USSR who were interested in Stalin getting sick "seriously and for a long time, if not worse" ...

But the "trick" failed, which is why, perhaps, in Stalin's answer, a cheerful anger - you're lying, they say, you won't take it!

One way or another, already in June, Stalin left for the Caucasus, although from the very first day of his "vacation" he worked every day - this is proved by his almost daily correspondence with Moscow ... Moreover, he ended his first letter to Kaganovich like this: "Well, that's all for now . *I am well. Hello! I. Stalin.*

Since the mountain eagle of the Caucasus has again found itself in the Caucasus, there is no escape from Caucasian affairs and no fly away. And on June 20, 1932, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich, Postyshev and Ordzhonikidze:

"Well, dear friends, squabble again. I am talking about Beria and Orakhelashvili, attaching two letters to Orakhelashvili: one addressed to me, the other addressed to Ordzhonikidze.

My opinion: for all the angularity in the "actions" of Beria, Orakhelashvili is still wrong in this matter. Orakhelashvili's request must be denied...he can appeal to the Zakkraykom, and finally to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And there is no need for him to leave. I'm afraid that Orakhelashvili's self-esteem is in the foreground (they pecked at "his" people), and not the interests of the cause and positive work ... "

So far, Stalin is not inclined to replace Orakhelashvili and ends the letter of June 20 in words:

"Everyone says that positive work is going well in Georgia, the mood of the peasants has become good. And ***this is the main thing*** at work.

Hello. I. Stalin.

Who was right in the conflict that arose - the old (since 1903) Bolshevik

Orakhelashvili, a fifty-year-old party intellectual who graduated from the Military Medical Academy in 1908, in 1921 - the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, or "this" Beria with his party experience "only" since 1917?

Well, let's think...

After all, it was not for nothing that Stalin noted that the right line for a Bolshevik is to sort out a business conflict (if it is really business-like) in the party committee, collectively. And Orakhelashvili rushed to complain to Sergo and Kobe ...

The "conflict" was more than dubious! Orakhelashvili's wife, 45-year-old beauty Maria Orakhelashvili, also an old (since 1903) Bolshevik, after the "renaissance" of her husband, who became the first person in Transcaucasia for the second time, was appointed People's Commissar of Education of Georgia. And on June 10, 1932, she received a reprimand at the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and was relieved of her post ...

For what?

And for "spreading false rumors and trying to oppose the Central Committee of Georgia to the Zakkraykom and discredit individual leaders of the Central Committee and the Tiflis Committee (in particular, Comrade Beria)".

Yes, many in Georgia liked Beria's new incarnation as a party leader even less than his former Chekist incarnation. In Georgia, they are used to working neither shaky nor roll, but here - on you, at the head of Georgia - a bunch of energy.

Beria was tired of the fuss around him for a long time, and he appealed to the Central Committee - in the party order.

And the Orakhelashvilis secretly ran to their old leading comrades in parties - in a personal and quarrelsome way.

So who was right here?

Kaganovich, having familiarized himself in Moscow with the essence of the claims and complaints of the Orakhelashvili couple, communicated his opinion to Stalin in an extensive letter dated June 23, 1932, concerning many issues:

"... 11) A new squabble really ignites in Transcaucasia. You are certainly right that a healthy start, especially in business terms, is on the side of Beria, Orakhelashvili reflects the aching, non-business circles of the asset ...".

"WHINING" leading circles were against Beria. Business circles were already entirely for Beria.

Normal people don't want to quarrel and don't be clever, don't tear their noses, don't beat the bucks...

They want to work!

It didn't go well with normal work in Georgia for many years, and then he stood at the head of the business an intelligent person, and it turned out that the affairs of the solar republic are not so bad!

However, an asset is an asset, and the old Bolsheviks are old Bolsheviks ... At an asset - energy, but the patriarchs have merit.

And Maria Platonovna Orakhelashvili also has a "rare beauty" ...

For both Orakhelashvili, ambitions and antipathies were important, for Beria - as Kaganovich accurately caught it - the business side. Ultimately, it was a conflict between the growing competence of Beria and the waning competence of Orakhelashvili.

And to be absolutely precise - between the young and old party members of Georgia.

Bursting with self-conceit and ambitions, Mdivani, Orakhelashvili, Eliava and the Okudzhav brothers brewed conflicts, and Beria had to take "prompt" actions to eliminate them.

I'll be Mdivani, Mamia and Maria Orakhelashvili and others like them all did not let up, quarreled, bred nepotism and mutual responsibility, "dripped" on the brains, itched ... And Beria was a solid Bolshevik-Stalinist. And already in the twenties did not suit many even in the supposedly Bolshevik Caucasian camp.

In one of the two "Letters from the Caucasus" written in 1910 - the letter "Tiflis"

Stalin noted the "special inclination" of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussions. He explained this by the fact that in Tiflis they had to wage an especially stubborn ideological struggle against the Mensheviks. However, it is not for nothing that they say that you sow a habit, you reap a character, and you sow a character - reap your fate...

The habit of verbal battles before the revolution led the Georgian party, state and economic leadership of the 1920s to excessive chatter instead of concrete deeds. That is, just to what Beria could not and did not tolerate.

On July 13, 1932, Beria informed Kaganovich: "I was twice with Comrade Koba and had the opportunity to inform him in detail about our affairs."

And on August 12, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich:

"... Beria makes a good impression. A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker. Looking closely at the Transcaucasian affairs, I am more and more convinced that in the matter of selecting people, Sergo (Ordzhonikidze. - S.K.) - incorrigible head. Sergo defended Mamulia's candidacy for the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, but now it is obvious (even for the blind) that Mamulia is not worth Beria's left foot.

The very logic of the situation pushed Stalin to the need to release Orakhelashvili from the position of the first secretary of the Zakkraykom...

Who will replace him?

Stalin reflects and continues:

"Although Beria is not a member (and not even a candidate) of the Central Committee (meaning the allied Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. - S.K.), he will still have to be nominated for the post of first secretary of the Zakkraykom, Polonsky (his candidacy) is not suitable, so how he doesn't speak any of the local languages"...

In mid-August 1932, Beria arrived in Moscow. He put before the Politburo several issues, and they were to be discussed at the next meeting on August 16.

The meeting took place, and on the same day Kaganovich notified Stalin:

"Beria was with me. Indeed, he makes a very good impression of a major worker. We discussed a number of his questions today at the PB... We will give them buses at the expense of Moscow..."

So, the "cold intriguer" Beria came to Moscow not to squabble - as Maria Orakhelashvili came there, but to intercede for the republic. Moreover, he substantiated all requests - otherwise no one would satisfy them.

Beria managed, as we see, even from Moscow to "chop off" something and received 10 buses, 10 Ford cars and 8 trucks that had previously been allocated to the capital.

Formally, Orakhelashvili was still at the head of Transcaucasia, but in fact people went to Beria, and in addition to the problems of Georgia, the problems of the entire Transcaucasia were already falling on him.

And he solved them.

And these were more and more problems integrated into the problems and plans of a large, huge country - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Chapter 2

1932–1938 Creator of new Georgia: integration with a big country

Indeed, without exaggeration, BERIA can be called the creator of the new Georgia. However, the novelty here was not only that under Beria, Georgia quickly changed. It was also important that the new Georgia from the backyard of the empire became

a strategic region, entered the all-Union economy and life as a bright and necessary element - I already said a little about this earlier.

The brilliant work on the socialist reconstruction of Transcaucasia and Georgia, on the creation of a new Georgia as the most important part of the USSR, became the second major victory of Lavrenty Beria.

Today it is forgotten, or rather, hushed up, but Georgia in the early 30s was completely not the same Georgia that it had become by the end of the 1930s.

In 1934, the wonderful Russian writer Konstantin Paustovsky wrote the story "Colchis", where one of its characters, the old man Pakhomov, says:

"Colchis has the climate of South Japan and Sumatra, an abundance of heat, and meanwhile it is a malarial desert in the full sense of the word. Something like tropical penal servitude ... If not for the swamps, then we would block Java and Ceylon with their splendor and wealth "...

The plot of Paustovsky's book is built around the struggle to drain the swamps in the basin of the Rioni River, which flows to the sea along the Colchis Lowland. At the end, engineer Kahiani makes a speech. In response to his question - who had malaria? only a small boy with a red tie did not raise his hand ... Therefore, Kahiani had every reason to declare:

"But the value of our work lies not only in the fact that we are draining swamps and creating new land, that we are destroying the old swamp vegetation at the root ... and planting a new one. This is not the only point of our work, comrades. It is also in the fact that we are creating a young, healthy generation"...

It was in this - in the destruction of the rotten old and the planting of a healthy new in all spheres of life in Transcaucasia - that the essence of the activity of Lavrenty Beria and the "team" he selected was ...

This was the essence of everything that happened throughout Russia from the beginning of the 1920s, after the end of the civil war.

The material side of life was then dilapidated, the country, and before that for the most part not rich, became generally impoverished.

But the moral side of life every year became more and more rich, rich, optimistic and active. A new attitude to life was in full swing - not passive, submissive, but active, innovative, transforming ...

Why did the bourgeois liberal-Westerner Noah Zhordania need Georgian lemons, tangerines, Georgian tea? He could easily order lemons from Italy, tangerines from Morocco, and tea from India ...

Imagine Tiflis as a major mathematical center, for example, the center of Zhordania and other Georgian Mensheviks could not even in their wildest dreams.

And did they have dreams? Not idle and empty dreams, but realistic, expressing a real social perspective!

Of course, all sorts of jordani and tsereteli had none of this.

And the "old party members", mired in ambitions and squabbles, were no longer capable of business, so to speak, romance.

And Beria himself was capable and could appreciate and direct dreams and impulses of others...

In 1934, a special issue of the Ogonyok magazine was published under the title "Soviet Subtropics". It talked a lot about the creation of "Soviet Florida", there were calls to catch up and overtake California.

There was also a large photo of Lavrenty Beria - in the essay by Yefim Zozulya "Subtropical People". And here is what Zozulya wrote about Beria:

"He has solid, military skills at work. Huge experience. In his face, attention is drawn to the expression of will, combined with a special acute thoughtfulness. He tells us about the subtropics. He says with great enthusiasm: "Yes, this region will be one of the best in the country!"...

It is characteristic and significant that in these words - the whole of Beria. Indeed, speaking of the Georgian subtropics as a region that would be the best in the country, by "country" Beria meant precisely a large country - the entire USSR! He worked, creating not "Georgian Florida", but "**Soviet** Florida".

In the same spirit, he educated others, overcoming localism, national prejudices and prejudices. Day after day, then one, then another, he integrated Georgia into the flow of all-Union work.

And so it happened - in the new Georgia, in which Beria became the true and largest reformer in the entire, if you think about it, the history of Georgia. And, in any case, he became its most successful reformer.

Successful, because Beria, as a Bolshevik and ally of Stalin, made the basis of all successes cadres, new people working for society, primarily because to do this - damn interesting!

When Beria stood at the head of Transcaucasia, the true anthem of socialism had not yet been written - the "March of Enthusiasts" by D'Actil and Dunayevsky, but those who would soon sing this were already growing up:

In the everyday life of great construction projects,
In a cheerful roar, in fires and ringing,
Hello land of heroes
The country of dreamers, the country of scientists!..

And this:

Should we stand still?
In our daring, we are always right ...

And this:

Our world has been created for glory.
Over the years, the deeds of centuries have been done.
We take happiness by right
And we love it hot, and we sing like children.

And our scarlet stars
Unprecedented sparkle
Over all countries
Over the oceans a dream come true.

We have no barriers either at sea or on land,
We are not afraid of ice or clouds,
Flame of your soul
banner of his country
We will carry through worlds and centuries!

Pomp, pomposity, false pathos - this was not Beria's style. He was a realist.

Sometimes - in his mature years - an ironic realist ...

However, the price of romance and high feeling - as factors in ensuring the success **of the business** Lavrenty Pavlovich knew.

He convinced a simple Georgian peasant with hardened hands, first of all, by practical calculation of profitability, high profitability, for example, citrus growing or

tea growing instead of growing corn.

But he aimed the son of this peasant no longer at profit, but at **a dream** - as the main stimulus and nerve of life. And he gave a real basis to this dream - first of all, in the form of an increasingly powerful higher education in Georgia ...

I will say more about this!

Orakhelashvili still remained the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), that is, the governing body for all of Transcaucasia. But in Georgia, everything healthy and active was limited to the second secretary of the Zakkraykom and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria.

HOWEVER, he also tackled the Transcaucasian problems in general, all the more so since many of these problems were all-Union.

Especially, as before, Baku oil.

In August 1932, immediately after returning from Moscow, Beria began to "embroider" one of the most important "bottlenecks" in the Transcaucasus - the problem of increasing oil production. He studies the state of affairs and appeals to the center with a request to improve the technical supply of oil fields, to supply additional pipes and transport ...

Beria never separated the purely industrial sphere from the social one - this has always been his style. Therefore, he asks Moscow not only for pipes, but also for additional food supplies, including 67 tons of cheese and 370 tons of confectionery, as well as 65 tons of linen soap, 545 thousand meters of cotton fabrics and "various manufactured goods" for 2 million rubles.

In addition, he proposes to equate oil workers in supply with Moscow and Leningrad.

On August 26, Kaganovich and Molotov sent a cipher to Stalin with a proposal to satisfy these requests, but to put forward a counter request: not only to fulfill the 500 thousand tons oil production program given "from above" before the navigation was closed, but also to overfulfill it.

The draft telegram ended like this: "Grozny will let you down this year, we need to put pressure on Azneft with all our might."

Stalin in the upper left corner of the encryption imposed a resolution:

"Although you are overfeeding Azneft according to the "requirements" of all kinds of grabbers, I think that the telegram can still be accepted. I.St.

So, Stalin already enrolled Beria in the number of "grabbers", but he grumbled for the sake of formality, but in fact he already saw - this "grabber" can be given. Firstly, he does not try for himself, but for the cause and for the people doing this business ... And secondly, this "grabber" is not a talker. And if you give him what you need, as a result you will get what you demand from him!

And here is another "oil" story...

In October 1933, Beria personally gave Stalin several memos with proposals for the development of the oil industry in Azerbaijan, and on October 21, 1933, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich:

"The situation with Baku oil is bad. This year we mine 15 mil. tons of oil. In the future, it is necessary to extract 21-22 mil. tons. To do this, it is necessary to inflate **exploration**, strengthen **the current drilling** in already explored areas, strengthen the "caspar" (Caspian Shipping Company. - S.K.), urgently build tanks in Makhach-Kala and Krasnovodsk, etc. If all this is not done by the deadline (i.e., during the winter with the start of work **immediately**), the business will be ruined. Despite this, the Oil Directorate is asleep, and Sergo gets off with pious promises ... It will be a shame for us if we fail to force the NKTyazh (People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. - S.K.) to *get down to business immediately* ... I am sending you

appropriate will explain. Beria's notes. I consider them correct, with the exception of the note about the Makhach-Kala-Stalingrad kerosene pipeline. Get to know them and act decisively..."

Beria proposed to include in the 1934 plan:

- construction of crackers and plants for primary oil refining;
- construction of a kerosene pipeline Makhachkala - Stalingrad;
- expansion of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline;
- carrying out exploration work on new areas in Azerbaijan;
- construction of new vessels for the Caspian Shipping Company.

Here everything was considered as it should be - in a complex. And this was also the style of Beria. In fact, for the first time at the head of Transcaucasia, in a later language, was not a pure politician, but a technocrat, moreover, a technocrat of a new, socialist type, a technocrat-politician.

That is, a statesman who is able to understand special problems, but works to develop a meaningful and prosperous life for the masses. A figure who does not divide life into "production" and "social and cultural life", but sees their unity.

Half a century and even more have passed since the events described... On July 25, 1991, at the age of 97, one of the creators of that era, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, died at his desk. He died while continuing his Memoirs, begun in the 1960s...

About Beria in that part of the "notes" that was published in the "damned nineties", it was said in two words, but they are worth citing ... In the second half of 1937, Kaganovich was appointed People's Commissar of Heavy Industry - one of the then key government posts ... Among the concerns of the new People's Commissar was also oil - and the concept of "Soviet oil" was then almost synonymous with the concept of "Baku oil". And so, recalling the work of those years, Kaganovich wrote:

"I must also emphasize the great assistance provided by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the Transcaucasian regional committee of the party (in particular, Bagirov and Beria), who then actively joined in the rise of the Baku oil industry ..."

In fact, Beria and Bagirov were actively involved in the rise of the Baku oil industry not then, but ten years earlier, but even such restrained praise from Kaganovich *after everything* that happened is worth a lot.

There are many examples of Beria's activities on the scale of the entire Transcaucasus, but then I will focus on Georgia - here the multifaceted talent and essence of Beria manifested itself most clearly.

Here's an interesting moment...

Quoting above Kaganovich's letter to Stalin dated August 16, 1932 - the place where Kaganovich writes about Beria's visit, about the allocation of buses to Georgia at the expense of Moscow, I deliberately released the following phrase: "In particular, they removed another 300 tons from Georgia. of bread..."

The fact is that Beria, being so far the second person in Transcaucasia after Orakhelashvili, but already the first in Georgia, managed to be noted by the fact that with his power he "lowered" the grain procurement plan reduced by 430 thousand pounds (about 7 thousand tons) to the regions of Georgia .

In general, for the ZSFSR, the plan was also reduced by a decree of the Zakkraykom from 4 million poods to 2.5 million poods. On July 23, 1932, the Politburo canceled the decision of the Zakkraykom on the entire Transcaucasus, but did not cancel the reduction of the plan for Georgia, although it assessed Beria's actions as "arbitrary".

Moreover, after Beria visited Kaganovich in mid-August and reported on the reasons for the reduction in the grain procurement plan, he asked for a seed loan, the Politburo, as

we see, it found it possible to reduce Georgia's plan even more.

Judging by this decision, even then Beria was going to drastically re-profile Georgian agriculture for subtropical crops, and in this case, was it worth losing the support of the Georgian peasantry and demanding from him increased supplies of grain - in terms of their volume on the scale of the USSR, pennies ...

Moscow agreed with him.

And Beria saw many other changes in the near future, which he was ready and able to initiate and carry out.

Looking ahead, I will say that everything worked out for him.

Well, maybe not everything - it does not happen in life, but a lot - yes, it has been done.

In just under six years!

On OCTOBER 9, 1932, the Politburo granted the request of Mamia Orakhelashvili to release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Zakkraykom and appointed Beria as the first secretary, leaving him as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. And soon Beria became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b).

He headed Transcaucasia on the eve of the second five-year plan. And this was a mutual success both for Beria and for Transcaucasia. Beria received the opportunity for ever wider activities, and the Transcaucasus received an active leader capable of solving the upcoming grandiose tasks.

Beria reached the age of Christ and managed a lot in his thirty-three years. But even more he had to do - together with the country.

Comparing Stalin's USSR with an airplane, one can say, perhaps, like this ...

The two wings are industry and agriculture. The motor is a science, and the rudders and elevators are the mood of the masses, their readiness to respond to the control actions of the pilots in the cockpit.

If it fails, some structural element of the aircraft does not work, normal flight is impossible. But in Stalin's USSR, the "plane" flew more and more confidently forward and upward with increasing speed.

The same thing happened with the "plane" of the new Georgia, when Lavrenty Beria sat at the helm. And let's not forget - a stable social situation in Georgia in the future was created by the efforts of Beria as chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU. The secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Georgian Central Committee knew all the "sick" problems of Transcaucasia and Georgia professionally - as a Chekist. This is also why he acted so successfully and unerringly when he became the party leader of the most important region.

By the way, the comparison of Georgia with an airplane is not so far-fetched - through the efforts of Beria in the second half of the 30s, an aviation (!) industry was created in Georgia, and the Tbilisi Aviation Plant mastered the production of fighters even before the war.

How it was useful to the whole country during the war!

Under Beria, production of electricity, the "bread" of industry, immediately began to grow in Georgia. The very same republican industry - with the exception of that part of it, which objectively had regional significance, Beria built as part of the all-Union, integrated into the economy of the entire USSR.

This was genuine proletarian internationalism - not chatter from the stands, but business merging of all union republics into a single economic organism.

On February 4, 1932, the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks finished its work. The congress approved the all-Union directives for the new five-year plan for 1932-1937.

Beria at the XVII Congress was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). And in March 1932, the joint plenum of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the main directions of the five-year plan for the development of the Transcaucasian Federation. The volume of industrial production in Georgia was to increase by more than five times, the production of ferroalloys - by seven times

half times, coal mining - twelve times ...

These were already signs of a new, only emerging Georgia, Beria.
And that was just the beginning...

So, in October 1933, Beria handed over to Stalin, in addition to notes on oil, another memo. And Stalin wrote to Kaganovich:

"I am sending you information from Beria about rare metals in Georgia. This matter must also be moved forward."

Beria's "rare-earth" note spoke of Chiatura manganese, polymetallic molybdenum and lead-zinc deposits, and production
aluminum oxide.

And it's clear, dear reader, that Beria was neither a geologist, nor an oilman, nor a metallurgist ... He did not put forward the idea of new geological exploration ... He did not assess the need for a new oil pipeline or the prospects of polymetallic deposits ...

But if earlier the ideas of specialists were deadened by the incompetence of the same Mamiya Orakhelashvili, now they came to life with the competent support of Beria.

And not only support should be discussed here! Beria was able to put forward himself
strong ideas...

And put forward.

Moreover, he not only put forward, supported, but also turned into a deed, into a material result.

The reserves of manganese ores in Georgia are of world importance. Manganese was mined at the Chiatura mines under the tsar... And under Orakhelashvili... But the scale, volume of production, its methods - everything now changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. And how much this manganese was needed in Zaporozhye, in Magnitogorsk, in Mariupol ...

Previously, with the same polymetals, things were stalled. And now moved from the dead points. This, too, was Beria's Georgia's contribution to the growing power of the entire Soviet Union.

Mechanical engineering was developing - of union significance, silk production was developing with silk-winding and silk-weaving factories, headed by the Kutaisi silk factory named after Bakradze.

In 1932, 200 thousand pairs of shoes were produced in Georgia, and in 1939 only the Tbilisi Shoe Factory named after L.P. Beria produced 6 million pairs of shoes a year. Not only good shoes and boots were sewn for Georgians - Georgian shoes were worn in various cities and villages of the entire Union ...

The drainage of the malarial swamps of Colchis has already been mentioned. Planted in Georgia then 10 million (!) eucalyptus trees - natural "killers" of swampy swamps.

As Beria's biography reported in 1939:

"Under the direct guidance of Comrade L. Beria, grandiose work was carried out aimed at turning 220,000 hectares of centuries-old impenetrable swamps, a hotbed of malicious destructive malaria, into a flowering garden ...

Comrade L. Beria personally dealt with all issues related to the drainage of Colchis, with the organization of the resettlement business, in particular, he himself chose and indicated places for the construction of new settlements, considered projects for residential buildings, taking care of the maximum convenience for the collective farmers-migrants ... "

This is not a ceremonial report in any line. This is the pure truth, because such cases were for Beria the same delicacy as for a gourmet - soup seasoned with grated truffles.

After all, Beria not only had the education of an architect, builder, but also passionately desired to be a builder!

EVEN MORE startling were the changes in the agricultural face of Georgia. Beria reoriented agricultural production in Georgia to the cultivation of crops that only the mountainous and subtropical zone of Georgia could give the Soviet Union: citrus fruits, tea, tobacco ...

Already in 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR noted in their resolution that the achievements of Georgia marked the beginning of the independence of the Soviet Union in the production of tea. If in 1913 tea plantations in Georgia occupied less than a thousand hectares, in 1932 - about 19 thousand hectares, then by 1940 - more than 47 thousand hectares. Moreover, the yield of tea leaves increased from 750 kilograms per hectare in 1932 to 3000-4000 kilograms in 1939!

Before the war, up to 400 million tangerines and lemons were harvested from citrus trees a year. A cannery was built in Batumi, designed to produce 8 million canned citrus fruits a year.

However, Beria did not start with tea and lemons, but with the fact that in December 1931 he liquidated the Georgian Collective Farm Center, replacing it with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. And unlike, for example, Kosior and Khataevich in Ukraine, he did not reduce, but even somewhat expanded the subsidiary farms of collective farmers in order to avoid the threat of starvation.

And in parallel, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia did a lot of organizational work both in the office and when traveling to the villages. Plenums of the Georgian Central Committee were devoted to individual crops, congresses of collective farmers were held, exhibitions were organized, portraits of leading workers adorned the front pages of newspapers and magazine covers.

As a result, in January 1934, at the IX Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, Beria had every right to say:

“A completely stable situation in the countryside of Georgia, the strengthening of collective farms, the growth of collectivization, the successful introduction of special and industrial crops ... and the conscientious fulfillment by collective farmers and working individual farmers of their obligations to the state have become a reality.”

And here is the digital “background” of what was said: in 1931, 36% of collective farms were united peasant farms, by 1939 - 86%.

At the same time, in 1936 the income of collective farms amounted to 234,992 thousand rubles, and in 1939 they exceeded half a billion.

It was with the advent of Beria to the leadership of Georgia that plantations of tung were laid, giving fatty oil used in the paint and varnish, shipbuilding, aviation, automotive, chemical industries and in the electrical industry. By 1939, tung was grown on 16,000 hectares in Soviet Georgia.

Plantations of essential oil crops, noble laurel, ramie, medlar, feijoa, figs, pomegranates, persimmons grew rapidly ... This is in addition to the development of traditional fruit growing and viticulture!

This was the result of the work in Georgia - for Georgia and for the entire USSR - "agrarian" Beria.

The untimely deceased Alexei Topygin, in an interesting, albeit uneven in estimates, book about Beria, states that "as an organizer of agricultural production, Beria turned out to be at a height that was accessible to very, very few." I will add to what has been said only one union: **"And** as an organizer of agricultural production ...".

The same A. Topygin rightly states that under Beria, Georgia became a leader in the creation of the Soviet food industry in terms of canning fruits and vegetables, industrial winemaking, tea processing ...

Here, Beria's closest associate from the ZakChK, Vladimir Dekanozov, who became the people's commissar of the food industry of Georgia, also worked hard.

BUT BERIA was no less competent in organizing the cultural revolution in

Transcaucasia. At the time when Madame Orakhelashvili worked in the field of public education, in Georgia there were several hastily opened "universities" capable of giving students a "higher" education, rather in quotation marks.

Under the leader of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria, the situation here began to change before our eyes. At the end of 1931 and 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia adopted six resolutions on issues of public education.

Over the previous five years of leadership of Georgia by Papulia - Orakhelashvili - Kartvelishvili, these issues were considered only twice, and then - in the framework of the discussion of the decisions of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Now the decisions of the Georgian Central Committee were specific and businesslike.

Since 1932, universal primary education has been introduced in Georgia. This is for children and teenagers... But at the same time, according to the Komsomol enrollment, thousands of Georgian boys and girls go to study at universities in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Saratov...

By 1938, Georgia was one of the first places in the Soviet Union in terms of the level of education of the population. And by the beginning of the 20th century, the illiteracy rate in Georgia was 79%.

Without becoming a certified engineer himself, Lavrenty Pavlovich understood perfectly well that the new Georgia needed a lot of its highly qualified specialists. And as soon as, by the will of Stalin, the personnel security officer Beria was at the head of socialist Georgia, he, already as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, began to make active efforts to develop Georgian science and culture.

It was under Beria that their heyday began.

In 1913 there was one university in Georgia, by 1941 there were twenty-one. And among them: industrial, engineers of railway transport named after V.I. Lenin, Agricultural Institute named after L.P. Beria, veterinarian, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, theatrical, artistic (Academy of Arts) - in Tbilisi; pedagogical institutes in Gori, Kutaisi, Staliniri and Sukhumi...

The list was headed by Tbilisi State University named after I.V. Stalin.

In 1938, an institute of physical culture was also opened in Tbilisi - obviously on the initiative of Beria, who always paid special attention to this side of life and was personally not alien to sports hobbies. It is indicative that of the six institutes of physical culture that existed in the USSR before the war, two were opened in Transcaucasia (except for Tbilisi, in Baku).

This, after all, also manifested the style of Beria.

In 1913 there were three theaters in Georgia, by 1941 there were forty-eight. The number of students in schools more than quadrupled during the twenty Soviet years and in 1937 amounted to 665.3 thousand people, with a population of then Georgia of 3.5 million people.

Of course, similar processes were going on throughout the USSR, but Beria's Georgia was ahead of almost everyone here. The same must be said about healthcare.

In terms of the number of students, Beria's Georgia surpassed England and Germany. And the quality of higher education in Georgia was already very good - the results of sending young talented Georgians (and, let's not forget, Georgians!) to study at the best universities of the USSR had an effect. In the second half of the 1930s, they began to return to their homeland and formed an energetic backbone of scientific and creative national personnel.

Under Beria, the foundations for the future glory of Georgian mathematics, Georgian applied science and engineering were laid. An illustrative example is the young mathematician Nestor Vekua. In 1937, which for "democrats" personifies only the Gulag, Vekua, after graduating from Moscow State University, began to read a course of lectures at Tbilisi University.

In fact, in the pre-war USSR, of all the non-Slavic peoples, only the Georgians quickly began to play a prominent role in the all-Union scientific, technical and cultural life. And this was not least due to the policy of Beria personally in the field of education, science and culture. ***In a matter of years, from 1932 to 1938, he managed to develop***

the creative potential of Georgians and make it significant on an all-Union scale.

In 1938, not only in the Caucasus, but throughout the country, the anniversary of Shota Rustaveli's poem "The Knight in the Panther's Skin" was widely celebrated. Here, too, Beria's hand was felt, as it was felt in the fact that in Georgia in 1934 the Republican Union of Architects was created - one of the first in the USSR.

In Azerbaijan and Armenia, subordinate to Beria on the party line, such unions were also created quickly, with all the same assistance from Beria, an architect and builder by training.

BERIA is an outstanding reformer of Georgia and its outstanding builder, he did more for its comprehensive development than any other Georgian in the entire history of the Georgian people.

I emphasize - for comprehensive development, and not just to maintain independence, development of statehood ...

Beria did the most for the integration of Georgia with Russia, an integration that is vital for both Georgians and Russians.

Stalin turned out to be the first - according to the results of his creation - a figure in all-Russian history, having no equal in world history. But even he, the first Georgian among the great Georgians of all times, did not give as much strength to the new Georgia as Beria gave them.

Before the revolution in big Russia, only the name of Prince Bagration was known, and he was really a "significant" figure. A descendant of the kings of Georgia, Bagration, while remaining a Georgian, became the flesh of the flesh of the common Russian fate and common Russian history.

Bagration and the true patriots of Georgia did not separate or alienate Georgia from Russia, but, on the contrary, brought them closer in the interests of both Russians and Georgians. In this sense, Beria became the heir and continuer of the best traditions of Georgian patriots, who were also devoted to Russia.

In the history of Georgia - and this can be said about the history of far from all small peoples - there are a number of outstanding rulers ...

"King of Kings" David III, David the Builder (Renewer) from the Bagration dynasty, his great-granddaughter Tamara, the great Mouravi George Saakadze, Vakhtang VI, who founded in exile - after the occupation of Tiflis by the Turks - a Georgian colony in Moscow ...

These names were known in the Soviet Union not only by historians, but also by schoolchildren - in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Khabarovsk, in Siberian and Ural rural schools ... And Lavrenty Beria is quite worthy to be among these builders of the Georgian state, which always naturally gravitated towards Russia.

Moreover, Beria turned out to be a great builder of new Georgia, not only figuratively, but also in the literal sense of the word. Beria's Georgia massively built new factories, new quarters of cities and new cities, stadiums, sanatoriums, rest houses, hospitals ...

It was under Beria that Georgia turned into a health resort of the Soviet Union. It is symbolic that on the same day, October 31, 1931, when Beria was recommended by the Politburo as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted on the creation of a network of resorts in Georgia.

Tskaltubo, Abastumani, Borjomi, Bakuriani, Gagra, Sukhumi, Gulripshi, Teberda - these names soon became known far beyond the borders of Georgia, and the places bearing these names changed. And how new sanatoriums and rest homes were useful to the country during the war - no longer for rest, but for the treatment and return to duty of the wounded ...

However, Beria's personal contribution to the socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi became especially outstanding ...

Construction of a new Tbilisi! This one thing could swallow up all his time, moreover, the problems of construction and architecture were for Beria as a first love.

In the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, there was no place for a separate article about Beria - when the first volumes were published, Beria worked in the ZakChK and ZakGPU, and these

departments did not seek to advertise their leaders. But volume 53 of the first edition of the TSB, published in 1946, reported:

"A new era in the history of T[bilisi] begins after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia (1921). T[bilisi] becomes the capital of the Georgian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation. The rapid development of the city ... takes on the character of its complete reconstruction, carried out under the leadership of L.P. Beria "...

So it was! In 1926, 294,044 inhabitants lived in Tiflis, and in 1939 - already 519 175, almost twice as much!

Beria knew the construction business professionally and was prepared not only theoretically - his official dacha in Gagra was built according to his own project, which contained all the drawings and calculations. And he gave not only his heart but also his mind to the cause of the restructuring of Tbilisi, knowledge.

The general plan for the development of the capital of Georgia was considered in June 1933 at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Tiflis city committee, where the main report was made by the first secretary of the Central Committee and the city committee L.P. Beria.

The report was, of course, the result of collective work, but Beria was the leading and guiding force here, not only by position, but also in essence, although the official authors of the general plan were the architects Z. Kurdiani, I. Malozyomov, G. Gogava and the economist G. Sheilekhovsky ...

Malozemov previously participated in the work on the general plan of Zaporozhye, was later one of the authors of the plan for the restoration of Kiev, but he, like other developers of the general plan of Tbilisi, cannot be attributed to especially large architectural quantities.

But this master plan bore a clear imprint of Beria's style.

In the textbook for universities "The History of Soviet Architecture (1917-1954)," published by Stroyizdat in 1985, it was said about the problems of restructuring Tbilisi as follows:

"The need for the construction of new government, administrative, scientific and cultural institutions, industrial buildings and structures could not fit into the framework of the former Tbilisi. Overcrowded residential areas of the old city were molded along the Kura River and cut through by a network of narrow streets winding along the relief. The improvement and engineering equipment of the city was at an extremely low level. There was not enough water, landscaping was insufficient. In summer, the city, located in the basin, was poorly ventilated and suffered from overheating ... "

And then, without, of course, any mention of Beria, it was said:

"The authors (of the master plan. - S.K.) preserved the historically established planning structure of the city, but at the same time subjected it to reconstruction ... The total landscaping area was doubled"

To recreate without destroying - it must be able to!

In the PLAN of reconstruction, a comprehensive, systematic approach was implemented, when the issues of architectural appearance are linked to the problems of all types of communications, rational placement of residential, administrative, public and industrial zones, reasonable redevelopment without losing the existing identity of the city.

Suffice it to say that all architectural sights have been preserved old Tiflis, including **almost all** the old churches.

Beria knew how to attract innovators to the cause. So, one of the developers of the general plan of Tbilisi - G. Sheilekhovsky was a pioneer in the study of the problem of "housing and climate", the architect E. Kalashnikov built a "hundred-apartment house" in Tbilisi, the plan of which was based

a duplex section was laid with good ventilation of the rooms and the orientation of most rooms to the south, which removed excess solar radiation in the hottest time, when the sun is high.

During the two pre-war five-year plans, 219 million rubles were invested in the public utilities of Tbilisi (not Putin's, but Stalin's!).

The main highways and squares of the city underwent, as the TSB wrote, "a radical, sometimes very complex restructuring" ...

New housing estate Vake... Beria Square... Kalyaev's rise connecting the main working area with the center... Completely renovated railway station square... Three kilometers long embankment named after Stalin... New bridges, including the Chelyuskintsev bridge... Rustaveli Avenue and the circus on the hill at the end of this avenue... Dynamo Stadium named after Beria... A wonderful park of culture and recreation with an area of 50 hectares on Mount David, from where panoramas of Tbilisi and the Caucasus Range opened... New parks on the former Madatovsky Island and on the Funicular Plateau...

The funicular, built in 1936-1938, was the pride of both Tbilisi and Beria ... But you could be proud of the new powerful water pipeline with Natakhtari spring water, and the new thermal power plant ...

And an automatic telephone exchange ... And a large bath building near sulfur springs ... And the Botanical Garden ... And the buildings of the Tbilisi Institute of Railway Engineers named after V.I. Lenin ... And the town of the Institute of Bacteriology ...

And yet - the rebuilt tram lines, as well as the new city for Tbilisi transport - bus and trolleybus.

In 1938, the construction of the ensemble of the Palace of the Government of Georgia was completed. project of Professor V. Kokorin. It was the largest building in Transcaucasia.

According to the project of academician A. Shchusev with the participation of architect P. Sardaryan, in the same 1938, a monumental building of the Tbilisi branch of the Marx Institute was built - Engels - Lenin.

Former dirty and dusty Tiflis - now transformed has become pride and adornment not only of Georgia, but of the entire Soviet Union.

This is what the years 1937 and 1938 were like for the Georgian capital and for Lavrenty Beria... And not only business energy, but also architectural talent of Beria was invested in Tbilisi, transforming before our eyes, in its socialist general development plan.

This, too, must be remembered.

And, first of all, to the people of Tbilisi themselves...

However, in the current, rapidly provincializing and graying, breaking away from Russia, Georgia, they prefer to simply not know Beria! Incredibly, but the fact - as the author of the first modern Georgian biography of Beria Zaza Tskvitaria reports - in the Georgian Wikipedia, Lavrenty Pavlovich is devoted to only a few lines:

"Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. R. March 17 / March 29, 1899, Merheuli, the current Gulripsh municipality (oh, how the last word attaches the Georgians to the "Europes." - S.K.), which in 1946 separated from the Sukhumi municipality within its current borders. Deceased December 23, 1953, in Moscow (according to other sources, June 26, 1953). State and political figure of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union (since 1945), Hero of Socialist Labor (since 1943). After Stalin's death, a struggle for power began in the highest circles of power. In 1953, Beria was arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy.

This is all.

Well, what can I say?

OLD Tiflis, being transformed by the people of Georgia, led by Beria, into a new Tbilisi,

turned from the second half of the 30s into one huge construction site. And Beria often came or came to the facilities under construction at night ... It was easier to get an objective idea of \u200b\u200bthe real state of affairs, and ...

And, of course, to dream after the usual bustle of the day, in the silence of the night about unfulfilled...

About the title of architect that he never achieved.

As already mentioned, 1934 was the year of the founding of the Union of Architects of Georgia. This was a general trend in the USSR - the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on architecture dates back to 1932. But the fact that in Georgia, as well as in Armenia, in Azerbaijan, this case was not delayed was also due to Beria's interest. His opinion, as the former first secretary of the Zakkraykom, even after the abolition of the TSFSR, was certainly significant, and the fact, for example, that in 1938 a new, seriously revised general plan for the restructuring of Yerevan was adopted in Armenia, proves Beria's attention not only to Tbilisi.

Beria also paid attention to the master plan for the new Baku, adopted in 1938 to replace the old one, developed in 1925-1927.

Formally, Beria never built a single building in his life. However, he nevertheless became an architect, but not of one ensemble - even the most grandiose, but an architect in the great restructuring of the whole society, all of Russia.

And he started with Georgia ...

Chapter 3

1939–1941 Reformer of the NKVD: from conspiracies to the state secret service

And from the end of the summer of 1938, Beria's activities finally and clearly acquired all-Union significance, and all his further work took place already in the capital of the USSR, Moscow.

On August 21, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made two decisions related to the NKVD of the USSR:

"To predetermine the appointment of Comrade Frinovsky as the People's Commissar of the Navy with his release from the duties of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Approve Comrade Beria as the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

The issue of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia should be resolved within three days and invite Comrade Beria to submit a candidate for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "

So Lavrenty Beria was again returned to the Chekist path, but already in much higher quality and with new challenges.

On September 9, 1938, by a resolution of the Politburo, he was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank.

And on November 25, 1938, Beria became the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, replacing General Commissar of State Security of the USSR Nikolai Yezhov.

I will not dwell much on the collisions of this substitution. I do not rule out that at first Stalin did not expect to replace Yezhov with Beria almost immediately. The expediency and even the absolute necessity of this became clearer gradually.

Yes, and the same conclusion from the NKVD of the "natural" Chekist Mikhail Frinovsky, who had never been involved in the fleet, could not have had suspicions at all in its original basis. It is unlikely that Stalin, if he had ceased to trust Frinovsky immediately, would have invited him to his meetings - already as People's Commissar of the Navy, eight times. The last time Frinovsky was in Stalin's office was on February 8, 1939, and only on April 6, 1939 was he arrested.

By the way - for the cause, as he was for the cause, after almost a year of investigation, shot February 8, 1940.

One way or another, from the end of 1938, Beria stood at the head of the most important people's commissariat. And it is still not understood, and even I sparingly dwelled on this moment in my past books, that Beria fundamentally changed the essence of the Soviet public security body as People's Commissar of the NKVD!

This change consisted primarily in the fact that the new People's Commissar decisively put an end to the past "political" NKVD, which was the source of potential state conspiracies and the bearer of the spirit of the "world revolution", and in return recreated the NKVD as a purely state body that performs those tasks and **decides** those tasks that were assigned to the special service by the highest state leadership.

It can be said in short: a semi-amateur organization, prone to politicking and conspiracies, Beria transformed into a professional intelligence service.

Dzerzhinsky considered the Cheka and then the OGPU as a political body, and not only (and not so much) as a special service of the state. Actually, the abbreviation of the GPU itself is formed by the first letters of the name "Main Political Directorate". And for those years, everything here was true.

In addition, Dzerzhinsky, like Menzhinsky later, were major Bolshevik politicians - major not only in terms of position in the party even before the revolution, but major in essence. They were able to think like politicians and look at the processes in society like Marxist politicians.

Yagoda, who replaced Menzhinsky, was politically a figure of absolutely different caliber than his predecessors in the leadership of the Cheka-OGPU, but (sic!) He claimed political roles!

And this was not only Yagoda in the OGPU - the same Artuzov-Frauchi, Frinovsky, Evdokimov, and many others! In 1934, the United Main **Political** The management of the USSR was transformed into the People's Commissariat **of Internal Affairs** of the USSR. The name and structure have changed, but the people have remained the same! With **political** ambitions!

The growing and powerfully developing country no longer needed a political emergency organization, but a normal, effective special service. And the Soviet state did not even have it in the second half of the 30s. More precisely, it certainly was, but not to the extent required!

And that was not the case...

Among other things, there were enough people in the OGPU and then by inheritance in the NKVD of the USSR an adventurous warehouse, hardened from youth by the vicissitudes of the revolution and civil war.

It must be said that the overdue cleaning of the NKVD was already started by Yezhov. During the period from October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 5229 employees left the state security agencies, and only 1200 were arrested (not convicted!). Data on arrests are given as reliable, because they are recognized by "democratic" "researchers" (see Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 6, 1997).

5359 people arrived at the authorities. And the very composition of the new Chekists proved that Stalin needed not bone-breakers in the NKVD, but educated people with high moral qualities - mainly specialists with higher and secondary specialized education were recruited.

Nikolai Yezhov is usually presented as almost a half-wit, who only knew how to pick out bullets from the heads of those who were shot, but I recommend everyone to familiarize themselves, for example, with a transcript of Yezhov's speech to young communists and Komsomol members mobilized to work in the NKVD on March 11, 1937. Here are a few quotes from there according to the reference book of the International Fund "Democracy" "Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD - MGB - MVD - KGB. 1917-1991" of the 2003 edition (see pp. 569-582).

I am sure that any thinking person, after carefully reading this one huge, but specific, and at the same time - freely, not according to a cheat sheet, delivered speech

Yezhov, his opinion about him is at least a little better, but he will reconsider.

For example, Yezhov said this: "... we do not have enough intelligence culture. We cannot, for example, compare with the culture of British intelligence ... "

And so: "Another quality is obligatory for a Chekist, it is not only at work, but also in everyday life, to always think that you are people's intelligence, that they look at you as the most honest and best people who are allocated to this area of work. At work and at home, you need to be distinguished by some qualities of an advanced Soviet person ... "

And so: "... you have to be conspirators, not talk ... I know, for example, from different Chekists, at least 15 options for capturing Savinkov, but in general, these options, each of them partially, reveal something in our work ... »

And so: "I am for awareness, but we don't need awareness in such a mass scale, it needs to be skillfully used and skillfully arranged ... This is, firstly, secondly, we must be terribly careful about the materials of this network ... Our informants are not so hot, what qualified People. If you look at some of their reports, it is sometimes quite difficult to understand what is written there ... "

And at the end, Yezhov warned the newcomers: "Finally ... - the Constitution, comrades. With the introduction of the Constitution, many of our things that we are now doing casually (*laughter in the audience*), they will not be in vain. There is legality, so we need to know our laws... then all relationships with the prosecutor's office will disappear. Our main fight with the Prosecutor's Office so far is going simply along the line of ignorance of... procedural norms, that is, it goes along the line of trifles, because... if a political fight breaks out, it will definitely go to the Central Committee..."

Yes, it was not Cicero's speech, but it was the speech of an intelligent, intelligent professional, a man of no small statesmanship. Not everything that the people's commissar urged young NKVD recruits to do, he himself always corresponded to, but he said something sensible, true ...

Alas, Yezhov got confused - not only in the hidden politicking of his own subordinates, but also in relations with Western intelligence services, who caught Nikolai Ivanovich during his treatment in Germany on an elementary "honey trap" even when Yezhov did not come to the NKVD.

I will not state categorically, but I do not exclude that if Yezhov had carried out the purge of the Yagodin cadres in the NKVD more decisively and in a timely manner, then the course of the repressions of 1937-1938 could have been completely different - without the number of "chips" that are inevitable when cutting down forests. After all, the main "phony" and other similar cases are the aftereffect of Yagoda's policy and the result of the fact that in the NKVD of Yagoda's model there were a couple of every creature, from Trotskyists to careerists.

No, only "democratic" falsifiers of history are able to evaluate Yezhov as a "bloody dwarf", he is an ambiguous figure in our history, and still not researched.

And what to investigate, if to this day we have only scraps of complete information! For example, the International Foundation "Democracy" publishes a collection of documents "Lubyanka: Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 ", and on page 52 "publishes" Beria's special report to Stalin No. 1123 / b dated April 20, 1939 on the direction of the protocol of interrogation of the arrested head of the security department of the NKVD of the USSR Israel Dagin. But only the "accompaniment" is given with the note: "Published without an interrogation protocol."

Why did it happen?

Dagin knew a lot and many, and said a lot. Moreover, it seems that he said the same thing that, it turns out, it's not convenient for the current "source experts" to inform even the readers of a small-circulation specialized publication about the essence of what he said.

It was not easy to understand all this "mess", but Beria is Beria - he figured it out.

Although, of course, not immediately ...

TODAY put forward a variety of versions of why Stalin took Beria to Moscow. Without listing all of them, I will put forward - in addition to what I have already expressed earlier,

one more...

This version came to my mind only during the work on this book.

Stalin could decide that Beria was needed in Moscow simply because Beria was no longer needed so much in Transcaucasia ... Of course, the need to clear the perennial "Augean stables" in the NKVD - which no one could have done better than Beria - on Stalin's decision, too, presumably, influenced, but ...

But in any case, Beria had to look for a field of activity essentially wider than what he had since 1938 ...

Since 1937, the scope of Beria's activities has been seriously reduced, since, according to the new Constitution of the USSR, all three republics that made up the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became directly part of the USSR.

In early December 1936, the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) was abolished, and from December 5, 1936, Beria remained only the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia. To some extent, the load deficit was compensated by the fact that since May 1937, Beria was also elected the 1st Secretary of the Tbilisi City Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, but still, the potential of such a powerful worker as Beria was far from being fully demanded.

And it was not in a businesslike way, not in a state way ...

Over the years of leadership of the entire Transcaucasus, Beria, of course, as a leader and organizer, has grown. The volume of his versatile knowledge has also grown - the management of living concrete affairs and communication with major specialists forms an intelligent person no worse than a university, and Beria was an intelligent and inquisitive person.

Transcaucasia is the most important huge region for competent coverage of all its problems a man of great statesmanship and outstanding qualities was needed.

But Georgia?

In Georgia, the sample of 1938, everything was more or less adjusted with the most active role in that just Lavrenty - it's somehow embarrassing to even call him Lavrenty Pavlovich, because he was then only 39 years old.

The republic was developing steadily, young national socialist cadres could already work effectively in politics, and in the economy, and in science, and in culture. So the best manager of socialism in one, and even very prosperous - through his own efforts - republic became cramped.

Could Stalin not understand this, having long said that "cadres decide everything", and who knew how to value and promote cadres?

Of course not!

And, very likely, the explanation why in the summer of 1938 Beria was transferred to Moscow is that Beria "outgrew" the regional level and he had to select work on an all-Union scale.

In 1937, however, there was still a need for Beria at the head of Georgia. Who better than him could carry out a purge in Georgia of both all types of anti-Soviet and anti-party elements, as well as the agents of foreign special services and the "fifth column"? ..

The purges of 1937-1938 were harsh and large-scale in the USSR, although there is every reason to question both the total number of those who were repressed and the number of those who were shot.

Yes, yes, the most official Khrushchev figures, taken as a basis by the Yeltsinoids, can be questioned after analyzing these very figures and archival data declassified after 1991 by the Russian anti-Soviet themselves.

However, I will deliberately not touch on this side of the life of Stalin's USSR, not only because I have written about it more than once before, and not because there are a number of reasonable works on this subject by a number of modern researchers who have shown the fundamental necessity and validity of such a social action - with despite the fact that overlays could not be avoided ...

You can say a lot of things "about the 37th year", but in a short book about the fate and victories of the hero of this book I cannot delve into the topic of repression and touch it only to the extent that it will help us better understand Beria.

An active operation to "clean up" Georgia began even before the publication of the famous operational order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00447 "on the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements." The all-Union operation began on August 5, 1937, but already on July 20, 1937, Beria personally sent a note to Stalin, which began like this:

"Dear Koba! The investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionaries in Georgia is unfolding further, revealing new participants in the most heinous crimes against the Party and Soviet power. The arrest of G. Mgaloblishvili, L. Lavrentyev (Kartvelishvili), Sh. Eliava, M. Orakhelashvili, Lukashin and others, and the testimonies given by them during the investigation, shed a bright light on the treacherous sabotage and sabotage espionage and terrorist work that they carried out as members of the K.R. organizations of the right..."

Today, the beginning of the repressive operation of 1937-1938 is often associated exclusively with the provocations of Eikhe, Postyshev, Khrushchev, etc., who were frightened by the idea of alternative elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which Stalin proposed.

There is a reason for such an interpretation of the unfolding events. But should we forget that one of the reasons for the repression was the urgent need to neutralize internal threats in the face of increasing external threats?

The situation in Georgia was especially difficult - I will talk about this a little later. And this was clearly seen from the specifics of Beria's note dated July 20, 1937. In it, by the way, there are names that are familiar to the reader - including Orakhelashvili ...

Beria said:

"From... testimonies it is established that Ph.D. The organization of the right was created in Georgia in 1928, on the one hand, on Rykov's directive, brought from Moscow by G. Kurulov, and on the other hand, on the instructions of Bukharin, personally transmitted by Orakhelashvili during Bukharin's visit to Tbilisi in the summer of 1928 of the year..."

The background here is...

On May 17, 1937, the Politburo decided to put to a vote by the Central Committee the issue of expelling Mamiya Orakhelashvili from the members of the Audit Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and Shalva Eliava from candidates for members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and both from the party, with expulsion from Moscow on charges of ties with the Georgian Trotskyist center.

On May 19, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the proposal of the Politburo. Orakhelashvili was deported to Astrakhan, and on June 26 he was arrested and transferred to Tbilisi. Eliava, a Bolshevik since 1904, personally and well known to Lenin, was also arrested.

On July 20, 1937, Beria, as we already know, informed Stalin about the progress of the investigation. And it, this consequence, with all the outward unimaginability of what Beria wrote about, showed that resentment and ambition are a bad line of conduct for politicians working for the people. At first they saw an enemy in Stalin, then they made an alliance with Stalin's enemies in the outside world...

And in the end they came to a camp hostile to the people.

Beria has always been and remained with Stalin. At the end of the note dated July 20, he wrote, in particular:

"Anti-Soviet and K.R. elements on Georgia will be thoroughly withdrawn. About 200 people have already been shot. Recently, through the NKVD of Georgia, comrade. Yezhov was sent materials for another 350 people to be shot for approval.

I think that at least 1000 people will have to be shot, from among the K.R.,

rightists, Trotskyists, spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and so on. This number does not include former kulaks and criminals who returned from exile and are subject to administrative execution through a troika created under the NKVD of Georgia in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

<...>

I ask for your instructions.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia L. Beria.

By the way, the administrative execution itself was first used in the 20th century not in the USSR. Say, with the outbreak of the First World War, the prefect of Paris arrested - according to the available operational data of the police - about a thousand of the most active and dangerous metropolitan criminals and shot them in the Vincennes moat.

Without red tape, trial and investigation!

As the French say: "A la guerre comme a la guerre", that is: "In war, as in war" ...

And Soviet Russia, as it ended up in the position of a besieged fortress after October 1917, so by 1937 it remained in the same position, and by no means in its own way desire.

On October 30, 1937, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Beria, sent a note to Stalin, which reported that over the past year, the NKVD of Georgia had arrested more than 12,000 people, of which 7,347 people were convicted.

By the way, from this, purely closed, note by Beria, it also unequivocally followed that not mythical enemies were arrested in Georgia, but real ones. Everything is quite understandable - when the general cleaning begins, it always takes more effort than expected, and there is so much garbage that one has only to wonder - where did it come from?

On January 31, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution approving an additional number of "former kulaks, criminals and an active anti-Soviet element" subject to repression, while in the Georgian SSR the limit for category I ("execution") was increased by 1,500 people, and for II category - per 1000 people.

The ratio of those sentenced to death (by the way, not all sentences were carried out, although there were few such cases) and to the conclusion was approximately equal with a preponderance, however, in the direction of capital punishment. Taking this into account, the number of those sentenced to CMN in Georgia during the repressions of 1937-1938 can be estimated at about 6-7 thousand. Human.

According to the very doubtful - already Khrushchev's - estimates of the end of 1953, 8 thousand people were sentenced to death in Georgia, and this figure should be taken, most likely, as the limit. In today's Georgia, it is argued that it should be raised to 15 thousand people, but this is a clear lie, without which the "democrats" of any nationality cannot do anything - brought up on it.

That is, with the then population of Georgia of 3.5 million people, they were shot about 2 people per thousand people.

Let's leave aside theoretically supposedly philanthropic, but really vile and vile (at best, just stupid and naive) ranting that any human life is priceless.

Such chatter looks truly disgusting in the same, for example, Yeltsinoid Russia, where, as a result of state policy, the number of **excess** deaths per year is at least several hundred thousand, with a total figure - over two decades - of a dozen, if not more, millions of victims of Yeltsin's and Yeltsin's totalitarianism.

(In the allegedly "totalitarian" USSR, where the average life expectancy is constantly grew up, nothing was even close!)

So, let's ask ourselves soberly and realistically - is it a lot or a little, two shot per thousand inhabitants of Georgia specifically?

Georgia was the only national republic headed by anti-Soviet Mensheviks for so long, from 1918 to 1921. Moreover, the number of the party of Georgian Mensheviks at one time reached 80 thousand people. In fact, the majority of the then national intelligentsia turned out to be connected in one way or another with the Menshevik Party.

And in 1921 Lenin said:

"In my opinion, of the Mensheviks who joined the Party after 1918, approximately one hundredth of a share should be left in the Party, and even then, checking each one left three times and four times. Why? Because the Mensheviks ... during the period 1918-1921 proved two of their qualities: to skillfully adapt, to cling to the current that prevails among the workers; the second - it is even more skillful to serve the White Guard faithfully, to serve it in practice, renouncing it in words..."

Lenin's words were applicable to the Georgian Mensheviks, perhaps, many times over. more so than the Russians...

And here is what Stalin said on December 4, 1920 in an interview with Pravda after returning from South:

"The catastrophic economic and food situation of Georgia is a fact ascertained even by the rulers of today's Georgia. Georgia, entangled in the snares of the Entente ... Georgia, which has become the main base of imperialist operations for Britain and France and therefore entered into hostile relations with Soviet Russia - this Georgia is now living out the last days of its life. It is not without reason that the decaying leader of the dying Second International, Mr. Kautsky, who was driven out of Europe by the wave of revolution, found shelter in musty Georgia, entangled in the nets of the Entente, among the bankrupt Georgian social-spirit makers ... "

On February 25, 1921, the 11th Army, led by Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, entered Tiflis, and Georgia of the Menshevik social dukhans ended as a state entity.

But their political and moral (more precisely, immoral, of course) influence was still considerable. At the end of June 1921, Stalin arrived in already Soviet Georgia and on July 6 delivered a report at the general meeting of the Tiflis organization of the Communist Party of Georgia. Specifically, he said at the time:

"I remember the years 1905-1917, when there was complete fraternal solidarity among the workers and working people of the Transcaucasian nationalities in general, when the bonds of brotherhood bound the Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Russian workers into one socialist family. Now, upon my arrival in Tiflis, I was struck by the lack of former solidarity... Nationalism developed among the workers and peasants, a feeling of distrust towards their comrades from other nationalities intensified... The old ties of fraternal trust were broken or, at least, greatly weakened. Obviously, the three years of the existence of nationalist governments in Georgia (Mensheviks), in Azerbaijan ..., in Armenia ... were not in vain.

But that's how it was!

And a nationalist is almost automatically an anti-Soviet and almost automatically the same as at least an accomplice of the West, and often its direct agent...

Especially - if we mean educated nationalists from among the "clean" public.

At the same time, Stalin warned of the danger of an influx into the Communist Party of Georgia

"intellectual-petty-bourgeois nationalist elements" and urged "not to chase after the number of party members", fighting against any contamination, - according to Stalin, - "petty-bourgeois rubbish that kills ... the living spirit."

Alas, the temptation for the leadership of the then small (several thousand people) Georgian Communist Party to quickly increase the size of the party turned out to be irresistible, and the number of latent anti-communists among the members of the CP (b) of Georgia was not significant.

In any case, it was calculated in it not in tens or even hundreds, but in thousands, even in the second half of the 30s, when the number of the CP (b) of Georgia reached about 60 thousand members (55,033 members by January 1934) ... Beria did not force growth of the party, but it was forced before it, and for the time being, for the time being, we had to put up with it.

And it wasn't just the former Mensheviks who kept a fiddle, or even a knife, in their pocket against Soviet power! There were Trotskyists - only in the Communist Party of Georgia there were about three thousand of them, who seemed to be "former", but in reality by no means always. There were "right" - "former" supporters of Rykov and Bukharin... There were former princes and their lackeys... Former merchants and kulaks... Stupid nationalists... Numerous agents of all major Western powers, recruited before 1917 and after 1917 - English, German, Turkish, French, Polish, Italian, American...

And things were going to war - this was understood by those who built and strengthened Soviet power, and those who would be glad to destroy it and were ready to destroy it, which could only become possible as a result of a new powerful external intervention.

Moreover, in the Caucasus, the anti-Soviet could count on both German aggression against the USSR and Anglo-French. Let me remind the reader that in the spring of 1940 the Anglo-French planned both aerial bombardments of Baku and a direct invasion of the Soviet Transcaucasus.

Therefore, we will leave all the stories about the alleged "bloody execution" of Beria in Georgia on the conscience of the narrators - if, of course, they have at least a semblance of her ...

But when the tension of the purges subsided, Stalin, like me, had a special need for Beria in the Caucasus. I understand it's gone.

Lavrenty Beria became more needed in Moscow.

BERIA was killed in 1953, and for almost forty years he fell out of public attention, only from the end of the 80s again returning to his focus, but already as a kind of personification of "Stalin's bloody totalitarian regime."

Of the Soviet leaders of the OGPU - NKVD of the 30s - I mean Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria - Beria, real, and not mythologized, was the least tough. This was his principled position. However, liberal propaganda made the "executioner", "monster", "ghoul" precisely from Beria.

To know, it was he who nevertheless annoyed every bastard especially strongly!

But he - even the "liberals" do not deny this - having come to the NKVD, in a short time initiated a massive re-examination of investigative cases, which resulted in the release of more than 300,000 people from camps and colonies. Moreover, this process continued later.

Even "democrats" sometimes write about the "Beria thaw", although, of course, one must speak of the joint work here between Beria and Stalin. Moreover, there was nothing hypocritical about that - everything was very difficult then. I can recommend to the interested reader, for example, a collection of documents "Lubyanka. The Soviet elite on Stalin's Calvary. 1937-1938", published in 2011 by the International Fund "Democracy" (Alexander N. Yakovlev Fund) with a circulation, however, of 1000 copies. and cost under 1000 rubles. The provocative and deceitful (as always, however, with the "chicks of the Yakovlev nest") the title of the collection absolutely does not correspond to its content, which would be more suitable for the title "The decomposed part of the Soviet elite at the moment of truth in 1937-1938".

The same can be said **about any** collection **of documents** published by anti-Soviet

completely anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet times, that is, after 1991. Surprising, but true! Documents published by slanderers of Stalin, Beria and their era testify *in favor of* Stalin, Beria and their deeds in the name of the people and power of Russia ...

However - not because of Stalin's alleged "butchery", of course, but because of the complexity of the political and social situation - the repressive process also captured a lot of those who were either innocent or guilty not according to the prescribed punishment. And Beria began to deal with this, and his very appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was regarded by his contemporaries - there is more than one evidence of this - as a harbinger of major positive changes.

But to restore trampled justice is a worthy thing, but not the most complex. Organizing sustainable and effective work is perhaps a more difficult task.

And a difficult task is a task for Beria and - let's not forget - for the personnel selected by him and educated.

As already mentioned, Beria turned out to be an effective **systemic** reformer of the NKVD - a political body prone to slipping into politicking, he quickly transformed the special service into the state needed.

It was, however, a systemic reform, and Beria also carried out a number of **specific** reforms, giving the NKVD of the USSR a qualitatively stronger professional image ...

In March 1938, Yezhov carried out another reorganization of the structure of the NKVD. One of the major innovations was the downgrading of the status of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) to just Directorate. There were also advances in the organization of the production activities of the NKVD and control in the economy. Nevertheless, only with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, the last process quickly reached its logical conclusion.

On August 21, Beria was appointed deputy commissar of the NKVD, on September 9 he was awarded the rank of commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, and already on September 13, 1938 - formally according to Yezhov's note, but really according to Beria's outlines - the Politburo approves the new organizational structure of the NKVD.

In the NKVD system, three new headquarters were formed: the Main Directorate of State Security, the Main Economic Directorate and the Main Transport Directorate.

The State Security Directorate restored the lost status of the Main Directorate, and Beria stood at the head of the GUGB.

The GEM and the Main Transport Administration were called upon to control the work of the economy and transport and provide the country's leadership with objective information about position there.

By 1940, the GEM included the following departments: industry; defense industry; Agriculture; Goznak and refineries; aviation industry; fuel industry.

In the Main Transport Administration there were branch departments for railway transport, water transport; communications, highway construction, civil air fleet.

The beginning was laid, but ten days later - September 23, 1938 - The Politburo, in a change to the resolution of September 13, finally approves the "Beria" structure of the NKVD of the USSR, which was only improved later.

So, in February - March 1939, the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops was divided into six main departments: the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR; Main Directorate of the troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the protection of railway facilities; Main Directorate of the NKVD Troops for the Protection of Particularly Important Industrial Enterprises; Main Directorate of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR; Main Military Supply Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR and the Main Military Construction Directorate of the Troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

This immediately dramatically improved the controllability of the troops and expanded the possibilities for their training and development. As a result, those tasks were effectively solved, each of which had its own specifics, but which, before Beria, were dumped into a common "heap".

In the new structure of the NKVD of the USSR, Beria also introduced - which is usually forgotten - an independent Bureau for receiving and considering complaints.

A fact that speaks for itself.

I also note that in early 1940, Beria achieved the adoption of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated January 28, 1940 No. 140 "On approval of the regulation on the Main Archive Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR." In fact, he carried out an effective reform of archiving in the USSR. The old archivists for a long time remembered Beria's words that there are no archives without documents, and there is no history without archives ...

The problem of organizational structure is always and everywhere extremely important, because, ultimately, there are only two types of structure: one that allows you to work effectively and one that **does not** allowing you to work effectively.

And here is a clear example of two approaches to business.

In April 1937, the new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov, who became him six months ago, sent Stalin a detailed letter asking him to approve the draft resolution on the formation of the Investigative Department of the GUGB.

Yezhov wrote:

"The operational departments of the GUGB are engaged in both intelligence and investigative work. The same workers conduct both undercover and investigative work.

Concentration of undercover and investigative work in the same hands in practice, it leads to the fact that both branches of this work suffer ...

From the foregoing, it follows that the work of the GUGB should immediately be carried out in such a division of labor that the operational departments would be left only with agent-operational and search work; to allocate a special Investigative Department for the production of the investigation ... "

This idea was correct, long overdue, and Yezhov noted that a new department must be created within three months. However, Yezhov did not achieve the realization of his own idea until the end of his tenure as people's commissar.

Beria, a month after his appointment as People's Commissar, in a short letter (No. 109785 dated December 22, 1938) to Stalin justified the need to organize the Investigative Unit of the NKVD of the USSR, and it was organized **on the same day** by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00813.

As you can see, there are people's commissars, and there are people's commissars...

HOWEVER, the structure is the structure, and the work is carried out by personnel ...

Here Yezhov left behind not only a bad legacy - that party and Komsomol set, before which Yezhov spoke on March 11, 1937, in its main part, it was quite useful to Beria, and he brought him up well already in his

style - business and active.

And in December 1938, a new recruitment was carried out in the NKVD among politically proven and advanced production workers in Moscow. Then 1500 people were selected. Strong engineering personnel were also recruited to the production Glavkas, since the expansion of the production activities of the NKVD of the USSR required competent leaders. Intelligent, almost ordinary engineers quickly grew under Beria's hand into the heads of organizations, were part of the leadership of the Main Directorates (Glavkovs).

In 1939, 7,372 operational workers (22.9% of their total composition) were dismissed from the NKVD system, and 14,506 people were hired for operational security work, of which 11,062 were on party and Komsomol vouchers.

The personnel problem also had such an aspect... Already Yezhov significantly reduced the percentage of Jews in the leadership of the people's commissariat. Beria further reduced this percentage: as of July 1, 1939, among the 153 leading employees of the NKVD, there were 102 Russians, 19 Ukrainians and 6

Jews.

But it was, again, not about "anti-Semitism" - Beria valued people not according to the columns of the questionnaire, but according to business qualities, therefore, in 1940, 189 Jews (6%) continued to work in the central apparatus of the NKVD.

I have already said that Yezhov was let down not so much by his own cadres as by the inherited cadres of Yagoda, with whom Yezhov did not fully understand, especially at the leadership level.

Beria quickly and completely "cleaned up" the NKVD, driving out the stupid and shooting or imprisoning the guilty. And he immediately brought to the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR a number of his experienced employees in the Transcaucasus: V.N. Merkulova, B. Z. Kobulova, P.A. Sharia, V.G. Dekanozova, S.R. Milstein, I.I. Maslennikova, S.S. Mamulova...

Now it was possible to begin the real work, because the main task of the "organs" was not to cleanse their own ranks, but to ensure state security - intelligence and counterintelligence, the fight against sabotage and sabotage, border protection, protection of critical facilities, government communications and much more ...

After all, the NKVD was in charge of the police, and the fire brigade, and the forestry, and the Department of Acts civil status with a network of registry offices ...

A lot of objective stuff has been written today about how the production headquarters of the NKVD worked - I myself wrote about this more than once. But I can refer the interested reader to the book, for example, by Alexei Toptygin, whom I mentioned earlier, where there is good factual material.

I will focus on those aspects of the reform, the re-creation of the NKVD of the USSR by Beria, which are most characteristic of the effective special service of the state ...

Intelligence service...

The state of intelligence of the NKVD, when Beria came there, was depressing: one after others experienced three serious emergencies there.

At first, the captain of the GB Ignaty Stanislavovich Reiss (Nathan Markovich Poretsky) changed. Previously, he worked in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and in 1931 he moved to the intelligence of the OGPU - the Foreign Department (INO). In 1937, Reiss was recalled to Moscow, but he did not return, on July 17 he published an open letter in French newspapers with "denunciations" of Stalin and just as openly joined Trotsky.

In September 1937, Reiss liquidated a special group of the NKVD near Lausanne, but then the second betrayal arrived. In the autumn of 1937, the captain of the State Security Service, an illegal resident in Holland, Walter Germanovich Krivitsky (Samuil Gershevich Ginzberg), became a traitor and defector. This one also went into all serious trouble, got in touch with Trotsky's son Lev Sedov, but most importantly, he "surrendered" the Intelligence Service to more than a hundred of our intelligence officers and agents.

Already the betrayals of Reiss and Krivitsky caused much more damage to intelligence than all the "bloody repressions" of Yezhov, and in addition to Krivitsky in July 1938, Alexander Orlov (Leiba Lazarevich Feldbing, known in the NKVD and as Lev Nikolsky) also changed.

The senior major of the GB (almost a general!) Orlov knew a lot. He was a resident of the NKVD in France, Austria, Italy, an adviser in Spain (he fled from Spain to the USA). It is believed that Orlov saved his life due to the fact that in a letter addressed to Yezhov he warned: he would not "hand over" agents. But only naive people.

In Spain, Orlov-Feldbing, in fact - saving from the scandal, was sent by a close friend Abram Slutsky, head of the INO NKVD under Yagoda. The fact is that in August 1936, right in front of the Lubyanka building, a young employee of the NKVD Galina Voitova shot herself - mistress of Feldbing. She could not bear the fact that he left her, refusing to divorce his wife.

Such was our intelligence then ...

If we add to the total score the betrayal of Genrikh Lyushkov, who fled to Manchuria on June 13, 1938, the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory, the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank, then the picture of the decomposition of Yagoda's personnel, whom Yezhov trusted, turns out to be quite impressive ...

Beria also had to deal with the consequences here. The People's Commissariat as a whole turned Beria from a politicking body into a government body, into the special service of the USSR. It is the same with intelligence - **it would not be an exaggeration to say that Beria created Soviet foreign intelligence as a state institution.**

Instead of the former "warm get-together" talented - no doubt! - adventurers, instead of the "intelligence of the Comintern", through the efforts of Lavrenty Beria, the country received a reliable, constantly developing and improving intelligence agency. Scouts were "planned" selected, "planned" prepared, "legended" and equipped.

At the same time, Beria did not "destroy" the old cadres, as it is attributed to him - he sensibly and quickly checked them, weeded out those who were not trustworthy (even shot some of them!), And again sent the healthy part of the "frame" beyond the cordon.

Beria knew how to check, but he also knew how to trust - the story of the intelligence officer Korotkov, described by me in the "capital" book about Beria, illustrates this well. But to this day, many are convinced that it was Beria who finally "defeated" our intelligence.

And here is another, forgotten and unappreciated merit of Beria - his role in introducing long-distance high-frequency (HF) government communications into the state practice of the USSR, reliably protected from eavesdropping and interception.

Officially, this type of communication dates back to June 1, 1931, when a corresponding unit was created in the OGPU of the USSR, but only with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD did the rapid development and introduction of high-frequency communications begin.

Of course, his arrival coincided with a number of serious technical achievements in this area, but Beria's energy and his ability to understand the potential of high-frequency communications gave her a new impetus for development.

Immediately after his appointment as People's Commissar, Lavrenty Pavlovich ordered a thorough check of the state of affairs, and already in the winter of 1939, his first deputy V.N. Merkulov submitted a memorandum, which noted that "due to the unsystematic organization, there is a dispersion of technical forces, irrational use of materials, etc."

Lack of system and Beria are incompatible things, and by the end of 1939 the number of HF stations increased to 78, and the number of subscribers increased one and a half times and amounted to 430 numbers.

By July 1940, there were 103 communication lines, by April 1, 1941 - 116 HF stations and 729 subscribers.

Only stupid and lazy shoemakers go without boots, but Beria was neither stupid nor lazy. Therefore, the governmental high-frequency communications of the NKVD of the USSR also widely served the NKVD of the USSR itself.

Beria periodically returned to the topic of high-frequency communications and paid constant attention to it during the war. And those principles of the approach to the organization of closed communication lines that he introduced have not been archived to this day.

Cover in a small book all aspects of Beria's reform activities in the NKVD
impossible.

Let's take the sniper movement ... Beria himself shot very decently and ensured that his subordinates shot at least as well. As a result, snipers were not trained in the Red Army in the same way as they were trained in the NKVD of Beria - in such a massive and mandatory manner. But even in the attack, not to mention the trench warfare in defense, an average sniper cost at least a dozen ordinary fighters, and an excellent one - fifty!

Later, during the war, NKVD snipers were periodically sent on front-line missions, and the results of their combat work were such that army commanders, by hook or by crook, tried to keep them longer, although they themselves trained snipers in

were lazy on such a scale.

But the most outstanding, and simply great, result of Beria's activity as a reformer of the NKVD was the new border troops with effective intelligence of the border troops. They strongly rescued the country in the most difficult first days of the war.

With this I will end the story of the third great victory of Lavrenty Beria ...

The FIGURE of a border guard in the USSR, Stalin, was popular, comparable to the popularity of pilots. For example, the Ploshchad Revolyutsii Moscow metro station is decorated with bronze statues of young boys and girls, personifying the generations for which the October Revolution was made: pilots, sailors, students, workers and workers, miners... There is also a bronze border guard with a watchdog. Today, the muzzle of the dog is polished to a mirror shine - it has become fashionable to touch it "for good luck" ...

The border guard is the legendary Nikita Karatsupa, and the dog is the no less legendary Hindu, whose nickname was once known to all the boys of the Soviet Union.

Karatsupa and his comrades-in-arms, guarding the Soviet borders, became the pride of the people even before Beria came to the leadership of the NKVD, but it was Beria who gave the NKVD border troops not only glory, but also power!

He did not create the border troops, but he recreated ...

I have in my hands a weighty volume of documents "The Border Troops of the USSR. 1939 - June 1941", published in 1970 jointly by the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Political Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR.

Eight hundred and seven documents on eight hundred and twelve pages ... Hundreds, if not thousands of names - from ordinary border guards to deputy people's commissars ...

But looking for the name of the people's commissar here is a waste of time! It became a taboo for the Khrushchevites and remained a taboo for the Brezhnevites. And if the documents - as a rule, these are "reports from the NKVD to the central authorities" - do not have a signature, then it is clear: the document was signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the General Commissar of State Security of the USSR Beria.

And the "Message of the NKVD to the central authorities" should be deciphered as: "Beria - Stalin."

With all this, no one - neither before nor after Beria, did as much for the border troops as he did. He did it not in the sense that he fed pies and donuts, but in the sense that the organizational decisions and ideas of Beria and those whom he attracted to the restructuring of the border troops created a powerful and formidable mechanism from the border troops with huge

opportunities.

The Soviet Guard of the Red Army was born only during the war, in the autumn of 1941. But already before the war, the Soviet Union had its own guard - the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR. And this became clear from the very first hours of the Great Patriotic War - I will tell you more about this.

In general, **it will not be an exaggeration to assert that Beria's reforms on decades have determined the general appearance of the Soviet border troops!**

Publishers of the Orders of the NKVD of the USSR 1934-1941 published in the series "Catalogues" in Novosibirsk note that two-thirds of the orders of People's Commissar Beria for the troops concern the border troops of the NKVD.

Moreover, there were also such orders as "On the allocation of additional 150 horses to the disposal of the GUPV", that is, these were specific, business instructions, and not Brezhnev's "cardboard".

Every week, Beria was presented with reports on the political and moral state of the border troops, signed by the head of the Political Directorate of the border troops, divisional commissar P.M. Mironenko.

The results of attention and care of the new people's commissar affected quickly - not only special, but also purely military training of border guards.

Yes, the best traditions of the Soviet border guards were laid down already in the 20-30s, but

Beria developed them, starting with the fact that in 1939 the magazine "Pogranichnik" began to be published, which quickly gained popularity.

An ideological weapon, however, is effective when backed up by an effective organization and related material weapons.

Beria was a brilliant manager in everything, so he approached the improvement of the organization of the protection of the state border in a comprehensive manner. And at the same time, he, a natural Chekist, did not forget about the organization of intelligence work in the border troops, which will be said separately.

In 1993, the book of retired Major General Sechkin "Border and War" was published. Despite the front-line past of this border guard officer, I have no special respect for him for a number of reasons. But in terms of information, the book is not bad, and that's what we are there. we find:

"In February (1939 - S.K.), a decision was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars, which was separated from the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops as an independent Main Directorate of the Border Troops. The creation of a special body with clearly and precisely defined tasks and district administrations on the ground had a favorable effect on the organizational strengthening of the border troops as special troops designed to guard and protect the state border of the USSR ...

During 1938–1939 a complete reorganization of the units of the border troops was carried out; the headquarters of units and formations were reorganized according to a single control scheme from top to bottom, **intelligence agencies of units and formations of the border troops were also created according to a single scheme** (the emphasis here and below is mine, - S.K.); all departments of commandant's offices were reorganized in two main model states (land and coastal, <...>, the existing communications units were formed and re-formed, <...>, motorization of transport units was carried out, <...> formed ... 7 naval schools, 7 schools of service dogs were re-formed and communication school.

<...>

The technical reconstruction of the troops, **the re-equipment of the land border units with modern small arms** ... the development of border aviation, the introduction of engineering and technical into the protection of the border made increased demands on ... the preparation of means of the commanding and political staff.

<...>

By the beginning of 1941, command and engineering personnel for the border troops were being trained in 11 military educational institutions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

There is not a word about Beria here either; if Sechkin mentions him, it is only to smear him with black paint. But in everything described above, the signature of Lavrenty Pavlovich is visible: a clear structure, the development of technical means, training, reliable communications, motorization ...

And - let's not forget - intelligence! Mass intelligence, at an extremely low level, intelligence, in fact, carried out by ordinary people, by the people themselves, and therefore the most reliable and **reliable!**

It is appropriate to call such reconnaissance "ant" - an individual ant carries a little, but in the end a huge anthill grows! And the fact that the border detachments collected such intelligence information, which the GUGB, together with the GRU of the General Staff, could envy, is the merit of Beria! He perfectly placed such intelligence back in the ZakChK, and then in the ZakOGPU, so he knew its significance for the effective protection of both borders and the security of states, not in theory.

SO, by the end of 1939, the border troops had changed. And their high quality

was confirmed in the most obvious way - in battles ...

By the very nature of their functions, border guards should not fight like soldiers. And here - Beria's border guards fought, and how! By the end of 1939, their combat effectiveness was so good that in the Finnish war, which was replete with downright criminal miscalculations of the army, the situation sometimes developed anecdotal.

The joint directive of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria No. 16662 dated September 14, 1939, that is, before the start of hostilities, it was provided that with their start the border troops were under the operational subordination of the command of the Red Army until the units of the Red Army reached the line of 30-50 kilometers *in deep into Finnish territory*.

By mid-December, many units of the 9th Army reached this line, but the military commanders still demanded that they be allocated to support units of the border troops.

It ended with the fact that on December 17, the chief of staff of the border troops of the NKVD of the Karelian district, Colonel Kiselyov, sent a report to the headquarters of the 9th Army, in which he tactfully, but firmly reminded the army generals that the business of the border troops was to protect the state border, and not break through a heavily fortified defense.

As you can see, the border guards were able not only to detain violators, but also to fight like field troops, and fought better than the army. And Beria made sure that the "green caps" were able to fight even better and fight with the best weapons.

So, one of the surprises of the Finnish war that was unpleasant for us was the massive use of Suomi assault rifles by the Finns. There were samples of them in the People's Commissariat of Defense even before the war, but in the course of hostilities both new captured assault rifles appeared and the opportunity to get an idea of their effectiveness in battle.

However, none of the high military officials - neither the former People's Commissar Marshal Voroshilov, nor the People's Commissar Marshal Timoshenko who replaced him, nor the chief of armaments of the Red Army, Marshal Kulik, nor the chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov, ever appreciated the machine guns. Kulik, as he believed that machine guns, they say, are "weapons of the police and gangsters," but the Russian three-ruler, they say, will not let you down, and after the Finnish campaign he did not change his mind.

However, there is nothing to blame everything on Kulik - in the "swamp" of the pre-war People's Commissariat of Defense and there were plenty of other "pips".

Therefore, the army did not make mass industrial orders for machine guns, although there were good domestic developments in the USSR.

Alas, even after the Finnish war, the army did not favor machine guns. In 1940, with an established arms production, the industry of the USSR produced only 81.1 thousand submachine guns.

Soon - after the start of the Great Patriotic War - they were urgently ordered to be made almost as bed workshops - factory production could not satisfy the needs of the army, which finally understood what it was in a maneuverable battle - machine guns!

But the correct conclusions long before the war were made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Beria. And he ordered as many machine guns for the border troops as the cost estimate of the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops allowed.

By the beginning of 1941, only in the Ukrainian border district were armed with 300 heavy machine guns, more than 600 light machine guns and quite a few machine guns. And besides - about 500 cars - Beria did not forget about increasing the mobility of the border troops.

Five detachments of the Belarusian border district had 200 heavy machine guns, about 400 light machine guns, about 6.5 thousand self-loading rifles and 2.5 thousand machines.

Moreover, in 1940, to strengthen the fire capabilities of the frontier posts, an additional 3515 submachine guns (machine guns), 1200 self-loading rifles and 110 heavy machine guns were allocated, and in March - April 1941 - 357 RM-50 company mortars, 45 heavy machine guns and 18 anti-tank rifles .

This was what General Sechkin called "re-equipment of land border units with modern small arms", while "forgetting" to mention that such rearmament is the result of the perspicacity of People's Commissar Beria.

The relative saturation of the border troops with automatic weapons before the war many times exceeded the army's indicators. And with the outbreak of war, the NKVD sometimes had to share its supplies with the army, although Beria's subordinates themselves needed them for battles with the same Germans!

Until now, many are sure that Stalin did not believe in the imminence of the war already in 1941 year, that he was reassured by Beria, who was in charge of Soviet intelligence.

However, this is not entirely true, or rather, not at all!

In reality, everything was different - exactly the opposite, as mathematicians say.

Firstly, from February 3, 1941, Lavrenty Beria did not direct foreign intelligence, and Vsevolod Merkulov laid its data on the table for Stalin, because on February 3, the single people's commissariat - the NKVD was divided into two separate people's commissariats - internal affairs and state security.

The reasons for this will be discussed later.

The NKVD of the USSR was still led by Beria, and the NKGB was headed by his former first deputy and head of the GUGB Merkulov. Foreign intelligence remained, of course, in the NKGB, but this intelligence, by the way, did not reassure Stalin about the impossibility of war, but quite the contrary.

As for Beria, although he was no longer in charge of NKGB intelligence, he had reconnaissance of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

It was border intelligence, and among its informants there were no "cream of society", but ordinary people helped it: train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest settlers and residents of border towns ... They collected information like ants, and, put together, it gave the most an objective picture of what is happening.

The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was reflected in the notes of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria to Stalin.

I will cite - almost in full - three of them, published in the 1995 collection *Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table*. The collection was published jointly by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Moscow City Association of Archives. Bold text everywhere my.

So...

"Memoir of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIA I.V.
STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE S.K. TYMOSHENKO
ON THE TRANSFER OF THE GERMAN TROOPS TO THE SOVIET BORDER
AND VIOLATION OF THE USSR AIRSPACE.

"No. 1196/B April 21, 1941

Top secret

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the general government.

In the border zone of the Klaipeda region: Two infantry divisions, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, **a tank battalion** and a company of scooters arrived.

In the Suwalki-Lykk area: Up to two motorized mechanized divisions arrived, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, **tank and engineer battalions**.

In the Myshinets-Ostrolenka area: Up to four infantry and one artillery regiments, **a tank battalion** and a motorcycle battalion.

In the area of Ostrov-Mazowiecki - Malkinya-Gurna: One infantry and

one cavalry regiment, up to two artillery battalions and **a company of tanks.**

In the Biala Podlaska region: One infantry regiment, **two sapper regiments arrived battalion**, cavalry squadron, scooter company and artillery battery.

In the area of Vlodava-Otkhovok: Arrived up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery regiments.

In the area of the city of Holm: Up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment and a **sapper battalion arrived. Over five hundred cars** are also concentrated there .

In the Hrubieszow region: Up to four infantry, one artillery and one motorized regiments and a cavalry squadron arrived.

In the Tomashov area: The headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and **up to three hundred tanks,**

In the Pshevorsky-Yaroslav area: We arrived up to an infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments.

<...>

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, squadron, battery, and **often at night.** In the same areas where the troops arrived, **a large amount of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles were delivered.**

In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified.

<...>

During the period from April 1 to April 19, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 km.

Most of the planes were fixed over the areas: Riga, Kretinga, Taurogen, Lomzha, Rava-Russkaya, Przemyśl, Rivne.

Application: scheme.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

Such information was sent from the NKVD to Stalin on a regular basis, and it acquired an increasingly formidable and unambiguous meaning. So, on June 2, 1941, Beria personally sent a note to Stalin No. 1798 / B:

"The border detachments of the NKVD of the Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR obtained the following information about the military activities of the Germans near the border with the USSR.

Two army groups concentrated in the areas of Tomasov and Lezhaysk . In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were identified: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanov ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierz manor ..., commanded by General Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. Movement troops occurs mainly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and one hundred aircraft were delivered to the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) . <...>

Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border: May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of the town of Ulguek ..., May 18 - a general with a group of officers - in the Belzhets area ..., on May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in the Radymno area.

Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated in many points near the border. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov. <...>

In addition, information was received about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction of the borders with the USSR ...

<...>

Reason: telegraphic reports of districts.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

Three days later, on June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note (No. 1868/B) to that same topic:

"Border detachments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR additionally (our No. 1798/B dated June 2 of this year) the following data was obtained:
 Along the Soviet-German border
 May 20 this year in Byala Podlaska ... the location of the headquarters of the infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the **personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the headquarters of the tank formation are noted.**
 In the Yanov-Podlyasky area, 33 km northwest of Brest, **pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges are concentrated.** <...>
 May 31 at st. Sanok arrived **a train with tanks.**<...>
 On May 20, up to a hundred aircraft took off from the Modlin airfield .
 Along the Soviet-Hungarian border
 In the city of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the area Khusta - German tank and motorized units.
 Along the Soviet-Romanian border
 <...> During May 21–24, they proceeded from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border: through st. Pashkans - **12 echelons of German infantry with tanks**; through st. Craiova - **two echelons with tanks**; at st. Three echelons of infantry arrived at Dormenashti and at st. Borshchov two echelons **with heavy tanks** and cars.
 At the airfield in the Buzeu area ... **up to 250 German aircraft were noted.** <...>
 In Dorokhoi Uyezd, the gendarmerie and local authorities proposed to the population within five days, arrange a bomb shelter near each house.
 The General Staff of the Red Army has been informed.
 Reason: telegraphic reports of districts.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

Today, only a few pre-war notes by Beria to Stalin with data on the growing threat near the borders of the USSR are available for analysis. But there is no doubt that Beria constantly, including in the half-month remaining before the start of the war, sent Stalin the accumulating data as they were obtained by the agents of the border troops of the NKVD.

Stalin had many objective reasons to doubt the reliability of the data of external, "salon", so to speak, intelligence. But the data of the "ant" intelligence of Beria could not be disinformation, and Stalin could not help but understand this.

The topic of the last pre-war six months, and especially the last pre-war week, is beyond the scope of this book. But, taking into account what I wrote on this topic earlier, and what I know now, I can confidently say that it was not Stalin who missed the start of the war, but the highest generals in Moscow and in the districts.

It seems that the "burp" of the conspiracy of Tukhachevsky - Yakir - played its fatal meaning Uborevich...

But as for Beria, he - as the head of the NKVD, first created a mechanism for accurate information about possible external aggression, and then used the possibilities of this mechanism for accurate, complete and timely information from the top leadership, including Stalin, about the imminence and inevitability of this aggression in 1941.

Lavrenty Beria was at his best here too!

And that's not it!

The border troops, transformed under the leadership of Beria, played in the initial period of the border battle not even an operational, but a strategic role, because the disruption in the pace of the "blitzkrieg" already in the first days of the war had in the future precisely

strategic importance. Namely, in this - in disrupting the pace, knocking down arrogance from the Wehrmacht, the border guards played an outstanding role, which no one demanded from them before the war, and no one expected.

Here it is necessary to say the following ...

During the 1939–1940s, the personnel of the border troops increased by 50%, and at the beginning of 1941, allegedly “not preparing for war,” Beria also sought an additional increase in their numbers, bringing it to 100 thousand people on the western border within five border **military** districts: Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa.

There were eight **border** western districts: Murmansk, Karelo-Finnish, Leningrad, Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and Black Sea.

It was a force, multiplied by the fact that it was united both in combat and in ideological respect.

Moreover, 47% of the number of all Western border troops were concentrated in the Belarusian and Ukrainian border districts. And this proves that Beria saw the directions of the possible main attacks of the Germans better than the General Staff of the Red Army!

Yes, and how could one not foresee the development of events, conveying to Stalin that information that Beria passed on to him?

And could Beria not feel the pre-stormy atmosphere, if he knew such a statistics...

In the first quarter of 1940, among the very numerous violators of the border (and it was violated by both smugglers and godfathers on opposite sides of the border who decided to visit relatives), 28 German agents were exposed, in the second quarter - 43, in the third - 64, in the fourth - 99, and in the first quarter of 1941 - already 153.

Of course, Beria understood everything, and prepared the border troops in advance for close combat operations.

The border guards were better prepared for war than the army through the whole practice of their service. If the army fires live ammunition at the enemy only with the start of the war, then the border troops are always at war - for them the Great Patriotic War began long before 22 June.

For example, in April 1941, a reconnaissance group crossed the border at the 86th border detachment section ... Sixteen people dressed in the uniform of the Red Army engineering troops ... After our border guards met with them, a uniform battle began. As a result, 11 saboteurs were killed, 5 were taken prisoner.

This was not an isolated case - from April to November 1940, 38 gangs and armed emigrant groups totaling 486 people were liquidated in the Ukrainian border district alone! But in general, on the eve of the war, the border guards repelled more than 500 armed incursions into Soviet territory.

Yes, the border was prepared in advance. In the monograph A.I. Chugunov "The border is fighting" it is said about this as follows:

“As for the border outposts, commandant's offices and detachments, in a short (pre-war! - S.K.) time they managed to equip light-type defensive structures: dugouts, trenches, communication passages, bunkers, trenches, which made it possible to create relatively strong nodes of resistance during the fighting on the front line.

Would all this be possible without the sanction of People's Commissar Beria? And would he have given this sanction if, like his subordinates, he had not seen a very high probability of the outbreak of war already in 1941?

After all, communication passages and trenches are not equipped a year before the start of the war.

And this is how the border guards of Beria met the war - according to the testimony of the same A.I. Chugunov:

"The last night before the invasion for the border troops of the western and northwestern sectors was in fact no longer peaceful. On the evening of June 21, many (? - S.K.) outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments, by order of their superiors, left the barracks and occupied defensive structures prepared in case of hostilities.

But who gave orders to the chiefs? And what does "...many" mean? What - at some outposts, the bosses said to their subordinates: "Guys! The night is warm, starry, let's sit this night in the trenches! You can see the stars better from them...", but at some outposts the night was cloudy, and there you didn't sit down in the trenches to admire the stars?

No!

Such a responsible order as an order to take up combat positions in the evening could come to the outposts only from Moscow, from the people's commissariat. And only the Commissar himself could give such an order. That is, Beria. And, of course, for the entire western strip of the border.

Moreover!

On the night of June 21-22, 1941, Grigory Grigoryevich Sokolov, head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, was on the site of the 87th border detachment of the Belarusian border district!

What, Lieutenant General Sokolov happened to be there - in the direction of the main attack of the Germans?

Of course, the main border guard of the country could not be at the border without a direct order from Beria and without the sanction of Stalin. Since it was already clear to both of them that a difficult war would begin from day to day, Sokolov was needed right there, in Belarus, in order to immediately organize the combat work of border guards already in war conditions with the start of hostilities.

That's why Sokolov was in the border zone! For KGB participation in a close war! One fact that Beria sent to Belarus on the eve of the war the head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR refutes the lie that Stalin and Beria did not believe in the imminence of the war, why the mission of General Sokolov is strenuously kept quiet to this day!

But the truth is this: only for the border troops of the NKVD did the war begin in the trenches, and not in beds, which is the merit primarily of Beria.

And one experienced border soldier in a complex, dynamic battle without a single front line, without a clear command, cost, perhaps, five, or even ten, or even *fifty* regular conscripts.

The personnel of the border troops were almost without exception Party and Komsomol, and this was the true guard of the socialist Motherland - the purest, most perfect and exciting human result of the new, Soviet, system ...

Before the war, there were about one hundred thousand of them, young and older guys in green caps, guardsmen of Beria, on the western borders: 47 land and 6 sea border detachments, 9 separate border commandant's offices and 11 regiments of the operational troops of the NKVD. And in the war that began, they immediately played a role, I repeat, without exaggeration, a strategic one!

They kept *for days* in an environment in which army units would roll back within *hours*.

The army met the war in different ways... On the whole, it was heroic, but often it was mediocre, criminal—criminal, first of all, in terms of command at different levels. The failures of part of the army led to a general failure.

But the Soviet border guards, under the leadership of a member of the party of Lenin - Stalin, Comrade Beria, met the war only with dignity. That is, like the Bolsheviks and Russian people - chest!

FOR THEIR combat commissar, the war began in Stalin's Kremlin office, when in 5 hours 45 minutes on June 22, Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis and Zhukov entered there ...

Later, at eight o'clock, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov approached...
Ahead were 1418 days of a huge, Great War, culminating in a great Victory...
But in this war, Lavrenty Beria also had his own victories.

Chapter 4

1941–1945 Victory in the name of the common Victory: the organizer of the fronts and military rear

By the beginning of 1941, it was already clear to Stalin that Beria would be used only as the head of the NKVD means to use it irrationally.

Stalin's employees worked to the extent that Stalin himself worked then, that is - worked as long as needed for the job. And since there was always business for twenty-five hours a day, then ...

It is clear how much Stalin's employees and associates worked. And Beria was also the most efficient.

Nevertheless, the working day can be filled with different content, and from February 3, 1941, the distribution of Beria's duties has changed significantly. On this day, a single people's commissariat - the NKVD was divided into two separate people's commissariats: the NKVD of the USSR, which was still led by Lavrenty Beria, and the NKGB - the people's commissariat of state security, headed by Vsevolod Merkulov.

At the same time, Beria's workload only ... increased, since, while remaining People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he was also appointed one of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Molotov was then the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and also the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, but on May 5, 1941, Stalin himself headed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. This, by the way, proves once again that he was expecting war this year.

By the beginning of 1941, the state position of Beria had already been defined as paramount. In the mass reference calendar for 1941, which was being prepared for printing and printed, of course, before the beginning of the year, Beria was awarded a separate article on the entire page, which reported that "Comrade. Beria is one of the most prominent leaders of the CPSU (b) and the closest students and associates of Comrade Stalin.

From March 1939, Beria was a candidate member of the Politburo, and now his state status was also rising. However, in Stalin's USSR, this only meant that the level of responsibility and workload increased.

Through the Council of People's Commissars, Beria oversaw the people's commissariats of state security, the forestry industry, non-ferrous metallurgy, the oil industry and the people's commissariat of the river fleet.

Things went to war, Beria not only understood this, he knew it. But no one expected that the war would start like this - inexplicably unsuccessful, tragic, catastrophic. Stalin met June 22, 1941 calmly - he prepared the country, its economy, its peoples and its Armed Forces a lot for war ...

The fact that Minsk would be surrendered on the sixth day of the war, Stalin could not have imagined in the most unfavorable development of events. An analysis of the reasons for the failure is also beyond the scope of a small book, especially since I have already spoken on this topic more than once in past books. But the more closely I peer into those days, the more clearly one black, charred word rises before my eyes: "Treason" ...

The betrayal was not total, but after all, one traitor who secretly opened the gates of the fortress to the enemy was enough for the fortress, with all its preparedness and power, to fall. No, I cannot be tempted to delve into explanations and simply return to the topic of Beria in the war.

On June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created - of course, it could not have done without Beria. But this was only the beginning - on June 30, all power was concentrated in

the hands of the State Defense Committee (GOKO or GKO). It was headed, of course, by Stalin. On the eve, after an almost continuous, round-the-clock first military week, after Minsk, he experienced a daily breakdown, but quickly overcame it and harnessed himself to a military "cart" for years, loaded with a variety of different problems.

Beria entered the very first composition of the GKO. In addition to Stalin and him, Molotov (deputy chairman), Malenkov and Voroshilov became members of the first composition. Each was a major figure, but there were two "workhorses" here - Beria and Malenkov. Looking ahead, I'll say that they really formed a kind of business "tandem" for many years – until Stalin's death. The comparison with the tandem came, however, from the West, but it is quite possible to agree with it ...

On July 20, 1941, the NKGB was again merged into the NKVD under the general leadership of Beria under Merkulov, his first deputy. With the outbreak of hostilities, two deputies of Beria - deputy for troops Ivan Maslennikov and another deputy Sergey Kruglov - left for the front and the duties of monitoring the work of the departments and departments of the NKVD of the USSR were redistributed.

The 1st Directorate (intelligence abroad) was assigned directly to the people's commissar; Investigation department for especially important cases; 2nd (operational equipment), 4th (Special Technical Bureau, HF communications) and 5th (ciphers) special departments; Secretariat of the Special Meeting; Control and Inspection Group; Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR and TsFPO - Central Financial and Planning Department.

Enough for one person?

It is significant that Beria personally left the supervision of high-frequency communications, realizing its increased importance. After all, now the troops spoke with Stalin over the high-frequency lines, and Stalin spoke with the troops. Therefore, it is no coincidence that it was after the start of the war that the provision of stable secret communications for direct negotiations between the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the fronts and armies was completely entrusted to the NKVD.

And by order of the NKVD No. 001430 dated October 2, 1941, government HF communications became an independent structure within the People's Commissariat - the Department of Government Communications of the NKVD of the USSR.

And again, on the one hand, the people who control the war, more and more got into the taste of high-frequency communications, but, on the other hand, Beria himself contributed to this in every possible way, constantly expanding the circle of subscribers even on his own initiative.

So, on March 27, 1942, Stalin wrote "For!" on Beria's report on the installation of high-frequency telephone sets at the heads of the rear of the active fronts, and on October 22, 1942, Beria, even without the sanction of the Supreme Commander, ordered the installation of high-frequency devices for the heads of the Air Forces of the Oryol, Stalingrad and North Caucasian districts.

Actually, by October 1942, Beria made a decision to bring high-frequency communications to each army operating within the fronts.

But this was only part of what Beria had been doing since June 22, 1941. So, by order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00101 dated June 29, 1941, Beria was introduced to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The previous order No. 00100 dated 06/29/41 was also dedicated to Beria.

Here is its full text:

"Proceed immediately to the formation of 15 divisions, of which 10 are rifle and 5 are motorized. For the formation of divisions, use part of the personnel of the commanding and rank and file of the border and internal troops of the NKVD.

Missing personnel to be covered from the reserve.

The formation of divisions is entrusted to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Beria L.P.

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to provide the emerging divisions with human and material resources and weapons at the request of the NKVD.

Headquarters of the High Command

**TYMOSHENKO
STALIN
ZHUKOV".**

In fact, the formation of new military formations is the task of the army, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. But, as we see, Beria was needed here too. And he already had enough tasks - like the head of special services. I will list only a few - except for the formation of divisions on the basis of the NKVD troops and the border troops ...

So:

- the creation of barrage detachments to protect the rear of the fronts;
 - organization of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind the front line, as well as
 - and the partisan movement;
 - Chekist counterintelligence (that is, counteraction to enemy intelligence, including radio games, etc.), the fight against sabotage, the protection of strategic facilities ...
- And, of course - the external illegal intelligence of the NKVD, again passed under the hand of Beria.

In addition, military counterintelligence, the Special Departments, returned to the NKVD. In February 1941, during the division of the NKVD, they were transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy and transformed into the Third Directorate of these People's Commissariats. Now it was necessary to rebuild them again - on the go.

And all this - **only through the NKVD.**

Well, Lavrenty Beria, who turned forty-third in 1941, met the war as an already recognized master of unraveling any tangle of problems.

WHY, with the living Marshal Timoshenko, the living Chief of the General Staff Zhukov and in the presence of the apparatus of the military department, was the Chekist Beria entrusted with the formation of new army divisions?

The answer is obvious: the situation required not just new divisions, but strong, **persistent** divisions, and demanded **immediately!** And since Beria's border troops turned out to be the most persistent, and since Beria could do it **quickly**, Beria had to work for Timoshenko and Zhukov.

After his arrest in June 1953, Beria wrote in a letter to Malenkov:

"The first weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western Front - which the Germans strongly pressed ... Our joint work to create, under the leadership of the State Committee, the Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin, the Reserve Front to protect the approaches to Moscow ... For the Reserve Front alone, 15 full-blooded Chekist military divisions were organized ... "

Of course, Beria did not then stand on the parade ground, doing drill. As always and everywhere, he selected competent executors, and left for himself the functions of control and prompt solution of those emerging problems that his subordinates could not solve.

Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov did a lot to form the KGB divisions - Chekist colleague of Beria in Transcaucasia. Having come to the leadership of the NKVD, Beria pulled him to Moscow as well. And it was, as always, a good choice.

Under Lieutenant General Maslennikov, an operational group of five people was created with the task: "The concentration of personnel allocated from the NKVD troops should be completed by 17

July."

The border guards of the border districts have already fought - some in the troops for the protection of the rear of the fronts, some surrounded or in combat units. And the new KGB divisions were formed primarily due to the best personnel of the border troops

Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Trans-Baikal districts.

Exposing even secondary sections of the border was a risky business, but the risk was justified, and from distant border circles to the places of formation, in particular to Yaroslavl, in a matter of days (for 8-11 days) from Transcaucasia and Central Asia, 3 thousand commanders and 10 thousand sergeants and privates.

Plus - 500 people each from the personnel of the Leningrad, Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts that emerged from the encirclement.

In total - more than 15 thousand combat core for 15 divisions. Strong cadres were also taken from the reserve of the Red Army. The border guards played the role of alloying additives in ordinary steel, and the alloy turned out great!

Almost all command positions in the divisions were occupied by border guards. Graduates of the Kharkov Cavalry Border School became platoon commanders, students of the Higher Border School became battalion commanders.

The first year of the war was a bitter year for the Soviet border guards - after all, then tens of thousands of our guys, beautiful, devoted to the Motherland and professionally able to defend it, died. However, the same year became for the Soviet border guards and the "star" year, because never before or after the value of the border troops for the country was not so significant!

Then the fate of Russia was decided, and the border guards did so much to ensure its future, like, perhaps, no one else.

On the KGB emblem - a shield and a sword. During the first battles with the enemy, the Chekists-border guards could not be a sword - the enemy was covered with too strong armor, and the sword of the army had to get it through this armor. But the border guards became a shield for the country, holding back and holding back the onslaught, weakening it and winning the main condition of future victory in those days - time.

It was truly a collective feat accomplished on the scale of war and history almost instantly. And in the way it was done, Beria's style was visible. However, he would not be able to impose his style on the work of subordinates if he interfered in the details. He gave the right impulse, the initial push in the right direction, and after that he moved on to another task. He didn't have two or three of them. And not even five!

If everything went as it should, Beria further limited himself to receiving operational information about the progress of affairs. If something went wrong, he quickly corrected the situation and again gave the initiative to his subordinates.

So it was here! The decision to partially expose non-belligerent borders is up to the people's commissar. Moreover, it was not for nothing that Beria widely used the Transcaucasian border guards - after all, they were, in fact, his direct pupils.

So he gave a directive. And then - help only when it is needed.

Putting together six divisions of the first stage took place at a Beria pace - ahead of schedule, because the front did not wait - in the area of the former ZapOVO, the current Western Front, a huge gap was formed through which German troops poured and poured into Russia. And Beria's cadres had to close the gap.

The oath was taken on the way and at combat positions - this was dictated by the situation at the front. All fifteen divisions went where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western Front, five (265, 268, 262, 257 and 259th) - to the North-Western.

The BORDER battle was lost by the army, and now it was necessary to think about organizing defense in the Moscow strategic direction.

On July 14, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command issues order No. 00334 on the creation of a front of reserve armies at the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk in order to prepare for a stubborn defense.

The front included six armies (29th, 30th, 24th, 28th, 31st and 32nd), four of which were commanded by border guards: the 30th - the head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district, Major General V.A. Khomenko, who died in 1943; 31st - Chief of the troops of the Karelian-Finnish border district, Major General V.N. Dalmatov; 24th - Chief of the troops of the Baltic border district, Major General K.I. Rakutin, who died in October 1941 and was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The 29th Army, having formed Chekist divisions, was received by Lieutenant General Maslennikov. He will fight valiantly and skillfully, end the war as an army general, commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of four orders of Lenin, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov I degree, two orders of Kutuzov I degree.

In October 1948, from the post of commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Maslennikov returned to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - deputy minister, but not Beria, but Kruglov. On April 16, 1954, less than a year after the death of Beria, his military commissar during the war, Maslennikov, foreseeing a wrongful arrest, would shoot himself.

Let us return, however, to the year 41.

Was it accidental that of the six armies that covered Moscow in the summer of 1941, four were commanded by border generals?

I think no.

The commander of the fronts of the reserve armies was also appointed a border guard - a former head of the troops of the Belarusian border district, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov.

On July 30, 1941, the Reserve Army Front was transformed into the Reserve Front under command of G.K. Zhukov (he invited Bogdanov as his deputy).

Let's calculate...

On the western border, the war was met by about a hundred thousand border guards, and almost everyone fought for several army men. In fact, the border guards then became the last reserve of command at all levels, at whose disposal the soldiers of Beria turned out to be the will of fate and military chance.

At the same time, until September 25, 1941, the border troops themselves had peacetime states, that is, they did not have means of reinforcement: anti-tank weapons, artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns ... After all, the border guards protect the border from violators, and do not reflect the aggression of the enemy. Fighting is the task of the army.

By the second half of July, in addition to the 100,000 border guards already fighting, the country received at least 100,000 soldiers of border condition, the backbone of which was 15,000 of the best border guards. And the fact that, on the one hand, it was they who were thrown to close the breakthrough, and on the other hand, Stalin also instructed Beria's border guards to occupy a new strategic line, speaks of the outstanding role of the border troops in the initial period of the war.

However, this role turned out to be downplayed already in the very first capital studies. about the Great Patriotic War. It is not appreciated to this day.

Why?

Is it because it is impossible to evaluate the border troops on their merits without mentioning who prepared the border troops for war, who was responsible for the formation of 15 divisions and the creation of a front of reserve armies, which almost immediately became belligerents from reserve ones?

The Beriev divisions actually broke the "blitzkrieg" in the Moscow direction. This merit alone would be enough to immortalize the name of the one who did it, but today Beria's military victory has simply been forgotten!

Someone will say that it was not Beria who fought, he did not command the armies ... But he answered something before Stalin and the rate for the formation of an operational strategic reserve, he.

The year 1941 ended, the Red Army carried out a successful counter-offensive near Moscow and there were hopeful prospects for the summer of 1942. However, in reality

it turned out differently - by the end of the summer of 1942, the Germans not only approached Stalingrad, but also successfully developed an offensive in the Caucasian direction.

The situation in the Caucasus by August was critical. Demonstrating his intention to deliver the main blow to Moscow by Army Group Center in 1942, Hitler considered the Blau plan to capture the Caucasus to be the main one.

And the Caucasus is, in the end, Baku ...

And Baku...

Well, what is Baku, clearly!

Baku is oil.

Moreover, in 1942, the Baku oil fields produced almost all the oil that provided both the front and the rear.

And this is how the first, "Khrushchev" 6-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War". On page 461 of volume 2 it says:

"The command of the German Army Group A believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus had lost their combat effectiveness and could no longer offer significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regroup troops with the aim of simultaneously developing an offensive against Baku and Batumi. The 1st Panzer Army was deployed with a front to the southeast and was supposed to advance ... in the direction of Grozny - Makhachkala - Baku. The 17th Army received the task of advancing from the Krasnodar region to Novorossiysk, seizing it and developing an offensive along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi-Batumi. The 491st Mountain Rifle Corps was supposed to strike from the Cherkessk region through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range, reach the Sukhumi region and facilitate the breakthrough of the 17th Army to the Black Sea coast.

On August 18, fighting began in the passes ... "

On August 18, Beria took part in a meeting with Stalin, as well as on the night of August 20-21, where there were also generals from the General Staff Bodin and Bokov. But already on the morning of August 21, Beria, with a group of generals and officers, flew through Central Asia to Tbilisi.

He returned to Moscow only on September 17, **and in less than a month, in fact, restored the Caucasian front and stabilized the situation in the Caucasus.**

I have said more than once that Beria cannot be removed from Soviet history with one stroke of a razor. So this time, in the 13th volume of the 2nd edition of the TSB, signed for publication on June 27, 1952 year, in the article "Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic", no one bothered to cut out (and how can you cut them out without noticing!?) the following lines on page 53:

"In the summer of 1942, at the cost of huge losses, the troops of the Nazi invaders broke through to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. On behalf of I.V. Stalin in these terrible days for the peoples of the USSR L.P. Beria led the defense of the Caucasus. L.P. Beria closely linked the work of the rear and the front and ensured the brilliant implementation of Stalin's plan for the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus ... "

Nevertheless, in the Soviet post-Stalinist historiography about the role of Beria in protecting Caucasus - even in a negative way - we will not find a word.

In the current anti-Soviet "historiography" it is told that the tyrant de Beria, sent by the "tyrant" Stalin as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the Caucasus, interfered in every possible way with defending the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. You don't have to look far for an example - "Triumph and Tragedy", Dmitry Volkogonov: "The archives testify: ... on behalf of Stalin, he instilled fear in military workers, filmed objectionable people, shot him ..."

However, he does not report the names of the executed Volkogonov - they simply did not exist. And here remove Beria really removed someone ...

For example, on August 28, 1942, he removed Major General Sergatskov from command of the 46th Army and appointed Major General Leselidze in his place. Those who wish can independently familiarize themselves with the combat biography of one and the other and decide whether Beria was right.

In agreement with the Headquarters, he actually removed the commander of the North Caucasian Front, Marshal Budyonny, from his post, and on September 1, 1942, Stalin, on the recommendation of Beria, decided to unite the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts into one Transcaucasian front.

However, having arrived in the Caucasus, Lavrenty Beria did not arrange dispersal, although not without it. He nominated people, and not only Leselidze. So, the same age as Leselidze, the future Marshal Andrei Grechko, became Beria's "godson". On September 8, 1942, Beria appointed him commander of the 47th Army. True, later Grechko kept quiet about such a "kinship".

The main thing that the representative of the Headquarters and a member of the State Defense Committee was engaged in was the organization of the liquidation of the breakthrough.

On August 8, 1942, even before Beria left for the Caucasus, the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front was created, commanded by Lieutenant General Maslennikov. The idea of this appointment belonged, of course, to Beria. And now Beria himself, with General Bodin, Colonel Shtemenko and a group of his old "Caucasian" cadres, arrived in Tbilisi to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front Tyulenev.

The cavalryman, Lieutenant General Bodin advanced during the war, by the summer of 1942 he was one of the deputies of the General Staff. Beria had a sharp eye for people, and he clearly looked after Bodin, having "married" him to the post of chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front.

Bodin "came to court", but died during the Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze operation in November 1942. Buried in Tbilisi.

And if he had not died, he could have gone far - with the light hand of Beria. He's people advanced and supported boldly.

So, with the arrival of a group of Muscovites led by Beria in Tbilisi, a lot of work began.

Fifty-two years old in 1942, Army General Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev, before the war, commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District, and shortly after it began, he was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, which became the Transcaucasian Front in May 1942. Beria knew him for a long time and well and helped him strongly.

It was Beria who helped in what he could and was obliged to help in Transcaucasia - in mobilization of people, reserves and economy.

However, Beria began with questions of purely military planning, that is, with questions in fact, commanders ...

Many years after the war, Tyulenev wrote (without mentioning Beria's name, of course):

"Some of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed.

Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. On instructions from Moscow, we developed a new plan for the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range: it was divided into areas, headed by experienced commanders and staffs.

Tyulenev writes about Headquarters, but Beria is immediately visible behind such a concept of defense. At the same time, he, as a rule, did not get involved in operational decisions - where and what units to send, how to plan strikes, etc. He himself was so professional in what he was professional in that he always respected professionalism in others.

It was necessary to create a defense in depth. During August and September 1942, five or six defensive lines were built on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny and Makhachkala, and more than ten on the approaches to Baku. On construction

90 thousand people of the local population were employed daily.

The nerve of all this was Beria, but perhaps even more significant and even decisive was the role of Beria in mobilizing the economy of Transcaucasia to ensure the interests of the front.

Not a word, of course, without saying a word about Beria, volume 2 of the "Khrushchev" "History of the Great Patriotic War", published in 1961 (Grechko was also a member of the editorial committee), reported this:

“... On September 9, martial law was declared in the republics of Transcaucasia.

Due to the fact that the main communications connecting Transcaucasia with the industrial regions of the country turned out to be intercepted by the enemy, in Transcaucasia, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee, the plan for the production of military products was increased Many enterprises, especially local industries, were completely transferred to the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment for the army ... The increase in the production of military materials in the Transcaucasian republics allowed the State Defense Committee to reduce centralized supplies to the troops defending the Caucasus. The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from the industrial centers of the country only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms were produced on the spot.

It's all about Beria!

Of course, the situation was broken by the efforts of millions of people. But the original impulse these efforts were given by him, Lavrenty Beria.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the battle for the Caucasus took place against the backdrop of the beginning battle for Stalingrad, and therefore Beria and his comrades in Transcaucasia also defended Stalingrad, allowing them to transfer the maximum possible due to the fact that the Caucasus

I started doing a lot myself.

Here is another evidence of the outstanding role of Beria in the defense of the Caucasus, and again - without a single word about who organized the events described below. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, writes in his memoirs:

“... Simultaneously with the Battle of Stalingrad, a grandiose battle for the Caucasus unfolded. Moreover, on a huge front stretching from the Black to the Caspian Sea. And if the supply of weapons and ammunition to our troops in the Stalingrad region was difficult, then the Caucasian epic in this respect was generally unsurpassed in its complexity ...

The supply of arms and ammunition to the troops defending here ... should was to go in a roundabout way - through Central Asia, Krasnovodsk, Baku ...

However, the transports were ...

The industrial enterprises of Transcaucasia also worked with a huge load. Under the leadership of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (whose work was led by Beria. - S.K.) , they switched to military production and gave the front thousands of guns, mortars and ammunition.

It's hard to believe, but it happened. Somehow I was informed that something similar to an equipment factory had been created in Baku. And on the basis of ... urban waste. And in Tbilisi, the building of the slaughterhouse was adapted for this. And at such and such "factories" for five months of work, 647 thousand hand grenades, 1.2 million mines, 549.5 thousand artillery shells were equipped!

Yakovlev exclaims: "Is this not a manifestation of the selfless devotion of the working people Transcaucasia to their socialist Motherland!"

Yes, that's right.

But this is also another proof of how Beria skillfully organized these workers, whom **he** brought up before the war as citizens of a large country, citizens of the USSR.

In the Caucasus, he was his own, because the Caucasus was his own. Of course, in any case, Beria would have given all his best in the Caucasus to the end, as well as on any other sector of the front where Stalin would have sent him. However, in the Caucasus, Beria defended not only the great Motherland - The Soviet Union, but also the "small" homeland ... So, for the mobilization of Transcaucasia for the struggle, the Caucasian Beria was an ideal figure in every respect. He was born here, he was here like a fish in water, he had authority, he relied on people he had found and promoted in his time.

Beria stayed in the Caucasus for less than a month, but he saved the Caucasus. Alas, later this great victory of his in the name of Russia after 1953 was turned topsy-turvy - they say, Beria almost surrendered the Caucasus ...

I respect the memory of Beria's son, Sergo, but I treat his memories in many of their parts not without skepticism. However, what he said about his father's role in the defense of the Caucasus is entirely historical:

"Father arrived at the front at a critical moment, when the command was in complete confusion. The Germans penetrated rather deeply into the rear, captured the Klukhorsky, Marukhsky, Mamisonky passes ... Together with comrades from the General Staff, with the huge support of the local population, my father managed to normalize the situation ... "

I draw the reader's attention to the train of thought and style of Beria's son. He does not write arrogantly: "my father managed to normalize the situation," but emphasizes: "together with comrades from the General Staff, with the huge support of the local population ..."

As you can see, Beria managed to convey to his son his attitude to the matter: only collective efforts ensure success, but these efforts must be united by a leader.

Well, okay, this is the opinion of the son. But here is an assessment that is worth a lot not only because of who **gave** it, but also because of **when** it was given ...

In the summer of 1953, when Beria was arrested and publicly defamed, his comrade General Maslennikov, outraged by an article published in the journal Military Thought, sent a letter to the editor, where he wrote:

"... the authors only casually and extremely briefly mention the enormous creative work and fundamental political organizational measures that Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria carried out, who created a radical change that changed the whole situation, despite the extremely difficult situation that had developed on the Caucasian fronts by August 1942. A similar description of the activities of Comrade L.P. Beria does not give an exhaustive picture of all the activities that were carried out under the personal and direct leadership of Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria ... "

To write **this** when Beria was officially declared an enemy of the people is ...

Well, it is clear how it should be regarded.

During the war, on different fronts and at different times, many representatives of Stalin visited: Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich ... Someone had a greater influence on the situation, someone less ... Kaganovich, by the way, at the end of 1942 more spent a month in Tbilisi, and there was some sense in it, although not always and not in everything ...

However, the role of Beria in the defense of Transcaucasia in the still unwritten objective history of the war should be highlighted. Perhaps in no other military case has the individual so clearly imposed his influence on the events, powerfully contributing to the collective success.

And it's time to admit it!

IN THE FIRST period of the war, Beria had to create a front of reserve armies and recreate the Transcaucasian front.

But there were two more "fronts" on which Beria fought before the war, during the war, and even after it.

The first, as the reader has probably already guessed, is the "invisible front" behind the visible front line, intelligence.

The second - the front is also without a front line, namely, the fight against the nationalist underground and gangs of nationalists in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine.

I will not talk about the last "front" here - in order to save the reader's time. Although a separate documentary study can be written about this hypostasis of Beria and his services to Russia on this path. Let me pause for a bit...

After the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB, Beria again oversaw foreign intelligence, more precisely - **and** exploration. And here are three intelligence stories for you, known from the words of Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya-Rybkina. A ripe Russian beauty, a colonel in foreign intelligence, she began work in the late 20s and before the war was part of the leadership of the German branch. You can also write books about her, but she wrote about herself and about intelligence - in the book "Under the pseudonym Irina."

Rybkina's book is not free from inaccuracies, but Zoya Ivanovna knew a lot, in participating a lot...

In the middle of 1940, the head of the 5th (INO) department of the GUGB NKVD, Pavel Fitin, instructed Rybkina to "unwind" an experienced Abwehr agent, the staff captain of the tsarist army, Alexander Sergeevich Nelidov. At first he resisted, but eventually gave up. Nelidov took part in the headquarters military games of the German General Staff and provided valuable information ...

The operation with Nelidov continued after the separation of the people's commissariats in February 1941, and when, on July 20, 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united under the leadership of Beria, he ordered Nelidov ... to be released.

To release, encourage and offer to move to neutral Turkey, Nelidov is well known, as an intelligence officer of the NKVD. In such a proposal there was an accurate psychological calculation and the ability to understand - to whom and when you can trust and entrust important things. case.

Nelidov was really released, settled in the Moskva Hotel, and began to prepare for a business trip abroad.

What is it?

Authorize the direction **over the cordon** in the conditions of a successful German offensive **former trusted employee of Admiral Canaris**, is, you know ...

And we are told that Beria de "trusted no one."

The story with Nelidov ended, though sadly. Apparently, he was frightened by unexpected trust, his psyche was broken by a wasted life, which he no longer had the strength to start again.

Nelidov hanged himself - right in the comfortable room of the Moskva Hotel. It turned out that Beria believed in him more than he himself could believe ...

Rybkina, shortly after the start of the war, was included in a special group, and she was engaged in the selection, organization, training and transfer of saboteurs and intelligence officers to the occupied territory. And in October 1941, Rybkina was preparing for another separation from her husband, a major intelligence officer Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin-Yartsev. The husband, under the legal cover of an embassy adviser, was heading to Sweden, the wife - to the German rear. So to say, "an order was given to him to the west, to her - in the other direction ..."

And this is how it happened next - according to the memoirs of Zoya Ivanovna:

"On the eve of his (husband. - S.K.) departure, everything turned upside down in my fate. The Commissar called me and asked what I was doing. I said I'm getting ready to go

work behind the scenes. "As who?" - "Railway watchman at the crossing." The People's Commissar laughed: "The Germans will arrest and shoot such a watchman. You need to go to Sweden..."

I had to hand over the cases ... A few days later, the two of us were already flying on the "duck" (U-2) to Arkhangelsk ...".

Comments required?

The third plot is also from the epic of Rybkina and her husband ...

In 1942, Boris Yartsev ("Kin"), a legal resident of the NKVD intelligence service in Sweden, and his wife and employee Zoya Rybkina were given the task of the Center to establish a communication channel with the Red Chapel group in Berlin. A suitable candidate was quickly found - a Swedish industrialist, married to a Russian emigrant and often visiting the Reich on commercial matters. Having received the operational pseudonym "Director", he completed the task, although not the first time - inexperience summed it up.

And suddenly a message comes from the Center about the arrest of all members of the Red Chapel. The Center believed that this was the result of the "Director's" provocation, and in order to verify it, he ordered "Kin" to again send this messenger to Berlin to communicate with the notorious "double", about which the Center knew for sure that he was working for the Germans.

After analyzing the situation, Rybkin and Voskresenskaya came to the conclusion that The "Director" is an honest man, and sending him back to Berlin means dooming him to death.

"We persistently tried to prove to the Center that we were right," Rybkina-Voskresenskaya recalled. - The order followed: "Follow the instructions." We again ask you to weigh everything. The answer is a harsh shout. Then we decided to turn to the drug addict. We ask you to cancel the instruction of the head office, not to destroy a person. A couple of days later the answer came. The sending of the "Director" to Berlin is cancelled, all communication with him is ordered to be cut off."

This is how the real Beria worked with people. The one whom the "general of democracy" Volkogonov called a "ghoul" and a soulless "monster". And the real Beria, on the contrary, was a sensitive, although absolutely without lisping, person. Knowing this, "Kin" decided to appeal directly to him over the head of his immediate superiors.

However, Beria also had one more, third front without a front line, which he commanded the entire war - a partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage front.

A number of large partisan formations formed around strong popular leaders - the same Kovpak, Fedorov-Chernigovsky, Begma ... But the main organized struggle behind enemy lines was carried out by detachments organized by the NKVD of Beria. Already then they overgrown on the spot with new people, grew stronger. But the core most often was the KGB.

They also prefer to keep quiet about this, since is it worth recognizing this merit for Beria? Enough already that I had to publicly acknowledge in recent years the outstanding role in the Soviet Atomic Project, which will be discussed later.

To organize the reconnaissance and sabotage "front" Beria picked up a strong a team at hand of the most experienced master of special operations of the NKVD, General Sudoplatov.

The resolution of the Central Committee on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops was adopted on July 18, 1941, but already on July 5, 1941, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, a Special Group was formed under the People's Commissar, headed by Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov's deputies were appointed such Chekist "bisons" as Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Mordvinov, Gudimovich, Orlov.

On October 3, 1941, the Special Group was reorganized into an independent 2nd department of the NKVD, while maintaining the direct subordination of Beria. Finally, on January 18, 1942, the 2nd Department was deployed to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD with the expansion of tasks and powers.

In the summer of 1941, a selective 25,000th (!) Separate

motorized rifle brigade of special purpose (OMSBON) of the NKVD of the USSR, this genuine forge of partisan personnel for special detachments and special groups, with which the names of Medvedev, Vaupshasov, Stekhov, Prokopyuk, Kuznetsov are associated ...

Bureaucrats in uniform from the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense failed to start the "big" war. Now they also failed the guerrilla war. It was January 1942, and the General Staff "in full swing" was still forming the TsSHPD.

The subordinate of the People's Commissar of Beria, captain of the State Security Dmitry Medvedev, the future Hero of the Soviet Union, during this time managed to form the Mitya special detachment, go to the Bryansk forests on September 4, 1941, conduct a number of operations there and in Belarus, return to Moscow on January 12, 1942, On February 17, receive your first Order of Lenin and start preparing for a new drop already near Rovno.

But all the front-line victories of Lavrenty Beria on the military fronts and on the "special" fronts not only fade, but fade into the background compared to what L.P. Beria to organize that military rear, the slogan of which was the words: "Rear to the front" ...

YES, the MAIN line of Beria's fate in the war was his work in the State Defense Committee. And in order to give her a general assessment, I will first use the information from the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953, published by the International Endowment for Democracy. This is the most reliable way to deprive Beria's haters of the opportunity to object, because this is what the "democrats" themselves recognize for Lavrenty Pavlovich:

"By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of duties between its (GKO. - S.K.) members of Beria, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, issues of the formation of the Air Force, in addition, in the future (not in the future, and already before that! - S.K.), Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: the oil, coal industry and communications. In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which considered all current issues.

Something is not mentioned in this certificate, and chronologically, the period only from the beginning of 1942 is covered here (and it was also the year 1941!), However, in general, the reference of the "democrats" reflects the military load of Lavrenty Pavlovich correctly.

At the same time, it often happened that Stalin shifted the duties of those who "failed" to Beria. As you know, a person is loaded as much as he can carry. And Beria carried as much as they loaded him.

That's where they loaded it.
Since the beginning of the war!

It is often argued that the production of weapons and ammunition was supervised by Nikolai Voznesensky, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, before the State Planning Commission, who was shot in 1950 as one of the most important defendants in the "Gosplan case" (the loss of more than a hundred of the most important secret documents was discovered in the State Planning Committee) and the "Leningrad case".

Anastas Mikoyan, in his later "memoirs" of the 70s, which saw the light already in the "perestroika" years, describing the history of the establishment of the State Defense Committee and lying and misrepresenting a lot, stated:

"Voznesensky asked to be given leadership in the production of weapons and ammunition, which ... was accepted. The leadership for the production of tanks was entrusted to Molotov, and the aviation industry and aviation in general - on Malenkov. For Beria, the protection of order within the country and the fight against desertion were left ... "

What can I say - everyone found things to do, and what things!

Well, what about Beria?

What is this former Musavatist counterintelligence officer and future imperialist spy good for? Is it possible to trust him in a difficult time for Russia to catch punks in the gateways, and to catch deserters in the forests ...

That's all - in the presentation of Mikoyan.

In reality, from the very beginning of the war, the People's Commissariat for Armaments, through the GKO, subordinated Beria, and even the former Deputy People's Commissar Novikov, who, in fact, slandered Beria, admits that "he personally answered for us before Stalin" ...

Novikov recalls that at the end of July 1941 he had a sharp argument with Beria about whether the Izhevsk plant could produce five thousand rifles in three months. Novikov insisted on writing a term of seven months.

However, already in November 1941, the Izhevsk people produced four thousand, and by the end of the summer of 1942 - twelve thousand rifles per day! And Novikov boasted to Voroshilov, who arrived in Izhevsk, that "we have rifles flowing around the clock from week to week, from month to month" ... Judging by this, Izhevsk reached the level of five thousand by the end of 1941, that is - in less than five months.

As a member of the GKO, Beria was responsible for controlling the production of almost all types of weapons, including mortars. Before the war, this type of weapon was not appreciated by all the military, despite the obvious combat effectiveness and simplicity, although Stalin, by the way, at a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 14–17, 1940, following the war with the White Finns, recommended paying attention to mortars in the following expressions:

"Why are there no mortars? This is not a new thing. During the era of the imperialist war in 1915, the Germans fled from the Western and Eastern troops - ours and the French, mainly by mines. Few people - many mines. Twenty-four years have passed, why don't we still have mortars? No answer, no hello.

Now mortars were needed in an unlimited, so to speak, quantity.

As, however, and everything else.

And on September 5, 1941, Beria creates in the NKVD a new, 7th special department of the NKVD of the USSR for the security service of mortar weapons, which lasted until November 14, 1942, headed by I.M. Tkachenko.

Let us return to the above-cited "democratic" "objective" on Beria, which states that only after the Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 and even later than Beria, in addition to numerous other tasks, "was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition ...".

In reality, as we know, these (though not only these!) orders from Stalin Beria had long before the aforementioned Decree, from the very first month of the war ...

One epic with mortars is worth something!

I think that in this - in the supervision of Beria, the reason is found that, despite all the losses of industrial potential, the production of mortars by industry in 1941 increased by 4.34 times compared to the peaceful year of 1940 - from 38 thousand to 165.1 thousand !

This was Beria's style, expressed most concisely and convincingly - in numbers.

But Beria oversaw both the production of ammunition and aviation production, although Malenkov was officially responsible for it. The latter possessed organizational acumen, however, not of Beria's standard. Therefore, Malenkov was often insured by Beria.

Moreover, something about the quality of Malenkov's "curatorship" is said by the fact that after the war an unsightly "aviation business" arose. Its essence was that People's Commissar Shakhurin handed over defective aircraft to the Air Force, and Novikov, the commander of the Air Force, accepted them, and then the pilots at the front did not die in battle, but because of a breakdown in flight of the skin ...

Beria was also responsible for the tanks ... And as for how it happened, there is a competent

testimony of Boris Glebovich Muzrukov, an outstanding industrial organizer, twice Hero of Socialist Labor. He received his first Star on January 20, 1943 as the director of Uralmash for the production of tanks, and the second - on October 29, 1949 as the director of plant No. 817 - for our first plutonium for the first RDS-1 atomic bomb. It was Beria who attracted him to "atomic" affairs, who knew Muzrukov from the "tank" war lines.

From June 1955 to March 1974, Boris Glebovich was the director of the largest center for the development of nuclear weapons at Arzamas-16 (KB-11, later the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics).

Much later, Muzrukov confidentially told his "atomic" colleagues:

"At first, the tank industry was supervised by Molotov. It was bad ... Aviation (after all, they were actually "led" by Beria. - S.K.) have both energy, and fuel, and raw materials, while tankers - poor, poor. We - asked Malyshev (People's Commissar of the tank industry. - S.K.) to ask Stalin to change our boss, and he changed ... Appointed the chief of the tank industry ... Beria. Of course, it has become better with raw materials, energy, fuel, food...".

In 1965, when asked about military impressions of Beria, Boris Glebovich answered:

"What can you say about a person who is much higher than you and with whom you have a relationship - a clear and severe submission? There are no personal impressions, as far as the case is concerned, there was competence to the extent that was required for supervision. He was tough, but also helped. I don't know the time when he would be sleeping or absent, call at any time of the day or night, and he is always there."

The question is, when did he, sorry, "walk around the women"?

I have already said that the cultural bureaucrats of the party recommended that an article about Lavrenty Pavlovich be cut with a razor from the 5th volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. But Lavrenty Beria did too much for Russia in his life to remove him, if not from official history, then from all volumes of the TSB published before June 26, 1953, the day of his arrest, with a swipe of a razor.

Therefore, in volume 12 of the TSB, signed for printing on May 28, 1952, on page 318 in the article "The State Defense Committee" and after June 26, 1953, one could read the 12 volume in any library of the Union:

"The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 30, 1943 noted the special merits of the members of the GOKO in strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition and supplying the army in difficult wartime conditions: in the field of tank production - Deputy Chairman of the GOKO V.M. Molotov; in the field of production of weapons and ammunition - a member of the GOKO L.P. Beria; in the field of production of aircraft and engines for them - a member of the GOKO G.M. Malenkov; in the field of setting up the matter of supplying the Soviet Army with food, fuel and clothing allowances - a member of the GOKO A.I. Mikoyan. By this decree, they were awarded the titles of Heroes of Socialist Labor.

I will draw the reader's attention to the fact that Nikolai Voznesensky, supposedly "Stalin's favorite", to whom his "democratic" adherents create the image of the "organizer of the war economy", did not receive the Hero Star either then - in 1943, or later ...

An interesting fact, isn't it?

As for the rest of the awardees, their contribution to the organization of the Victory undoubtedly deserved the awards they received. However, Molotov and Malenkov did not earn their Gold Stars for what Stalin officially awarded them for.

Mikoyan was awarded precisely for what he really did.

Beria received the Star of the Hero only for weapons and ammunition, although Lavrenty Pavlovich every now and then had to secure the official "aviator" Malenkov, and completely replace the "tankman" Molotov ...

But Beria also oversaw the "oil", "coal" and "railway" people's commissariats!

Actually, there was not, if you look at it, not a single large, state level, affairs during the war, to which one way or another Beria had nothing to do.

In the spring of 1942, a very difficult situation was created on the railways - in the liberated areas there were no tracks, infrastructure of stations, and in the rear there were "traffic jams" ... On March 13, 1942, a special GKO group was created, which was entrusted with all responsibility for transportation by rail. The composition of the group: Kaganovich, Beria, Malenkov, several employees of the People's Commissariat of Railways and several employees of VOSO - military communications service.

The operational, "technical" side of the matter is on the latter, but who is responsible?

On August 23, 1943, the Committee was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from German occupation, under the chairmanship of Malenkov. Members: Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev ... Then the list of surnames was not strictly in alphabetical order, but in order of responsibility. Knowing this, the reader can understand for himself - who was who in this Committee ...

And all this is not in return, but in addition to what has already been thrown at Beria!

Since 1944, Beria, along with Molotov, became Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin. At that time, all the fullness of state power was concentrated in the State Defense Committee - after all, it was an emergency body of wartime. In reality, this meant that Beria became the second person in the state after Stalin. Molotov, even at the beginning of the war, was more busy not with operational, but with foreign policy affairs, and even more so in the second half of the war ...

The well-known compiler of biographical dictionaries, Konstantin Zalessky, claims, however, in the reference book "Who is who in the history of the USSR. 1953-1991" that Molotov was second after Stalin, but there is as much truth in this statement as in Khrushchev's words quoted by Zalessky about Beria's alleged drunkenness at Stalin's dinners ...

Firstly, only an impenetrable fool who did not know Stalin at all could get drunk at Stalin's dinners. Even Khrushchev did not get drunk at these dinners ...

Secondly, Beria had diseased kidneys from his youth, and for this reason he drank little.

Thirdly, Beria, one way or another, was not inclined to abuse alcohol - not that kind of person...

There is such a thing - "Hamburg account". It traces its history back to absolutely closed world wrestling championships, which were periodically organized by circus wrestlers at the beginning of the 20th century, having rented a circus in Hamburg for this.

Wrestlers' entrepreneurs arranged their ratings in a way that was beneficial for circus commerce, so often the strongest were forced to lose to the weakest. And the carpet masters wanted to know the true strength of each. So they fought in an empty circus - no fools. And only the "Hamburg" champion was valued among professionals.

So, if you build a "Hamburg rating" of personal merits in the Great Patriotic War, then the absolute "champion" is obvious - this is Joseph Stalin.

But the second step must be given to Lavrenty Beria!

Chapter 5

1945–1953 Russia does itself: the solution of the Atomic and Missile problems

On July 16, 1945, the world's first atomic bomb exploded in Alamogordo, a desert area in the US state of New Mexico. So far, it was only a test explosion, the success of which was then known only to a limited circle of people in the USA, in England and in ... the USSR - thanks to foreign intelligence.

And in August 1945, two days before the start of the offensive of the Soviet Army in Manchuria, on the orders of US President Truman and without consultation with the Soviet Union, the atomic bombing of the densely populated cities of Japan began.

On August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and on August 8, on Nagasaki.

Thus, America publicly demonstrated to the whole world that it had acquired an atomic monopoly. And almost immediately began both diplomatic and public atomic blackmail of the Soviet Union.

Here is just one of hundreds of examples ... In 1947, University of Texas professor R. Montgomery wrote: "Within 24 hours we can destroy 75 million Russians without losing even a hundred people ... If we need to destroy the Russians, then let's do it now, let's not wait three years".

US Secretary of War Henry Stimson was not shy about declaring that America could now negotiate with Russia by "defiantly shaking" the atomic bomb. The era of "atomic diplomacy" began in America's world politics, which meant, as I said, atomic blackmail in relation to the USSR ...

The issue of eliminating the US nuclear monopoly and creating its own nuclear weapons became a matter of life and death for the USSR - literally!

The fact that nuclear work was being carried out in England and the United States was known to the Soviet leadership at least since the autumn of 1941, but then it was not up to it. But already on September 28, 1942, GKO order No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted.

On February 11, 1943, the next GKO order No. GOKO-2872ss was adopted,
starting and ending like this:

"For the purpose of more successful development of work on uranium:

1. Assign to TT. Pervukhina M.G. (then - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry. - S.K.) and Kaftanova S.V. (Chairman of the Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and authorized by the State Defense Committee for Science. - S.K.) the duty to daily supervise work on uranium and provide systematic assistance to the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The scientific management of work on uranium is entrusted to Professor Kurchatov I.V.<...>

11. To oblige the head of the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus (Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. - S.K.) prof. Kurchatova I.V. carry out the necessary research by July 1, 1943 and submit to the State Defense Committee by July 5, 1943 a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or a uranium fuel..."

And the first curator of atomic work from the Politburo was the unfortunate "tanker" Molotov. With all my sincere and considerable respect for Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, I must, looking ahead, say that he turned out to be no more successful as a "nuclear engineer" than a "tanker".

I DO NOT WRITE the history of the USSR Atomic Project, although a full-fledged such history does not yet exist and it would be worthwhile to deal with it ... One way or another, this topic has long been on public hearing, and I will dwell briefly on many collisions of the beginning of our large-scale work on uranium - in that volume, required for this book.

So, I'll let you know that Molotov's supervision of the nascent Atomic Project did not go well for the future, and on May 19, 1944, Pervukhin sent a letter to Stalin, where he proposed:

"... To create a Uranium Council under the GOKO for daily control and assistance in carrying out work on uranium, approximately in the following composition: 1) Comrade Beria L.P. (Chairman of the Council), 2) Comrade V.M. Molotov, 3) Comrade Pervukhin M.G. (Deputy Chairman), 4) Academician I.V. Kurchatov..."

Actually, from that moment on, the transition of leadership of atomic work in the USSR to Beria was a foregone conclusion, and without any initiative from Beria himself.

At that moment, of all those related "to uranium", Pervukhin was the most "status" person, except for Molotov, of course. So Pervukhin decided to take the right step - without formally going against Molotov, to offer Stalin as the curator of the Atomic Problem someone who could become a real "engine" for her. And Stalin rarely rejected reasonable proposals.

The significance of Beria for our Atomic Project can be summed up in six words: "Without Beria, there would be no bomb."

In any case, in the timeframe in which we did it.

And then the timing...

The terms were then determined: to be a great Russia and beyond, or not to be.

But here something needs to be clarified.

Unlike the other major victories of Beria, his "atomic" victory is confirmed most indisputably - by a huge array of documents that have not been destroyed today.

I wrote that there are not so many archival documents on Beria, because Beria's archives were destroyed especially zealously. But the "atomic" archive on Beria is rich, and this is explained by the fact that the archives of the atomic department were especially closed even for Khrushchev's party apparatchiks - after all, not political secrets were kept there, but technical ones ... Therefore, in the multi-volume collection of documents "Soviet Atomic Project", Beria's name is not found one thousand times, and the role of Beria in this project, after studying a dozen weighty book "bricks", becomes completely and convincingly clear.

It can be seen *from the documents* that Beria did not carry out "general interference in the affairs of his subordinates", but managed the atomic work quite competently. A few years ago, I received confirmation of this in a somewhat unexpected way.

One of the oldest weapons physicists of the nuclear weapons center in Sarov-"Arzamas-16" German Arsenievich Goncharov (1928-2009), Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, since the second half of the 90s, together with retired colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko, the former head of the representative office of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16, was engaged in the selection in secret archives, declassification and preparation for publication of the documents of the above-mentioned collection. The declassified documents were published in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated February 17, 1995 No. 160 "On the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR."

So, after studying thousands of documents with Beria's visas, after studying the transcripts of various meetings, etc. Goncharov came to the conclusion that **Beria understood the technical issues of the Atomic Project at the level of a doctor of technical sciences!**

Formally, Beria did not have a higher education, having managed to graduate only from a secondary technical school. But, firstly, at that time the secondary school was by no means the same as the current technical schools, parrot-like transformed into colleges.

Secondly, the school that Beria graduated from was transformed into a polytechnic institute in 1920, that is, the school had the potential for development. And Lavrenty Beria entered the Baku Polytechnic University and studied there, although, as he himself writes in his autobiography of 1923, classes at the institute continued "intermittently until 1922."

As follows from the same autobiography, during all this time Beria had no connection with the institute.

lost and stopped his studies only in connection with the transfer from Baku to Tiflis. By the way, the style of the autobiography is not only businesslike, but also businesslike. So, the author of it says: "I stop teaching, *being listed* (my italics. - S.K.) ... a student of the 3rd year."

Being a student and being a student are different states, and the first is more worthy of the second, but Beria does not deviate from accuracy - he has nothing to be ashamed of. After all, breaks and distractions from studies are explained not by spree or part-time work at McDonald's, but by Beria's increasingly busy party, Chekist and public work.

On the whole, it is safe to say that Beria had a basic technical background of a completely engineering level. During the years of study at a secondary school, he was already well educated, and the first years of study at the Polytechnic Institute deepened his knowledge. His memory was excellent, his reaction was fast, his ability to analyze was outstanding, so that Beria learned any knowledge correctly and firmly. And if he had a pronounced craving for a career, and not for knowledge, he would not have asked from the Chekists to become students.

And everyday communication with the largest specialists in the emerging atomic science and technology could replace any universities - there would be a head on their shoulders.

Beria had a head.

BACK, however, to the war years ...

Having said in May 1944 "a ...", Pervukhin did not stop there. Together with the physicist Igor Kurchatov, on July 10, 1944, he sent Beria, as Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, a "strictly secret" note on the development of work on the uranium problem in the USSR, to which they attached a draft Decree of the State Defense Committee, where the last paragraph looked like this:

"To organize a Uranium Council under the State Defense Committee for daily control and assistance in carrying out work on the problem of uranium in composition:

comrade Beria L.P. (chairman)

comrade Pervukhin (deputy chairman),
comrade Kurchatov I.V.

As you can see, Molotov was already directly taken out of the brackets here.

Moreover, on September 29, 1944, Kurchatov himself wrote a letter to Beria, ending interestingly:

"... Knowing your extremely busy schedule, I nevertheless, in view of the historical significance of the uranium problem, decided to disturb you and ask you to give instructions on such an organization of work that would correspond to the capabilities and significance of our Great State in world culture."

Not quite the usual argumentation, and, judging by it, one can assume that Kurchatov, knowing Beria only from stories so far, already understood that he was dealing with a man of broad views. And that it can be addressed, involving not necessarily purely utilitarian, pragmatic considerations in substantiating the significance of the problem

On December 3, 1944, meetings in Stalin's office began at 19.05, and until 20.50 a lot of people stayed there. But from 20.50 Stalin had three left: Beria, Malenkov and Shcherbakov, the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.

Most likely, Stalin left them in order to calmly discuss issues related to the transfer to Moscow of the Leningrad branch of Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences and from Sverdlovsk - the laboratory of Professor Kikoin ... All this was done in pursuance of the top secret Resolution of the GOKO No. 7069ss adopted that day " On urgent measures to ensure the deployment of work carried out by Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The last, tenth paragraph of the Resolution read: **"Assign to Comrade Beria L.P.**

monitoring the development of work on uranium". So Beria received a new task from Stalin, which at the same time was the task of the Big Country with the short name "USSR".

However, atomic work was not deployed in full force then - it was necessary to end the war, and the possibility of creating weapons based on a fission chain reaction remained a problematic issue, supported only by calculations not only in the USSR, but also in the USA.

Gradually, everything became clear - on July 10, 1945, the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov sent Beria message No. 4305 / m about the preparation of an atomic bomb test in the United States, indicating the alleged "explosion force" equivalent to five thousand tons of TNT (trinitrotoluene, TNT, tol. - S.K.)".

The real energy release of the explosion in Alamogordo amounted to 15 ... 20 thousand tons of TNT, but these were, so to speak, details. It was important that intelligence warned Beria in time, and Beria warned Stalin, who was going to the Potsdam Conference, which was scheduled to begin on July 17, 1945. (By the way, again, Beria was responsible for the protection of the Soviet delegation.)

That is why Stalin met the joint provocation of Truman and Churchill so calmly, when the American president informed Stalin about the successful bomb test, and the British prime minister watched the reaction of the Soviet premier.

Finally, the urgent need to speed up Soviet work "on uranium" became clear after the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which revealed the main secret of the atomic bomb - that it is possible.

On August 20, 1945, GKO Decree No. 9887ss / op "On the Special Committee under the GKO" was adopted. This Decree created a Special Committee with emergency powers to solve any problems of the "Uranium Project".

It included: L.P. Beria - chairman; G.M. Malenkov - Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; ON THE. Voznesensky - Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR; B.L. Vannikov - People's Commissar of Ammunition; A.P. Zavenyagin - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Head of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD; I.V. Kurchatov - Head of Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, academician, scientific supervisor of the problem; P.L. Kapitsa - academician, director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences; M.A. Makhnev - Secretary of the Special Committee; M.G. Pervukhin - Commissar of the chemical industry of the USSR.

For "direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and industrial enterprises on the use intra-atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs ", the First Main Directorate (PGU) was organized under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, subordinate to the Special Committee.

Vannikov, who was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of Ammunition, became the head of the PGU, and his deputies: A.P. Zavenyagin (first deputy), N.A. Borisov (from the State Planning Committee of the USSR), P.Ya. Meshik (ensuring secrecy), P.Ya. Antropov (exploration and development of uranium ore deposits) and A.G. Kasatkin (deputy people's commissar of the chemical industry).

I will draw the reader's attention to N.A. Borisov. It was the same Borisov from the group under the GKO member L.P. Beria, who during the war provided the current management of the production of weapons and ammunition. Now the deputy of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Borisov actually transferred to the PGU. Beria knew how to appreciate professionals, and since he got the right to take anyone into the Special Committee system, he chose not just the best, but those of the best who were tested in practice by himself.

The leadership of the First Main Directorate was also from among those whom Beria knew Fine...

The future three times Hero of Socialist Labor Boris Lvovich Vannikov (1897–1962) is a mechanical engineer with extensive leadership experience in industry

led the People's Commissariat of Armaments, and then - the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

The future twice Hero of Socialist Labor Avraamy Petrovich Zavenyagin (1901–1956) was a metallurgical engineer, he knew the country's metallurgical industry well, previously led the design and construction of the largest metallurgical plants, and since 1941, as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, supervised the construction of mining and metallurgical objects of this ministry.

Future Hero of Socialist Labor Mikhail Georgievich Pervukhin (1904–1978) – electrical engineer with extensive experience in organizational work; led the chemical industry, before that he was the people's commissar of power plants and the electrical industry.

Paragraph VII of the protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Special Committee of September 28, 1945 provided for the organization of Bureau No. 2 as part of the Special Committee with subordination directly to Beria. The functions of this Bureau were already visible from the one who headed it Deputy Head of Foreign Intelligence P.A. became the head of the Bureau. Sudoplatov, and his deputies N.S. Sazykin, N.I. Eitingon and L.P. Vasilevsky. These were the old employees of Beria in the NKVD of the USSR, and their involvement was, of course, not accidental, they had more than serious business ahead of them - "atomic intelligence".

SO, Beria gathered under his new banners both new and old tried and tested fighters.

On December 29, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was relieved of his duties as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. On January 10, 1946, the former People's Commissar and the new People's Commissar Kruglov signed an act of acceptance and delivery of cases for the People's Commissariat, and on January 15, 1946, several lines appeared in the Izvestia newspaper in the Chronicle section:

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to his overload with other central work. Comrade S.N. was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Kruglov.

The essence of the other "central work" was not reported, and nothing could be reported.

At the beginning of 1946, the main areas of work were finally determined, and at the same time the composition and structure of the Technical Council were revised. One of the reasons was the position of Academician Kapitsa. In November 1945, he wrote in a letter to Stalin:

"I personally think that Com. Beria would have coped with his task if he had given more time and effort. He is very energetic, perfectly and quickly orients himself, distinguishes the secondary from the main well, so he does not waste time, he certainly has a taste for scientific issues, he grasps them well, precisely formulates his decisions ...

... I offered him to teach him physics, to come to my institute ... "

I emphasize that this is an assessment of Beria by a person who **is not** personally friendly to Beria. Moreover, in the same letter, Kapitsa gives us indirect, but important evidence that Beria was not vindictive, and Kapitsa knew about it. Otherwise, he would not have added the following postscript to the letter: *"PPS I would like Comrade. Beria got acquainted with this letter, because this is not a denunciation, but useful criticism ... "*

The plot of "Beria - Kapitsa" is very interesting and instructive, but I cannot dwell on it here, referring the interested reader to my "capital" book and to my comments on the third volume of L.P.'s diaries. Beria, or directly to the documents. I can only say that Kapitsa's whims had no objective basis, and his advice to Beria to study the experience of organizing work when laying an underwater transatlantic telegraph cable looked simply ridiculous - given that it was addressed to

who just pulled out the organization of the military rear in the great war, and much more besides the military rear.

Academician I.V. Kurchatov. The Council included academicians A.I. Alikhanov, A.A. Bochvar, V.G. Khlopin, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences Yu.B. Khariton, I.K. Kikoin, A.P. Alexandrov, L.A. Artsimovich, as well as M.G. Pervukhin, Minister of the shipbuilding industry V.A. Malyshev and others ...

Under the Scientific and Technical Council, 5 sections were organized: on nuclear boilers; on molecular methods for the separation of uranium isotopes; on electromagnetic methods of uranium isotope separation; in chemistry and metallurgy of uranium and plutonium; on the study of the biological effect of radiation, the diagnosis and treatment of lesions by radioactive substances.

The MAKHINA had to move a huge one! Major General Leslie Groves, the head of "atomic" work in the United States, boasted in his speeches in 1945:

"Any other country will need 15-20 years to create an atomic bomb. Only those who have worked on the construction of nuclear plants ... know how difficult it is and what an almost impossible precision is required. Only they also know the fact that the wrong operation of some small part will put the plant out of action for several months "...

Consultant on the Russian economy of the US War Department E. Raymond and head of the technical information department of the Kellogg Corporation D.F. Hogerton reflected in the pages of the American press:

"Today, Soviet industry ranks second in the world, but this is not the same industry ... Russian industry is mainly engaged in the production of heavy rough equipment, such as steel furnaces and steam locomotives ...

The sectors of Soviet industry that produce precision instruments are underdeveloped and produce low-quality products ... In terms of production capacity, the key industries for the nuclear problem in Russia lag behind the corresponding industries in the United States by an average of 22 years.

The saddest thing was that the American experts were not so wrong - state of affairs at the end of 1945. At that time, for example, a little more than 340 physicists worked in the country's main physical institutes, and about 140 physicists dealt with nuclear physics, including young scientists who had just started working in the field of physics. These physicists worked in 6 research institutes...

In the field of radiochemistry at the end of 1945, only a little over 100 people worked in 4 institutes. It was out of the question to think of such a small number of specialists in uranium radiochemistry. It was necessary to create new scientific centers and gather people to solve new problems.

In the United States, when the atomic problem was being solved, specialists from all over the world were brought together. Entire teams of physicists from other countries participated in the work, and these physicists brought all the results of their research to the United States.

On December 5, 1951, the chairman of the US Atomic Commission, G. Dean, at a meeting of the American Artillery Association in New York, reported that 1,200 physicists were working directly for the atomic energy program in the USA. And we had to rely on our own strength to solve the Atomic problem.

By the end of 1945, more than 50 research organizations were involved in work on the atomic problem, and by the end of 1946, about 100

scientific research institutes and laboratories, physical, chemical, biological, medical and engineering, conducted intensive research according to a single plan of research work.

During the period from 1946 to 1951, four major decisions were made by the government on the issues of training specialists for nuclear plants and institutes. As a result, by 1951, special faculties of higher educational institutions were able to train over 2,700 specialists, including 1,500 physicists of various specialties.

But while the year 1946 began ...

The Stalinist idea that cadres decide everything remained true in principle, but in the Atomic problem, the problem of raw materials turned out to be central, and in the first place - uranium ore.

The United States had significant reserves of uranium ore by the beginning of work in the field of atomic energy, because long before the outbreak of World War II, there was the most powerful radium mining industry in the world - three-quarters of the world's radium production was accounted for by the United States. After the start of nuclear work, America immediately took over - not by washing, but by rolling - and most of the world's uranium deposits.

In the Soviet Union, by the beginning of work on the Atomic Problem, there was only one explored deposit of uranium ore in Fergana. The uranium content of this ore was hundreds of times lower than that of ores processed in US plants. In other words, if the United States was immediately provided with uranium raw materials, then in the Soviet Union it was necessary to start with the search for uranium raw materials, with the organization of geological exploration for uranium.

Now they often talk about the allegedly decisive role of the Soviet "atomic" intelligence in solving the Soviet Atomic problem ... Well, intelligence really did a lot, which, by the way, is also a considerable merit of Beria, who, although he has not led foreign intelligence since 1943, did a lot for the development of Soviet intelligence when he reformed the NKVD.

But any efforts of undercover intelligence could not provide information about whether there were any in the USSR large deposits of uranium and, if so, where?

Geological exploration was required here, and already in 1946, about 320 geological parties were engaged in the search for uranium deposits in the USSR. By the end of 1945, geologists received the first special instruments, but this was only the beginning - by mid-1952, the USSR Ministry of Geology received more than 7,000 radiometers and more than 3,000 other radiometric instruments for uranium and thorium exploration, as well as - over 900 drilling rigs, about 650 special pumps, 170 diesel power plants, 350 compressors, 300 oil engines, 1650 motor vehicles, 200 tractors and many other equipment.

In a dilapidated country, all this had to be torn away from the tasks of restoring a peaceful national economy, but what to do - plans for atomic bombings of dozens of large Soviet cities had already been developed in the United States.

Soon the number of potential targets increased to three hundred, and then - and even more ...

I had to hurry and hurry.

But uranium must not only be found - it must be mined and processed - enriched.

Until 1945, there was only one mining enterprise in the USSR engaged in the extraction of uranium ore. Now the situation has changed - the mining enterprises transferred to the CCGT received 80 mobile power plants, 300 mine hoists, over 400 rock-loading machines, 320 electric locomotives, and about 6,000 vehicles.

Over 800 units were handed over to processing plants chemical-technological equipment.

But the crux of the matter was not in uranium alone. Obtain weapons-grade uranium from extracted natural raw materials, or at least uranium suitable for a nuclear reactor,

producing weapons-grade plutonium was an extremely difficult task in all respects, including in terms of energy costs.

But there were also dozens of other only major problems, not counting hundreds of small ones ...

WHAT was the role of Beria in all this array of problems? Well, better documents on this question will not be answered by anything else.

Take, for example, the first book of the II volume of documents and materials "Soviet Atomic Project" and study only three Protocols (No. 53, 54 and 55) of the meetings of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, February 7 and February 27, 1948 ...

Below will be given a list of issues considered at these meetings with an indication of those who were related to them, but I inform the reader in advance that the order of the names of those responsible each time was determined not by hierarchy, but by the level of involvement and responsibility of a particular person. So, in Protocol No. 56 on issue IV "On measures for the manufacture of tubular filters", the responsible "TT. **Beria**, Pervukhin", and on issue V "On the organization of pilot production of corrosion-resistant materials for gaskets in the equipment of plant No. 817 and plant No. 813" - "TT. Pervukhin, **Beria**."

So (without breakdown by dates), all the questions of the three **ordinary** meetings of the Special Committee:

"On the work plan of KB-11 (comrades Khariton, Zernov, Makhnev, Alexandrov, Malenkov, Voznesensky, Pervukhin, **Beria**).

On the plan of special work for 1948 (comrades Borisov, Malenkov, **Beria**, Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Voznesensky, Kruglov, Makhnev, Cherepenev)

On measures to ensure research work in 1948
cosmic rays (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Vavilov, Pervukhin, Kruglov, Borisov).

About the resettlement from the regime zone of the plant No. 817 (comrades Rodionov, **Beria**).

On changing the boundaries of the Training Ground No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrades Antonov, **Beria**, Pervukhin, Makhnev).

On the term for the development of an operational plan for conducting research at the Training Ground No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrades **Beria**, Pervukhin).

On the procedure for financing special construction projects of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrades Zavenyagin, **Beria**, Voznesensky, Kruglov)

On measures to help the Scientific Research Vacuum Institute of the Ministry of Electrical Industry in the production of prototypes of high-vacuum equipment (comrades Borisov, Komarovskiy, Meshcheryakov, **Beria**).

On the allocation of foreign currency to PSU for 1948 (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky, Pervukhin).

Note by comrade Vannikov (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky, Malenkov).

On the allocation of a turbine generator to plant No. 544 (comrades Zhimerin, Klochkov, Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, **Beria**).

On the organization in the USSR Ministry of Finance of a department for financing and controlling the expenditure of special funds, rare and precious metals (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky).

On measures to provide personnel for plant No. 817 and plant No. 813 (comrades Pervukhin, **Beria**, Vannikov, Voznesensky, Pronin, Kruglov, Meshik, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin).

On the organization of the production of highly refractory products (comrades Voznesensky, **Beria**, Tevosyan, Vannikov, Mitrovskiy, Borisov).

On the plan of research work at the "Ms" installation in 1948 (vols. Kurchatov, **Beria**).

On the progress of the construction of the "M" installation (comrades Mints, **Beria**, Kabanov, Vannikov, Makhnev).

On the development of deposits B-9 (thorium. - S.K.) on the territory of the Yakutsk trust of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Kruglov, Mamulov, Melik-Stepanov, Lomako, Malyshev, Vannikov).

On measures to ensure the protection of hydroxyl (heavy water. - S.K.) (comrades Pervukhin, **Beria**, Kruglov).

On the use of repatriates and special settlers in the construction of facilities of the First Main Directorate (comrade **Beria**).

On the plan for the production of P-9 (code name for uranium ore. - S.K.) in Poland (comrades **Beria**, Zavenyagin)

On the results of the verification of an anonymous letter about the disorder in the Soviet joint-stock company "Vismuth" (comrades Meshik, Voznesensky, Malenkov, **Beria**).

I do not rule out that the reader got tired, just skimming through this list, and Beria had to **solve the listed issues (and many other issues not listed here)**. Moreover, in the field of view of Lavrenty Pavlovich were almost **all** issues under the jurisdiction of the Special Committee.

So we have the right or the right to say today that the creation of the nuclear industry and the solution of the Nuclear problem is the result of the integrated efforts of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots: scientists, engineers, intelligence officers, builders, production workers, but the personal contribution to this collective success of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria must be defined as the most prominent. This work of his was no less important for the sovereign future of the Big Country than his military work for the Victory of 1945.

Beria knew how to combine the work of many into a single whole. And the fact that the Soviet Union liquidated the US nuclear monopoly so quickly is due to its organizational and human talent. And the elimination of the threat of the atomic dictatorship of the United States was then really a matter of life and death for Russia!

Already in 1949, when the first bomb was tested, Stalin once said in a narrow circle that if we were late with our bomb for a year and a half, then we would probably "try" it on ourselves.

So it would be...

About BERIA, the curator of the Atomic problem, it would be necessary to write - **exclusively according to the documents** - a separate book. And this topic alone, if it is developed in the way it deserves, that is, in its entirety, in all its aspects, would take, according to my estimates, about a 1000-page volume. Therefore, many "atomic" plots associated with Lavrenty Pavlovich will be outside the scope of this book ... And in order to make the essence of Beria's "atomic" activities and its significance for Russia clearer, I will further turn to the evidence of a number of major "atomic" domestic figures who worked in our nuclear weapons complex at different times ...

These estimates cannot be challenged by anyone and in any way!

I will start, of course, with Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Yuliy Borisovich Khariton - legendary among the nuclear scientists "YuB", three times Hero of Socialist Labor, for almost forty years - since 1946 - Scientific Director of the Sarov Nuclear Weapons Center (KB-11, mailbox G- 4665, All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics) ...

First - a quote from a small book by Yu.B. Khariton and Yu.N. Smirnov (also a weapons physicist) "On some myths around the Soviet atomic and hydrogen projects." I quote from the photocopy of the typewritten text I have, this text was signed by Yuliy Borisovich on January 4, 1993 and is the most authentic.

"Distortions of historical truth arise, as we know, not only as a result of the subjective assessments of the narrators, excessive secrecy that limits access to information, or simply due to a misunderstanding. The ground for various conjectures also appears when the truth is hushed up due to political attitudes and considerations, as, for example, in the case of L.P. Beria. If there is no truth today, then there will be myths tomorrow...

It is known that at first the general management of the Soviet atomic project was carried out by V.M. Molotov. His leadership style and, accordingly, the results

were not particularly effective. I.V. Kurchatov did not hide his dissatisfaction.

With the transition of the nuclear project into the hands of Beria, the situation is radically
has changed...

Beria gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism ... "

Khariton wrote in the 90s and so:

"This man ... possessed ... great energy and efficiency. Our specialists, coming into contact with him, could not fail to note his mind, will and purposefulness. We made sure that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to bring things to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria, who did not hesitate to sometimes show frank rudeness (I note that for the most delicate Yuli Borisovich, even a swear word was already "extreme", which everyone who knew him knows. - S.K.), knew how ... to be polite, tactful and just a normal person... The meetings he held were business-like, always productive, and never dragged on. Beria was quick, did not neglect trips to the Objects and personal acquaintance with the results of the work. According to the impression of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the country's nuclear project remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would be difficult to count on quick success in carrying out such grandiose-scale work ... "

And here is how in 1995, in the collective monograph "The Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb", Academician Petrosyants, who knew him in a business way since the war, assessed Beria:

"... Being by nature a very smart person, with good technical acumen (in his youth he graduated from a mechanical and construction technical school, was fond of architecture), he became the largest organizer of military equipment in the pre-war and war years. Supervising the military industries on behalf of Stalin during the war years, leading the relevant people's commissariats, he managed to organize the production of many thousands of tanks, self-propelled gun mounts, many millions of ammunition, shells, ensured the uninterrupted operation of metallurgy in the rear - ferrous and non-ferrous, etc.

Among all the members of the Politburo ... and other top leaders of the country, Beria turned out to be the most prepared in matters of technical policy and technology. I knew all this firsthand, but from personal contacts with him on many technical issues related to tank building and nuclear issues ...

He gave all work on the nuclear problem the necessary scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed great energy and efficiency, was an organizer, able to bring any business he started to the end (I propose to compare this assessment with the independent assessment of Yu.B. Khariton. - S.K.). He often went to sites, got acquainted with the progress and results of work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and severely cracked down on negligent performers, regardless of rank and position (let the reader not think that we are talking about executions, Beria simply filmed negligent. - S.K.). In the process of creating the first Soviet atomic bomb, his role was immeasurable in the full sense of the word ... "

To understand the weight of this opinion, one must know who the person who expressed it was. Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants in 1933, after graduating from the Ural Polytechnic Institute, began as an ordinary engineer at the Ural Heavy Machinery Plant named after S. Ordzhonikidze and quickly rose to the position of chief engineer. In 1939, he was appointed a member of the board and deputy people's commissar of heavy engineering, and since 1940 - the first deputy people's commissar of the machine-tool industry. From October 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of the tank industry.

Since 1943, Major General of the Tank Engineering Service Petrosyants worked in the State Defense Committee of the USSR - along the same "tank" line. At the end of 1946, Beria took him to the Uranium Problem - Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate, and Petrosyants became one of the major figures in the rapidly emerging nuclear technology, later - Hero of Socialist Labor, Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Boris Vasilievich Litvinov, Hero of Socialist Labor, for many years - Chief Designer of the Ural Nuclear Center (NII-1011, All-Union Research Institute of Instrument Engineering, now All-Union Research Institute of Technical Physics) in Chelyabinsk-70 (Snezhinsk), came to nuclear weapons work young a specialist in 1952 and had no personal impressions of Beria, although I heard a lot about him from senior comrades. Already in the 90s, after studying the business style of Beria, Litvinov wrote:

"It is curious that from the many opinions and numerous technical and economic decisions, Beria chose the main ones and sent them to Stalin. Often multi-page or even multi-volume materials were compressed to one page, or even half of it. Only after that they lay down on the table of the Supreme, who made the final decisions ... "

But let's not forget - before that, Beria himself carefully read all these multi-page or even multi-volume materials, with a pencil in his hands! And he didn't just hand over the summary to Stalin, but offered solutions, as a rule, approved by Stalin ...

Academician Veniamin Alekseev is not a physicist, but a historian, and, as a normal, venerable Soviet historian who glorified the exploits of the Soviet working class in Soviet times, he fits in quite well in the current anti-Soviet times. However, even he, the author of the term "mobilization economy", having become acquainted in the mid-90s with the declassified documents of our Atomic Project, assessed Beria's activities as more creative than punitive ...

And now - about the style of Beria from a somewhat unusual angle ...

The recently deceased prominent theoretical physicist from Sarov (Arzamas-16) Vladislav Nikolaevich Mokhov, laureate of the Lenin Prize, has been working at the Sarov Nuclear Weapons Center since 1955. A non-standard person, he could express not only interesting physical, but also social ideas. And here is what he wrote about his first years of work in Sarov:

"... In our team, a free atmosphere of work and communication has developed, an extraordinary ... freedom of discussion and exchange of opinions, which was quite consciously supported by the leadership of VNIIEF ... Apparently, the curator of the work on the creation of nuclear weapons L.P. Beria considered this acceptable and necessary to create a creative atmosphere. We could spend hours discussing not only scientific and technical problems, but also philosophical issues related to nuclear weapons, including purely political aspects ... "

As you can see, the Soviet weapons physicist directly points to the personality of Beria as a source of creative atmosphere in the Soviet scientific environment! It turns out that it was from Beria that there was a business-like, but mutually benevolent atmosphere in relations between *efficient* workers, between people *of business who* honestly do this common, one for all, business?

DESERVES our attention and the style of Beria's resolutions on documents addressed to him. A typical example ... On July 19, 1948, Zavenyagin, Minister of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy Lomako, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee for PGU Borisov, Academician Alikhanov and Deputy Lomako Frolov send Beria a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the work plan for the "B-9 product" (this is how the documents coded thorium).

Beria's resolution: "1. T. Tevosyan I.T. (Personally). I ask you to consider this project and report your opinion. 2. Tt. Vannikov B.L., Kurchatov I.V. Please provide your views on the proposed program of work on the B-9 for the coming years. L. Beria. July 28, 1948 "

Among the thousands of visas and resolutions of Beria, there is not **a single one** on the documents of the Atomic Project "crushing", humiliating those to whom they are addressed, even if they touched someone else's guilt.

Irina Bystrova, the author of the academic monograph "The Soviet military-industrial complex: problems of formation and development (1930–1980s)", published in 2006, is by no means benevolent towards to Beria. However, she admits that "even in the most acute cases ... Beria's resolutions remained restrained and constructive."

By the way, Bystrova writes:

"... the contents of Beria's "Special Folders" show that the style of the "Beria leadership" was, although rather tough, but not as intimidating **as it is presented in many memoirs** (italics mine. - S.K.). Threats, of course, could have taken place verbally, but written orders looked much more businesslike and cultured.

I note, by the way, that the threats "orally" not only "could have taken place"! They, moreover, with the widespread use of "non-parliamentary expressions", of course, took place ... And it could not be otherwise with the level of psycho-physiological stress that Beria constantly experienced, and with that "racial" inescapable laxity, which in Russia was enough even after 1945, after the war, which taught discipline and

responsibility of many...

Another thing is that these, who broke, as they say, in a rush, from the language of Beria's threat never - I emphasize, **never** - had neither in wartime, nor in the Atomic Project, not only "execution", but even "prison" development, although Beria has repeatedly said that the Bolsheviks will always find a "turma" for slobs ...

Of course, in cases of direct criminal negligence, etc., the perpetrators were punished, but not because of Beria's "threats", but because of the presence of the relevant articles of the Criminal Code.

Here is another example... In June 1947, the director of the plutonium plant No. 817 under construction, E.P. Slavsky reports outrageous things in an extensive memorandum addressed to Beria:

"The pace of work ... is extremely weak ..., the most complicated object ... it was entrusted to build a road construction regiment, which does not include a single specialist in the construction of industrial facilities ...

Housing construction is a complete failure ... Workers sit for a very long time and no one forces them to work ... Out of 41,000 workers ... only 5,700 people work at industrial facilities, and the rest are dispersed in various auxiliary enterprises and auxiliary works, "

etc.

Beria's resolution:

"T. Kruglov (Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. - S.K.), comrade Vannikov and comrade. Zavenyagin. 1. We urgently need to strengthen the leadership... Release T. Rapoport for health reasons. Nominate the building of Tsarevsky as a researcher. 2. Consider the memorandums of comrade Slavsky and comrade Tkachenko (authorized by the Council of Ministers of the USSR at the plant No. 817. - S.K.) and take action on them. Report on the measures taken. 3. T. Chernysheva (deputy Kruglov. - S.K.) to send on a business trip for 2-3 months for acceptance

in place of all necessary measures to ensure the completion of construction and installation work in the installation. Government deadlines. 4. Urgently contact Comrade Khrulev on the issue of assistance to the building of engineering and technical. works.

L. Beria.

In the history of the Atomic Project, one can find, however, more striking examples ...

November 1949... Two months have passed since the successful explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1. The production of at least a few new atomic bombs is a matter of vital importance for the USSR, and the protocol of the meeting of the Special Committee No. 88a signed personally by Beria states:

"1. It should be noted that the storage of RDS-1 parts from amethyl (plutonium code name. - S.K.) at the plant No. 817 is unsatisfactory. Details of the RDS-1 were placed in damp underground rooms that did not protect their surface from oxidation.

It would seem that comments are unnecessary - the management of the plant can be accused of almost a state crime! After all, plutonium at that time was the main factor that was more expensive than any gold!

Well, what are the "organizational conclusions"?

And these are:

"2. To point out to the head of plant No. 817, comrade Muzrukov, and the chief engineer, comrade Slavsky, the inadmissibility of such an attitude towards the storage of products from amethyl.

3. The deputy head of the plant No. 817 for the regime, comrade Ryzhov, who is responsible for the storage of amethyl and gave the wrong order to lay the details of RDS-1 in a damp room, to announce a reprimand.

4. Oblige the head of plant No. 817, Comrade Muzrukov, to establish uninterrupted ventilation of the storage facility within 3 days, ensure its thorough drying and equip it with devices to control humidity and temperature.

T. Muzrukov personally systematically check the state of the repository ...

5. Instruct ... t. Meshik to check the execution on site of this decision."

The LAST resolution on Combine No. 817 refers, as was said, to the period after the first test of the Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1.

The code designation "RDS" was officially deciphered as "Jet engine "C", while the meaning of the letter "C" is not exactly identified today, despite the testimony of Yu.B. Khariton that this abbreviation was invented by the secretary of the Special Committee Makhnev, and it allegedly meant "Stalin's Jet Engine" ...

As for the developers of the nuclear charges of the RDS series themselves, they had their own decoding: "Russia does it herself."

And it was said to the point.

Beria was present at the test on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site, then known in a narrow circle as "Training Ground No. 2" ... He visited the assembly building at the 37-meter steel truss tower, on which the "product" was supposed to be raised, then went to the command post of the experiment.

The weather was let down - you could expect anything, up to a thunderstorm. As if the situation was repeated during the first American explosion in Alamogordo - there, too, the weather did not work out, and also unexpectedly, contrary to the weather forecast. General Leslie Groves, in his famous book Now It Can Be Told, wrote:

was connected with the weather ... That evening turned out to be rainy and windy. Many insisted that the test be delayed for at least 24 hours."

Fearing the vagaries of the weather, the Americans were forced to postpone the explosion, but it turned out the opposite for us - Kurchatov, fearing surprises from wind and rain, decided to postpone the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00.

At 06:33 on August 29, 1949, the sealed door to the control room was opened and the power supply to the automation system was turned on. 1300 instruments and 9700 indicators were in readiness to register all the phenomena of the explosion.

The experiment manager, Malsky, periodically announced in a singsong voice the time remaining until the explosion.

At 6.48 the field machine was turned on - the machine for the phased activation of devices for detonating atomic charge capsules.

At 6.50 the field machine turned on the glow of all the lamps in the devices arranged along the radii experimental field.

Of course, not only the filaments of radio tubes heated up - the glow also grew inside those who were now at CP.

Three minutes before time "H" Beria, Kurchatov, members of the Special Committee Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Makhnev, the leaders of the Sarov Design Bureau-11, which developed the RDS-1, who were not directly involved in finishing operations, approached the open door, prepared dark goggles ...

Decades later, in the "perestroika" times, the famous physicist I.N. Golovin, an employee of the Kurchatov Laboratory No. 2, made the public happy with the story that when the field machine was launched, Beria allegedly said to Kurchatov something like: "But nothing will come of you."

Here there is a desire to present Beria as a provocateur, but Yu.B. Khariton, directly refuting Golovin, wrote about this gossip: "... this did not happen. Golovin was not at these works, and all sorts of rumors spread ... "

20 seconds before the explosion, the operator, at the command of the head of the explosion, turned on the main switch connecting the "product" with the automation system, and at exactly 7.00 the whole area was lit up with blinding light. Approximately 30 seconds later, a shock wave approached the command post.

It became clear that the experiment was a success. Everyone rushed to each other, hugged, congratulated each other, shouted: "We have it!", "We managed to make it!"

Beria also hugged - everyone remembers how he impulsively hugged Kurchatov. He also embraced Khariton, kissing him on the forehead. And he kept escaping, trying to close the door before the arrival of the shock wave.

Everyone was happy, but at the CP of the first test, Lavrenty Pavlovich was the only one who knew what an important event in the history of Russia had just happened. After all, only he, of all those gathered here, had all the information about the plans for US nuclear aggression against Russia.

And with all that...

For all that, even at such a moment, Beria did not lose control of himself and managed to notice something that the rest did not notice. The famous Georgy Flerov told his student Alexander Veretennikov, later a major gunsmith, about this instructive episode, and Veretennikov cited his story in his memoirs ...

The neutron background from the "neutron fuse" (NC) of the charge was recorded by a mechanical counter installed at the test command post. Background persistence (otherwise - the number of clicks of the counter with a frequency of 2-3 pulses per minute) proved the safety of the NS until the moment of explosion.

Veretennikov wrote:

"When the explosion occurred, no one paid any attention to the counter, and Beria looked at his testimony and found that the last time he ...

registered 3–4 impulses in both channels at once. He immediately demanded an explanation, what happened to NZ? GN (Flerov. - S.K.) replied that these were, apparently, pickups on the equipment. And at that moment, none of those present knew that one of the first registrations of electromagnetic phenomena accompanying a nuclear explosion unexpectedly took place here.

Other in other words, the only observer-experimenter who, for the attentive first time in the USSR, recorded the phenomenon of an electromagnetic pulse. And his observation was not wasted - Flerov remembered Beria's question, and when the excitement subsided, he thought and understood - we are dealing with a new phenomenon.

But when did Beria manage to catch a burst of momentum? This is an instantaneous phenomenon, and he could not expect it in advance!

How do you need to control yourself in order to fix such details like counter clicks!

The reaction of the West to the Soviet test varied.

Labor Party MP Blackburn, known for his sharp attacks on The Soviet Union, on September 28, 1949, in an interview with the Daily Express, complained:

"Western experts believed that the Soviet Union would not be able to manufacture the first atomic bomb until 1953. Now it turned out that the Soviet Union was technically ahead of us ... "

By "us" he meant, of course, England, and Blackburn had reason to be sad. Active nuclear work began in England earlier than in the USA - in 1940, British specialists took part in the American Manhattan Project, and in early January 1947, a special government committee, code-named Jen-163, chaired by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, took decision on a course towards nuclear status. However, only on the morning of October 3, 1952, off the Monte Bello Islands, not far from the northwestern coast of Australia, on board a decommissioned frigate, the first British atomic bomb was detonated.

That is, the matter was not so much in the "atomic" secrets that intelligence is capable of obtaining, but in the general economic and scientific and technical potential of the power that began atomic work.

Blackburn had the objectivity to ridicule the suggestion that the Soviet Union owed its bomb of intelligence information. He admitted:

"First of all, the question of producing a significant amount of atomic energy does not depend on secrets, this requires the organized efforts of scientists, technicians and engineers, and this discovery was more of a production than a scientific miracle" ...

There is no need to argue with such a statement.

Political columnist for the weekly Italian magazine "Tempo" Roberto Candelupo remarked ironically:

"The Americans soon had to admit that with regard to the atomic bomb in the USSR, the American year 1952 (the date expected in the United States for the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project. - S.K.) came in 1949 ...

Russia gave a stunning proof of its will, its ability to work and its ability to keep secrets ... Their scientific efforts were colossal, their organizational work was colossal, Stalin's titanic will won.

The Italian wrote everything correctly, including regarding Stalin's titanic will and Russia's ability to keep secrets ... But it is unlikely that even Western intelligence services knew then that the words "colossal organizational work" should have been attributed primarily to Lavrenty Beria, who "exchanged" in the year of our first fifty years of trials.

As for America, she experienced such a shock, the likes of which she subsequently experienced only three more times - in the fall of 1957 after the announcement of the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite in the USSR, in the spring of 1961 - after the launch of Gagarin, and in the fall of 1962 during the Caribbean missile crisis.

Rankin, a member of the US House of Representatives, proposed moving the US capital from Washington to the small town of Paducah in Kentucky.

Senator Wylie sent a letter to US Secretary of Defense Jackson insisting on the transfer of the US Department of Defense offices from the Pentagon building and dispersing them around the country.

These, of course, were manifestations of political paranoia, but it does not prevent us from remembering them - as soon as America begins to feel its vulnerability, it immediately loses all restraint and immediately turns its tail between its legs.

And what is interesting and significant is that all four "universal" shocks of America were directly related to the activities of Lavrenty Beria - not only in the Soviet Atomic Project, but also in the Rocket Project.

And then I will focus on the latter ...

ALREADY ARRESTED and humiliated, Beria wrote to Malenkov on July 1, 1953 in a "letter from the bunker":

"I should especially note our joint active long-term work in the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on the creation of atomic weapons, and later on the Kometa and Berkut systems - guided missiles. <...>

According to the Berkut, the tests were completed successfully. Now the whole thing is to ensure the production in series and the appropriate personnel, and in this area a lot is being done by the relevant ministries. The main thing on the basis of "Kometa" and "Berkut" there are enormous opportunities for further improvements in the field of guided projectiles, both in terms of accuracy, and in terms of speed and range. A special report is being prepared for the government. This weapon must be moved forward, this is the real future, with which the army of our country must be armed. The United States and Britain attach exceptional importance to this. I repeat, all this was achieved because the Party and the Government wanted it, but I wanted to say, and here we worked together ... "

Yes!

"And we plowed ..." - Beria, being in distress, reminded Malenkov of their "joint active long-term work" to manage defense projects, clearly exaggerating the "merits" of the latter ...

Although formally there was nothing to object to - Malenkov was indeed included in the official leadership of both atomic and rocket work. However, not only nuclear scientists, but also rocket scientists knew Beria. And Beria's supervision of rocket work went in three directions:

- development of the Kometa cruise missile;
- development of the Berkut system for missile defense of Moscow from air raids;
- development of long-range ballistic missiles.

The first two points are better known today, if only because the Comet and Berkut projects were led by Beria's son, Sergo Beria. But the fact that Lavrenty Beria did a lot for the development of Soviet work on those missiles, which later became known as

"Intercontinental ballistic" is known much worse.

Therefore, I, having rather briefly dwelled on the "Komet" and "Berkut", more space I will take under the third, less well-known, "rocket" "hypostasis" of Beria.

The FIRST Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3140-1028ss on the start of the development of the Kometa unmanned aerial missile system with nuclear combat equipment was adopted in September 1947 - even before this very equipment was created. However, it was planned to equip the complex with a conventional warhead.

The development of the "Kometa" complex was to be dealt with - as the head - special design bureau KB-1 under the leadership of P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria - son L.P. Beria. The Tu-4 piston bomber was used as the first carrier, and later the Tu-16 jet bomber.

Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko (1896-1980) - a Soviet scientist and designer in the field of radio engineering, was a talented person, but Sergo Beria was by no means a "wedding general" in KB-1.

KB-1 was engaged not only (yes, perhaps, for a long time and not so much) in the Kometa system, but also in the Berkut system, which will be discussed later. Therefore, the Comet was worked out only by 1952, and in May of this year, Beria, together with his son Sergo, who was the technical director of complex tests, led the State tests of the Comet.

The tests took place in the Crimea on the Black Sea on the basis of the "atomic" 71st Air Force training ground, which was based in the area of Kerch (the village of Bagerovo). A cruise missile, similar to a swept-wing aircraft, pierced the side of the decommissioned cruiser Krasny Kavkaz and exited from the other side. But this success was preceded by a long and dangerous work.

The specifics of working out the "Comet" - **an unmanned** aerial vehicle in principle, was that in order to work out the systems for uncoupling the rocket and its design, it was necessary to make many flights in a **manned** mode.

At the same time, the cockpit in the "plane" - the baby was not only cramped, but cramped - in the "regular" version, the pilot was not required, and only "piece" aces could take the risk of such "piloting".

Sultan Amet-Khan (1920-1971), twice Hero of the Soviet Union, a Crimean Tatar, who personally shot down 30 aircraft and 15 in a group during the war, conducted the main flight testing of the unmanned aviation-missile nuclear complex "Kometa". The appearance of a third pilot - three times Hero of the Soviet Union in peacetime would have caused too many rumors, and that is the only reason Amet-Khan did not receive the third Golden Star for his heroic flights, in 1953 he was awarded the Stalin Prize among other developers of the complex.

The Sultan became a true friend of Sergo Beria. I draw the reader's attention: Amet-Khan was a Crimean Tatar, but this did not prevent him from making friends with the son of the one who led the eviction of his fellow tribesmen from the Crimea. This alone shows that the Crimean Tatars - just as a people - they were very guilty before the Motherland. And honest to the last drop of blood, the Sultan understood this. He died already in 1971 - while testing a new engine on a laboratory aircraft.

Two other testers of the Comet were Sergei Nikolaevich Anokhin (1910-1986) and Vasily Georgievich Pavlov (1916 - not earlier than 1998). For their courage and heroism during the testing of the Comet system, both were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on February 3, 1953. Together with Amet Khan, they made 150 manned test flights on an unmanned aerial vehicle. It was not only a huge risk, but also a manifestation of the highest professional skill.

However, the Kometa was a shock system, and after the war, defensive systems turned out to be the most vital for the USSR, and it was precisely such a system that the Berkut system was designed to prevent even a single American from breaking through to Moscow.

bomber carrying nuclear weapons.

DECISION of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426ss / op ("special folder") on the start of work on the Berkut air defense system (AD) of Moscow was adopted on August 9, 1950. The system was so classified that the military department was not aware of its development.

This system is the "foremother" of all subsequent air defense systems of the USSR, and its "godfather" "father" was Lavrenty Beria.

To make it clearer to the reader the scale of this first in the USSR and, in fact, the first in the world integrated air defense system, I will give its main composition. The Berkut system included as components:

- radar station for long-range target detection;
- radar station for targeting;
- anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM) V-300 developed by the Lavochkin Design Bureau;
- fighter-interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles.

And to make the stress of the work clearer, I'll let you know that, according to the Chief Designer, Hero of Socialist Labor Semyon Alekseevich Lavochkin, the creator of the famous La-5 and La-7 wartime fighters and then a number of jet fighters, it was so difficult to work on the Berkut, as it was not difficult even during the war years.

The unprecedented haste was due to the fact that Stalin and Beria had reliable information about the real threat of an atomic war by the West against the USSR, which would begin, of course, with the atomic bombing of Moscow.

Why the Moscow air defense system received the name "Berkut" cannot be precisely established today, however, KB-1 veterans agree that it is formed from the initial syllables of the names of the chief designers of the system - Beria and Kuksenko. After all, the Berkut system, like the Comet, was developed in KB-1.

Pavel Kuksenko and Sergo Beria had the status of Chief Designers, while the future Academician and Hero of Socialist Labor A.A. was appointed the only Deputy Chief Designer. Raspletin, the creator of the B-200 central guidance radar, which provided simultaneous tracking of up to 20 targets.

The radars of the first American Nike-Ajax anti-aircraft missile systems, unlike Raspletin's multifunctional sector radar, could only track one target.

The head of the design bureau, in fact, the head of the experimental production, Beria chose the Hero of Socialist Labor Amo Sergeevich Elyan.

During the war, General Yelyan directed the main artillery plant for the production of the most massive field and tank guns of medium caliber (100,000 guns were fired by Victory Day). Then Yelyan entered the sphere of interests of Beria as an experienced and skilled manager.

As in the "atomic" business, Beria saw the key to the success of "rocket" affairs in competent personnel and therefore transferred Yelyan, who had previously worked in the PGU system, to the system of the new Third State Guidance. Looking ahead, I will inform you that after the arrest of Beria, General Yelyan did not publicly renounce him, although the fate of Yelyan changed dramatically and badly after that.

To "ensure the development, design and manufacture of the means included in the air defense complex of the Berkut system." On February 3, 1951, by resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 307-144ss / op, the Third Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was formed.

Vasily Ryabikov (1907–1974), a former deputy commissar, and later first deputy minister of armaments, was also in charge of the Third GU, also a longtime acquaintance of Beria the father since the war.

TSU was directly subordinate to Beria's Special Committee.

It must be said that at one time, in addition to Special Committee No. 1, Special Committee No. 2 was also formed - on jet technology. From May 1946 to May 1947 at the head

it was Malenkov, from May 1947 to August 1949 - Bulganin (in August 1949, SK No. 2 was abolished). But here, too, the real guiding organizational "strap" was pulled by Beria every now and then.

Ryabikov was an experienced manager, but in acute situations, Beria also connected to Ryabikov the head of the "atomic" PGU Vannikov.

Moreover, Vannikov, according to Grigory Kisunko, one of the developers of the Berkut system (we will meet him again), sometimes spoke very harshly, for example, like this: "I ... am going to report to the LP that you all forgot here what responsibility is ... and think that everything is allowed to you. They gave you everything you asked for ... And now that's enough, now let's go "...

However, as even the hater admits, it is not clear why, both Beria - both father and son, Kisunko, managed "without looking for ... scapegoats."

I note, by the way, that semi-familiar, but imbued with warmth, unofficial behind-the-eyes abbreviations like "LP" (from "Lavrenty Pavlovich") were awarded a few among gunsmiths, and only those who were respected informally: "UB" - Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, "AD" - Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, "SP" - Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, etc.

But this is by the way...

So, work on the Uranium problem was in full swing, and Stalin threw Beria and one more - that one, I must say - a job.

As a result, Lavrenty Pavlovich supervised at the same time:

- "atomic" First Main Directorate, headed by B.L. Vannikov;
- "atomic" Second Main Directorate headed by P.Ya. Antropov, who was in charge of the extraction and processing of uranium raw materials into concentrate, and also carried out production and technical management of the extraction of uranium from deposits developed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, and control over geological exploration for uranium and thorium;

- "rocket" Third Main Directorate for Guided Missiles and Air Defense Systems, headed by V.N. Ryabikov.

But this was not all that Lavrenty Beria oversaw in the arms industry - there were also long-range missiles, but about them - later.

In 1951, the Berkut project began the stage of manufacturing prototypes.

In November 1952, the first launch of the V-300 SAM against an air target took place. April 26, 1953 was shot down specially redesigned - remotely controlled unmanned - Tu-4 bomber used as a target aircraft. And in May 1953, the first stage of the launch program for real radio-controlled aircraft was completed.

Here are two later assessments of the contribution of Beria Sr. to these achievements.

General M.I. Naumenko:

"He repeatedly visited the Kapustin Yar training ground (in the Astrakhan region. - S.K.), where, by the way, his son Sergey participated in the tests ... During the construction period, until 1953, while Beria was responsible for the implementation of the project, not a single failure didn't exist from the very beginning..."

Lieutenant General, Academician A.G. Bassists (the value in Soviet works is already Missile Defense Outstanding):

"In August 1952, I reported to Lavrentiy Beria on the state of the polygon sample of the Moscow air defense system. Beria came to our facility ... He spoke calmly, respectfully ... On that visit, he solved the problem of food for us. We worked for 18 hours, and there was really nowhere to eat. And after his visit, everything immediately appeared ... "

I don't think any special comments are needed here...

I will only add that it is possible to cite many similar examples that have been preserved in history of sincere concern for the life of those people who were led by the former member of the Baku Extraordinary Commission for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the improvement of the life of the workers, Lavrenty Beria.

And NOW let's return to the memoirs of Grigory Kisunko (1918–1998), who, after the death of Beria Sr., became lieutenant general, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, General Designer of the Moscow A-35 missile defense system ...

In the views of this really great and honored gunsmith, in the most bizarre way, sincere love for that Soviet Power, which raised the former peasant son of Gritsko Kisunko so high, and sincere kulak, "Kurkul" hatred for the great country of collectivists, created under the hand of Stalin and Beria, were united in the most bizarre way, about which Kisunko speaks only negatively.

Well, the more valuable is the testimony of such a witness ...

This is how Kisunko describes a certain meeting with Beria, to which Kisunko was summoned at the end of February 1953 from the Kapustin Yar training ground ...

A year before this, the paths of Kisunko and Beria had already crossed, but in absentia. Then, in February 1952, having invited Kisunko to his office, the chief engineer of the 8th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Armaments, Sergei Nikolaevich Savin, placed a folder with a "cart" on the table in front of him, which began like this:

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CC
TO THE GENERALISSIMO OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO COMRADE STALIN IOSIF VISSARIONOVICH
DEAR IOSIF VISSARIONOVICH!

I can no longer remain silent about, to put it mildly, the sabotage actions of the
leaders of the development of the Berkut system: Doctor of Technical Sciences Kisunko ...
"

etc.

In the upper left corner there was a resolution: *"TT. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan. Understand and report. L. Beria.*

Write a response from the Minister of Arms of the USSR Dmitry Ustinov to this "cart" Savin proposed to Kisunko himself, which he did.

It all ended in nothing.

Moreover, Kisunko, even after many years, did not understand that Beria deserves his gratitude even if only for addressing the denunciation for trial exclusively to the technical leadership, without including the department of Minister of State Security Ignatiev here.

But father Kisunko was shot in 1938 as dispossessed in 1930...

A year had passed, and now a face-to-face acquaintance was coming, but for what exact reason, Kisunko did not know. Kuksenko brought him to the Kremlin in his ZIM.

In the office of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria gathered the head of TSU V.M. Ryabikov, Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, "locator" Professor A.A. Raspletin, "radio operator" V.D. Kalmykov (the future Minister of Radio Industry of the USSR), Ryabikov's deputy for scientific and technical part, Academician A.N. Schukin.

Beria's assistant Sergei Mikhailovich Vladimirovsky was also present (Kisunko defined his polite smile when inviting guests to Beria's office as "a grimace that is part of the stencil of courtesy") ...

In Kisunko's description of the appearance of Beria, traces of looking at Grigory Vasilyevich photographs of Beria, published in the "catastrophe" time.

But in the fact that he is not devoid of panache (and even poses - all the more, he wrote poetry, and even

with "feelings") Kisunko accurately remembered Beria's clothes, I believe.

Here is how Kisunko described it: "a magnificent, brand-new suit made of soft dark fabric, a snow-white shirt with an exquisitely tied tie in the neckline of a single-breasted jacket"...

Kisunko seems to be reproaching Beria for his style of dress, as if it would be better if the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of a great power appeared in front of people in a worn jacket with short trousers, a shirt with a dirty collar and an "eternal" tie with an elastic band knocked to the side ...

Undoubtedly, exactly the description by Grigory Vasilyevich and the huge desk Beria, "lined with telephones" ...

Well, a huge desktop is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the efficient work of a very busy person. They don't manage at such tables, but really *work*, conveniently laying out a lot of papers so that they can be kept in sight, etc.

When everyone settled into their chairs, Beria ...

However, at first I confess that I am quoting Kisunko further with one correction: those words from the lips of Beria that Kisunko gives with a "Caucasian" accent (obviously thinking that this will cause additional negative feelings in the reader), I quote in the usual normative transcription - for convenience of the reader...

So:

"... First, let's get acquainted with one document," Beria began, rising from his chair (I am extremely grateful to Kisunko for this valuable detail, because it proves that Lavrenty Pavlovich was a well-mannered person, and not an bossy boor who, lounging in an armchair, utters "deep" instructions to the subordinate "riff-raff". - S.K.) and taking a folder from the table. - I'll read it to you now:

"Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you that launches of anti-aircraft missiles of the Berkut system against real targets cannot be started due to the fact that the antennas delivered to the test site by plant No. 92 turned out to be of poor quality. The plant treated its work irresponsibly... and the representative of KB-1 Zaxon arbitrarily allowed the shipment of antennas with these deviations. We ask for your instructions. Kalmykov, Raspletin"

Who wrote this encryption? Beria asked.

"We, Lavrenty Pavlovich," Kalmykov and Raspletin answered, rising like a military man. - We are both.

- How are you two? Who was holding the pen? .. "

Here I will temporarily interrupt the quotation in order to note that I personally admired the accuracy and "juiciness" of Lavrenty Pavlovich's last question! He immediately, "at the root" cut off the possibility of fogging, planting turuses on wheels, etc., but he established an atmosphere of concreteness ...

Therefore, I continue quoting Kisunko's memoirs:

"... The text was discussed together, and I wrote in the notebook with my fountain pen, - Kalmykov explained.

I (Kisunko. - S.K.) realized that the cipher read out was a surprise not only for me, but for everyone present ... This is what, it turns out, the authors of the cipher were doing secretly from me and Zaxon at the training ground ... It is terrible to work with such people ... »

Here again I have to interrupt the quotation... Kisunko expressed himself inaccurately above! For Raspletin and Kalmykov, the only surprise was that Beria would read their libelous cipher right away in front of all the honest people! Also, by the way, not such a trivial trick - to publicly open organizational "abscesses" without

evasive "therapy", and "surgical" method ...

Further, the events unfolded as follows:

"... And now let's read another document," Beria continued. - "Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you that A-11 and A-12 antennas, manufactured by serial factories with deviations from specifications (technical specifications. - S.K.), fixed by military acceptance, according to our decision, are shipped for installation on Berkut system combat facilities. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Kalmykov, Shchukin, Kuksenko, Raspletin, Kisunko.

What document would you like to believe? Beria asked. - At the training ground, the antennas are unusable, but for military objects the same antennas turn out to be suitable? Explain this paradox to me, Comrade Ryabikov.

- Lavrenty Pavlovich, apparently, comrades Kalmykov and Raspletin got excited, and, without consulting anyone, hurried with the encryption. We consulted with the chief designers and we believe that the antennas are suitable, - Ryabikov answered.

- Or maybe they didn't get excited, but they were pressured in Moscow and forced to sign this other document on the shipment of antennas to objects? Where will we ship from there? To the landfill?.."

Any person who has ever been engaged in business, not chatter, and who has taken part in meetings, already by the way Beria began this meeting, will understand, firstly, how strong a manager he was, and, secondly, how to the person will be treated with respect.

So talking and "wrapping up" the matter will only be humanly bright and good personality!

Beria also asked a number of specific clarifying questions, listened to the answers of Kisunko, Kuksenko, and then:

"... After a pause, Beria summed up:

"I am convinced that this is not a simple matter. It is necessary to sort out a special commission.

Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan, Kuksenko.

"And Shchukin," added Ryabikov.

- Good ... Report the results of the commission's work to me on March 6 at Monday".

And this time everything for Kisunko ended in "nothing".

He sees the reason for this, however, not in the objectivity of Beria, but in the death of Stalin that followed almost immediately after the meeting. However, this death did not violate the usual order of work either in the First, or in the Second, or in the Third Main Directorate, and the order of work of Beria himself changed only for a short time, as evidenced by the documents.

So even after March 5, 1953, Beria, if real sins had been revealed for Kisunko, he would not have forgotten about him. Yes, and the apparatus of Lavrenty Pavlovich (not repressive, but managerial) was not such as to lose sight of serious issues, especially personnel.

On this I part with the Berkut project, and then we will talk about Beria - "far rocket launcher...

WORKS on guided ballistic missiles (BR) in the USSR have been carried out for a long time, in particular, the famous future "Chief Designer of Cosmonautics" Sergey Pavlovich Korolev was engaged in this. But we began to work seriously on the BR only after the end of the war, when we managed to fully find out how much the Germans with their fantastic V-2 BR (Fau -2").

Such missiles are called ballistic because, having received the initial impulse

in the active phase of the flight due to the operation of the rocket engine, then the rocket - after the end of the extremely "gluttonous" engine - flies along a ballistic trajectory, like a stone thrown by a boy's hand into the expanse of heaven flies ...

In the spring of 1945, Soviet specialists examined the German rocket research center in Peenemünde, and on June 8, 1945, the people's commissar of the aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin reported to GKO Malenkov:

"... The Peenemünde Institute is a huge plant that was engaged in the development and testing of rocket projectiles.

The institute was located on an area of about 80 sq. kilometers, with more than 150 buildings and structures with a total area of more than 200 thousand square meters. The capacity of the preserved power plant of the institute is 30 thousand kilowatts. The number of employees at the institute reached 7500 people ... "

Work began on dismantling the equipment and exporting it to the USSR from Peenemünde, from the Rheinmetall-Borsig missile plant in the Marienfeld suburb of Berlin, etc. They also exported those German missilemen who the Americans did not have time to capture, although the chief Reich rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, General Dornberger and many others.

In Germany itself, the Nordenhausen Institute worked for a time. The head of the institute was Major General of Artillery L. Gaidukov, and the chief engineer was S. Korolev, the same one ... Both Soviet specialists and Germans worked at the institute ...

On April 17, 1946, Stalin was sent a note on the organization of research and experimental work in the field of missile weapons in the USSR. The note was signed (in order of priority) by L. Beria, G. Malenkov, N. Bulganin, D. Ustinov and N. Yakovlev - the head of the GAU, the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army.

Note that the document was signed by Beria first, and by no means in alphabetical order.

This, without exaggeration, historical note stated, in particular, that in Germany, 25 research organizations were engaged in missile weapons issues and up to 15 types of rocket projectiles were developed, including the V-2 long-range missile with a maximum range of 400 kilometers.

The note ended with the words: "It would be expedient to convene a special meeting with you to discuss all these issues."

On April 29, 1946, such a meeting was held at Stalin's, consisting of: I.V. Stalin, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Bulganin, M.V. Khrushchev, D.F. Ustinov, B.L. Vannikov, I.G. Kabanov, M.G. Pervukhin, N.N. Voronov, N.D. Yakovlev, A.I. Sokolov, L.M. Gaidukov, V.M. Ryabikov, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, L.A. Talking...

The meeting went on from 21.00 to 22.45, after which only Bulganin and Malenkov remained with Stalin.

As we already know, the Special Committee on Jet Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was soon formed, headed first by Malenkov, and then, already as Committee No. 2, - Bulganin.

Beria had enough to do without long-range missiles, but on December 28, 1946, the Commissioner of the Special Committee on Jet Technology in Germany, N.E. Nosovsky - through Colonel-General I.A., a member of the "rocket" Special Committee, who was leaving for Moscow for a new appointment. Serov - sent a detailed multi-page report on the structure and work of the Nordhausen Rocket Institute to the Chairman of the Committee, Malenkov.

Ivan Serov, when Beria was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, was his deputy and on the cover letter to the report he imposed a resolution, addressing one of Beria's assistants, Ordynstev: "Comrade. Ordynstev! When will L.P. have free time? Beria, I ask you to show some of the documents, and most importantly, photographs. 12/29/1946. Serov.

On December 31, 1946, the report was received by the secretariat of Beria, and from there - to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

Malenkov.

It is curious and indicative that Serov suggested that Ordynstev acquaint Beria with important, but not directly related to Beria documents when Beria had **free** time.

In fact, less tedious activities are associated with the concept of "free time" than reading a voluminous and rich business paper in content ... But it turns out that Lavrenty Beria had such a "free" pastime.

This is all to the fact that many still have a persistent misconception that the "voluptuary" Beria in his spare time was fond of exclusively a harem of young Muscovites caught up in the "black funnel", who, after the "pleasures", were dissolved either in sulfuric, either in hydrochloric acid, or in general in some kind of ingenious acid ...

But there was nothing like it in reality.

What happened?

It was what is described in this book - many hours of daily work, the result of which turned out to be the growing power of the Soviet Union and the welfare of its peoples.

Ivan Serov knew the real, and not the demonized Beria by the slanderers, well, and therefore expressed himself as he put it. Serov knew what he was writing, because he knew: during his **working** hours, Beria is busy with what Stalin specifically entrusted to him. But in **free** time he will be able to be distracted by the study of those problems that are objectively important for the state, but at the moment they are not included in the scope of Beria's **working** interests.

Especially since - what the hell is not joking! Today, long-range missiles for Beria - an optional "elective", and tomorrow, you see, is already a direct order from Comrade Stalin ...

Of course, Beria read the report from Nordhausen, but the supervision of work on long-range missiles was then entrusted to another, and Beria had a lot of trouble with atomic work.

However, as we will see from the future, work on long-range missiles could not have done without Lavrenty Beria.

MAY 10, 1947 in the Special Committee of Jet Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR - in accordance with the especially important Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1454-388 "Issues of jet technology" - there was a "changing of the guard".

The first paragraph of the Decree renamed the Special Committee of Reactive Technology Committee No. 2, but the essence was in the second paragraph (there were five in total), which read:

"To appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Bulganin N.A. Chairman of Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, having granted the request of Comrade Malenkov G.M. release him from this duty.

This leading "leapfrog", perhaps, does not need special comments - and so it is clear that Malenkov failed.

But something still needs to be clarified. The replacement of Malenkov by Bulganin had nothing to do with the so-called "aviation case", when Malenkov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks due to the fact that Malenkov, as it was said in the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee, "is morally responsible for those outrages" that were opened in the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR and the Air Force. (It turned out that during the war the People's Commissar of the People's Commissar Shakhurin was released, and the Air Force Air Marshal Novikov accepted poor-quality aircraft.)

I repeat: Malenkov's departure from the leadership of the "rocket" theme was not connected with the "aviation" business. The resolution of the Politburo on the "aviation" case, which removed (for a short time, however) Malenkov, was adopted on May 4, 1946, and he ceased to be chairman of the Special Committee on Jet Technology No. 2 only a year later.

Malenkov was the main "rocketeer" - Bulganin became the main "rocketeer" ... And rockets still did not fly, or flew poorly.

Why?

Neither Malenkov nor Bulganin were mediocre managers - there were no incompetent and mediocrity in Stalin's classic "team", even Khrushchev under Stalin did not get out of the general team for many years.

Both Malenkov and Bulganin worked hard and sensibly before the war, and during the war, and after the war. But with Special Committee No. 2, neither one nor the other did not work out ...

Why?

Malenkov was loaded with work in the Central Committee, Bulganin - in the Council of Ministers, but then Beria - the chairman of a simple Special Committee also had extensive responsibilities for the USSR Council of Ministers, like Bulganin. But everything went well with Beria both in the Special Committee, and with the Comet, and with the Berkut ...

Why?

Is it because neither Malenkov nor Bulganin, as - by the turn of the 40s-50s - and other members of the Stalinist team, had neither the taste for the new that Beria had, nor the taste for people who was with Beria?

Practically all post-war defense problems were distinguished by their unprecedented novelty: atomic weapons, jet aircraft, rocket technology of various classes led by long-range missiles, multifunctional radar, new electronics, digital electronic computers, new, often exotic, previously unproduced materials ...

Even the tried and tested "Stalin's bison" were lost, but Beria was not!

Why?

Well, firstly, because he was more talented - he had a quick and accurate reaction, immediately grasped the essence, thought broadly ...

Secondly, he was extremely efficient and had free time from the assigned work. also used for work...

And finally, Beria knew how not only to pick up people who, together with him, did what was entrusted by the Motherland and Stalin, but he also knew how not to waste time on trifles, trusting them ...

On this account, there is, for example, the testimony of a person who is by no means disposed towards Beria - the famous rocket scientist Boris Chertok. In his major work "Rockets and People," he reports that Dmitry Ustinov, having headed the emerging rocket industry, by 1949 understood all the "absurdity" of the structure of the industry's leading research institute, NII-88, but did not dare to reorganize, since the apparatus of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Ivan Serbin, who had the nickname "Ivan the Terrible".

Without Serbin's sanction, no changes, incentives, etc. were possible, and Chertok recalls that he had the opportunity to see for himself more than once: the ministers of this apparatchik were afraid and never risked arguing with him.

But in the "atomic" project and in the "Berkut" project, everything was, according to Chertok, fundamentally different, and he even reports with some sadness that where Beria was in charge, all personnel decisions, for example, were made by Vannikov, coordinating them with Kurchatov and presenting Beria for approval.

Of course, Chertok went overboard here - Beria himself made key personnel decisions, starting with the involvement of the same Vannikov in nuclear work and supporting Kurchatov and ending with the appointment of directors of enterprises, as was the case, for example, with the director of the "plutonium" plant No. from Uralmash...

But it is significant that, according to Chertok, the apparatus of the "Special Committee No. 1" was "small." The Secretariat of the "Atomic" Special Committee had many responsibilities, including the preparation of draft Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, including the Resolutions on appointments that Beria gave Stalin for signature. And this team of Beria's closest assistants was indeed small. And he worked efficiently.

Why?

Yes, because Beria's style was trust - to those who deserved it.

Actually, Stalin himself led the same way.

And one more feature of Beria's style was extremely fruitful - also because it is not so common among leaders, but is appreciated by subordinates ... I mean Beria's obvious taste for collective thinking, his ability to involve everyone who could usefully comment on the merits of the issue. "Every soldier must know his maneuver" is still a more effective phrase than a business principle. But every officer, and even more so a general, must know and understand his maneuver firmly.

This was the case with Beria, and an analysis of his business resolutions says a lot about him. As a rule, in Beria's resolutions there are the words: *"TT. such and such. Please discuss..."*, *"Please let me know your opinion..."*, etc.

As you know, the mind is good, and two is better ... But, studying how Beria led, you are convinced that he accepted this truth in an improved version: "Mind is good, but twenty is better ." At the same time, what has been said by no means means that Beria "smeared" his personal responsibility for the decision on many. The final decision - if it was a decision requiring the level of Beria - was made by Beria, not hiding behind the backs of his subordinates. And before Stalin, he always answered himself.

Actually, Stalin also led the same way, with the only difference that Stalin was no longer responsible for his decisions to someone personally, but directly to the people and history.

Years went by...

By the beginning of 1949, in the Uranium problem - Beria - there was a close success, and with the creation of rocket technology - Bulganin - things were going much worse. On January 8, 1949, Lev Gonor, head of the lead missile research institute NII-88, and Ivan Utkin, party organizer of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at NII-88, turned directly to Stalin with a particularly important memorandum, where they reported that "work on creating jet weapons is being carried out slowly" and " Government Decree of April 14, 1948 No. 1175-440ss is in danger of failure ... "

"It seems to us," wrote Gonor and Utkin, "that this is due to an underestimation the importance of work on jet weapons by a number of ministries ... "

And then something followed that I will highlight in particular:

"The question of... the work of the main subcontractors... was repeatedly the subject of discussion by Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR..., however, all attempts to dramatically improve their work, and most importantly, to raise a sense of responsibility for the quality and timing of work among the heads of departments and major enterprises did not give the desired results ".

I hope the reader has already understood why I singled out this particular place. After all, the Special Committee of Beria was also working in the USSR at that time, and the possible measures of repressive (if we put the question like that!) Influence on the negligent by the Chairman of the Special Committee No. 1 Beria were no greater than those of the leadership of the Special Committee No. 2. And the results differed fundamentally.

That is, there is leadership, and there is leadership ...

Gonor and Utkin finished their note with a request to Stalin: "For the indigenous improvement of missile manufacturing, we ask for your personal intervention."

Things, however, were still going neither shaky nor rolly, and by the end of August 1949 Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was liquidated and the responsibility for the development of long-range missiles by the especially important Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. By order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal Vasilevsky No. 00140 of August 30, 1949, the formation of the Directorate for Jet Weapons of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was initiated.

Nothing good came of it, of course. And this could be understood, by the way, already from the analysis of Vasilevsky's order - there were a lot of words, but few practical thoughts and specific ideas.

Today, no one can say for sure whether the liquidation of Committee No. 2 was connected with the fact that the Atomic Project under the leadership of Beria achieved its first historical success - atomic bomb RDS-1 exploded? In any case, I do not rule out that Stalin immediately wanted to load Beria with more long-range missiles - since there was an encouraging gap in atomic work ... However, it is possible that the military balked and decided that they were "themselves with a mustache."

IT WAS SO or not, but developing new equipment and fighting are different occupations, and there were no particular successes in the Directorate for Jet Weapons of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And then the Berkut project arrived in time, for the implementation of which on February 3, 1951, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. Beria...

The result was expected - on August 4, 1951, Stalin signed the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2837-1349 stamped "Top Secret. Of particular importance," which began:

"The Council of Ministers of the USSR DECIDES:

1. In view of the fact that the development of long-range missiles R-1, R-2, R-3 and the organization of mass production of R-1 missiles are related to work on the Berkut and Kometa, to entrust the supervision of the work of ministries and departments to create of these missiles against the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria ... "

Need comments?

I think no!

The situation with the development of long-range missiles in the USSR - and this was becoming an increasingly vital task, immediately began to improve. Already on December 10, 1951, the R-1 long-range missile was put into service with a flight range of 270 kilometers with a warhead containing 750 kg of explosive with ± 8 km range dispersion, ± 4 km side dispersion.

This was only the beginning - not very successful so far, but back in the summer of 1951, Beria's predecessors could not establish mass production of the P-1 at the Dnepropetrovsk Automobile Plant (the future famous Yuzhmash).

Engineers began to be trained for the emerging rocket industry, the life of rocket scientists began to improve - all according to the scheme worked out long ago by Beria and his associates ...

LET'S GO BACK to the spring days of 1946, when on April 14 and 29 Stalin's Kremlin office hosted two meetings on the "missile" topic, and on May 13, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1017-419ss "On issues of rocket weapons" was issued.

As the reader already knows, at that time a Special Committee on Jet Technology was formed under the chairmanship of G.M. Malenkov.

The Malenkov Special Committee included: Minister of Armaments of the USSR D.F. Ustinov and Minister of Industry of Communications of the USSR I.G. Zubovich (deputy chairmen), head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR N.D. Yakovlev, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR P.I. Kirpichnikov, member of the Council for Radar at the Council of Ministers of the USSR Academician A.I. Berg, Minister of Agricultural Engineering (the "peaceful" name covered the defense profile) P.N. Goremykin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (since December 1946 - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR) I.A. Serov, head of the 1st Main Directorate of the Ministry of Armaments of the USSR N.E. Nosovsky.

I will single out here Pyotr Ivanovich Kirpichnikov (1903-1980), Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR and head of the Defense Industry Directorate of the State Planning Committee of the USSR ... Beria noticed him at the beginning of the war, and during the war Kirpichnikov, like the oth

Beria's nominee from among the employees of the State Planning Commission - Nikolai Andreevich Borisov, worked in a group with a member of the GKO Beria.

In addition to Kirpichnikov, there were other people in the Special Committee, Malenkov, for a long time and firmly associated with Beria in a businesslike way - the same Ivan Serov, and Dmitry Ustinov ...

Beria himself was not a member of the "rocket" Special Committee, but P.I. Kachur, author of the article "Missile technology of the USSR: the post-war period until 1948" in No. 6 of the journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Energy" for 2007. In the Russian Academy of Sciences, Stalin, Beria - like the Soviet system in general, are not very fond of, but the more expensive is what an academic journal published about the hero of this book:

"In fact, rocket science was led by L.P. Beria. G.M. Malenkov was not involved in organizational and production issues and was the formal chairman of the committee "...

The B.E. Chertok also confirms that Malenkov, like Bulganin, who soon replaced him, "did not play a special role in the formation of ... the industry. Their high role was reduced to viewing or signing draft resolutions prepared by the apparatus. committee."

Everything was repeated, as in the case of the "aviator" Malenkov and the "tanker" Molotov during the war. They presided, and Beria pulled the cart, although this was not immediately formalized.

Moreover, the role of Beria in the development of the Soviet "rocket" branch of science and technology was all the more significant because the rocket scientists, apart from Beria, initially had only one influential supporter in the country's top leadership - Stalin himself.

Aviation designers, with the exception of Lavochkin, treated rocket technology with restraint, to put it mildly. As, however, at first, and to jet aircraft. According to the testimony of the same B.E. Chertoka, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev "was unfriendly to ... work on BI (Bereznyak and Isaev's rocket interceptor with Dushkin's liquid-propellant rocket engine. - S.K.) and to the work of A.M. Lyulki on the first domestic version of a turbojet engine, "and even published a sensational article in Pravda, where he characterized German work in the field of jet aviation as the *agony* of Nazi engineering.

The generals did not favor a new type of weapon (which, however, had yet to become a weapon). In 1948, at a meeting with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev spoke out sharply against the adoption of rocket technology into service, motivating the refusal by the complexity and low reliability of rockets, as well as by the fact that the same tasks were solved by aviation.

Sergei Korolev just as sharply spoke then "for", but in 1948 Marshal Yakovlev and "Colonel" Korolev were very different calibers...

But Beria immediately supported the missiles. Actually, the fact that the People's Commissar for Armaments Ustinov (who to some extent can be considered "Beria's man"), and not the People's Commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin (who to some extent can be considered "Malenkov's man"), began to oversee rocket affairs, immediately reveals the influence of Beria. It was with Ustinov that he established working contacts during the war, and Ustinov's appointment as a "rocketeer" could hardly have happened apart from Lavrenty Pavlovich.

But in vain we will look for the name of Beria in the pages of the history of Soviet rocket work.

Well, it's good that at least our current "atomic" history is a "satrap" and "executioner" did not hesitate...

AFTER Beria became the officially appointed Curator of the Missile Problem, our rocket science began to get on its feet firmly and the development of work on long-range missiles proceeded at an ever-increasing pace.

On February 13, 1953, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 442-212ss / op "On

plan for development work on long-range missiles for 1953-1955. with an extensive program.

So, by October 1953, the R-5 ballistic missile with an effective range of 1200 km with a maximum deviation from the target at the greatest effective range was supposed to be presented for test tests: ± 6 km in range, ± 5 km in side.

It was already a success, and by August 1955, R-12 missiles with a range of 1500 km with the same maximum deviations from the target as for the R-5.

"ROCKETMAN" Beria could have done even more, and not only for powerful military missiles. For example, since 1949, when the program of launches of the first Soviet B-2A type geophysical rockets began, the USSR began to prepare the first launches of dogs into the upper atmosphere. This was done, in particular, by Professor V.I. Chernov and Doctor of Medical Sciences V.I. Yakovlev.

Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, back in the winter of 1948, issued the first task for designing a cockpit for a pilot placed on a high-altitude rocket. Korolev knew how to dream in a businesslike way, knew how to look far ahead ..

But Lavrenty Beria also knew how to do this ...

Alas, 1953 turned out to be a black year for Russia - Stalin was killed in March, and after a few months - and the hero of this book.

But something Beria, when he was still in the leadership of the country, managed after Stalin's death. On March 16, 1953, it was accepted - on the initiative of Beria, of course - Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 697-355ss / op "On the management of special work."

All work - "atomic", on "Berkut" and "Comet", on long-range missiles was assigned to a single Special Committee chaired by Beria under First Deputy Vannikov.

However, Khrushchev, who eliminated Stalin, was already planning his new conspiracy - against Beria ...

I have ALREADY said that Beria's "atomic" activities are most fully documented, and many documents have now been published in the multi-volume series "Atomic Project of the USSR. Documents and materials", published under the general editorship of L.D. Ryabev by the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation - Federal Atomic Energy Agency.

Book 5 of Volume II of this edition contains a draft version of a collection on the history of mastering atomic energy in the USSR.

And this is an interesting fact!

In the USA in 1945 the book by G.D. Smith, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. Official report on the development of the atomic bomb under the supervision of the US government.

In 1946 the book was translated and published in the USSR.

Beria, on the other hand, came up with the idea of writing a Russian analogue of Smith's report. At the direction of Lavrenty Pavlovich and under his editorship, the secretariat of the Special Committee, with the participation of specialists from the nuclear industry, prepared in 1952-1953 for open publication the collection "The History of Mastering Atomic Energy in the USSR."

In the section "The success of Soviet science is not accidental", which spoke about the work of Russian and Soviet scientists, there were also such lines:

"In 1922, Vernadsky predicted: "... We are approaching a great upheaval in the life of mankind, which cannot be compared with everything he has experienced before. The time is not far off when a person will receive atomic energy in his hands, such a source of power that will give him the opportunity to build his life as he does.

wants.

It may happen in the coming years, it may happen in a century. But it is clear that it should be.

Will a person be able to use this power, direct it to good, and not to self-destruction?

Has he matured to the ability to use the power that must inevitably give him a science?

Scientists should not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of their scientific work, scientific progress. They must feel responsible for the consequences of their discoveries. They must connect their work with the best organization of all mankind ... "

An extensive (in the essay on the history of our atomic work, the quotation is more than twice as long as here) quoting the thoughts of the great Russian and Soviet scientist was undertaken in a text that was being prepared for wide publication and had an official **character**.

In fact, the collection "History of mastering atomic energy in the USSR" was supposed to be a report of the USSR government to the peoples of the USSR - the time came when people had to find out that they were malnourished, wore quilted jackets for a long time, lived closely after the war, not least because the funds went to ensure a peaceful future for Russia...

The Soviet people also had to know what a majestic feat and in what short time they accomplished, creating not only an atomic bomb, but also a new powerful branch of the economy - atomic ...

It is indicative of the characterization of the Russian-Soviet civilization that Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863–1945) expressed the thoughts quoted above 33 years before the Russell-Einstein manifesto, which contained an appeal to scientists of the world "to remember their duties to humanity..."

But it is indicative of the characterization of the Russian-Soviet civilization that one of the leaders of the USSR, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, included precisely these thoughts of Vernadsky in the official government collection.

And this meant that, unlike the leaders of the West, the leaders of the USSR were imbued with their **natural** desire for peace, their **natural** sense of responsibility for a peaceful, free and developed future of the world...

No wonder it was in Stalin's USSR that the great slogan was born: "Peace to the world!"

In the draft of the collection "History of mastering atomic energy in the USSR" there were such words:

"The atomic bomb in the hands of the Soviet people is a guarantee of peace.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru correctly assessed the significance of the Soviet atomic bomb when he declared: "The significance of the atomic discovery can contribute to the prevention of war" ...

I emphasize again: the above text is a presentation of the Soviet official view of the problem of nuclear weapons.

This is how Stalin, Beria, and in general everything Soviet looked at this problem management...

In the West, the US atomic bomb was officially and openly (!) regarded as a means of diktat, as a weapon for a quite possible nuclear strike on the USSR. The leadership of the Soviet Union, including L.P. Beria, immediately considered Soviet nuclear weapons as a factor in stabilizing and deterring potential aggression.

And this is a historical fact!

The scoundrels are trying to present Stalin, Beria as some kind of moral freaks, soulless manipulators of the fate of hundreds of millions of people. And Stalin, Beria and their associates lived and worked for peace and creation.

They were organically alien to destruction, death, war - in contrast to the current

There is an interesting document - "Extract from the Protocol No. 81 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) on the distribution of L.P. Beria.

Here is its full text:

"March 15, 1951

Top secret

Decision of March 15, 1951.

1. Questions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

<...>

4. Tov. Beria to oblige half of his working time to give to the case No. 1, 2 and

3.

Secretary of the Central Committee.

How was it deciphered?

That's how...

"Secretary of the Central Committee" is Stalin.

"Case No. 1" - these are the duties of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Comrade. Beria" on the "atomic" Special Committee and the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, headed by B.L. Vannikov, that is - according to the CCGT that led the rapidly developing nuclear industry - research institutes, design bureaus, plants, factories, construction organizations ...

"Case No. 2" - these are the duties of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Comrade. Beria" under the Second Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR headed by P.Ya. Antropov, that is, according to the VSU, which in 1949 separated from PSU and was responsible for geological exploration, mining, processing and metallurgy of uranium.

"Case No. 3" - these are the duties of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Comrade. Beria" according to the Third Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR headed by V.M. Ryabikov, that is, according to the TSU, which was formed in February 1951 and was responsible for work on the Moscow Berkut air defense system.

The reader is already sufficiently aware of all these "cases No. 1, 2 and 3".

But, as follows from the Politburo Resolution, these cases were officially supposed to occupy only **half** of Beria's working time.

In parentheses, I note that an objective download, even for supervising any of these three there would be enough cases for the whole, moreover, irregular, working day.

And there were three...

And all three dealt with issues of strategic defense ...

And Stalin obliged Beria to give these affairs only half of his work time.

What was Lavrenty Beria obliged to give **the second half** of his strength, energy and working days (the words "working day" would hardly be appropriate here)?

Let me remind you that from August 4, 1951, for "Comrade Beria L.P." Stalin will also consolidate another defense matter - so to speak, "case No. 4", that is, monitoring the work of ministries and departments engaged in work on long-range missiles.

However, so far on the calendar - only March 1951, and half of his working time Beria must give something else for the time being...

What?

We find the answer in the documents, and this answer can be briefly formulated as follows: the restoration and development of the national economy.

That is, Beria's "flight" into history took place - as it should be for a normal flight - on two wings.

One "wing" - military, defensive.

The other "wing" is peaceful...

In the short MAY nights of 1945, the battles ended after thundering down...

On May 8, 1945, Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, signed a Decree declaring May 9 "the day of national celebration - VICTORY HOLIDAY".

May 9 was declared a non-working day.

Soviet tanks, not having reached the English Channel, nevertheless reached Berlin. However, in the summer of 1945, many tank formations began to be transferred by rail to the east - in August they were to cross the Greater Khingan with access to the operational space in Manchuria ...

On September 2, 1945, at 10:30 am Tokyo time, when it was night in Moscow, an act of surrender to Japan was signed on board the American cruiser Missouri, which entered Tokyo Bay, and on September 2, Kalinin signed another Decree - to commemorate the victory over Japan, establish that September 3 "is the day of national celebration - the FESTIVAL OF VICTORY over Japan."

September 3 was also declared a non-working day, which even many professional historians hardly remember today ...

Khrushchev later stole two "red" days of the calendar from the Soviet people, but Brezhnev nevertheless returned one day - the great May 9th to the people. They forgot about the second "red" victory day, but in vain ...

However, in the 40s, Stalin was at the head of the USSR, both days were days off, but neither Stalin, nor the Stalinist "team", nor the entire Soviet people had much rest - half the country lay in ruins ...

The last words have long become a stencil and souls, especially young ones, do not touch much or even leave them indifferent. Therefore, let's turn to the language of numbers - it sometimes impresses more than the hottest "verbs" ...

So, during the war years, the USSR lost about 30% of its national wealth. About 32,000 industrial enterprises were completely destroyed or plundered, and among them were Dneproges, Zaporizhstal, Krivorozhstal, Azovstal, Kharkov and Stalingrad tractor plants, Ukrainian Uralmash - Novo-Kramatorsky machine-building plant, Novorossiysk cement plant ...

98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms, 2,890 machine and tractor stations (MTS), 216,700 shops, canteens, restaurants, 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 communications enterprises, 6,000 hospitals, 33,000 clinics, dispensaries and outpatient clinics were completely or partially destroyed or looted. , 976 sanatoriums, 656 rest houses, 82,000 schools, 1,520 technical schools, 334 universities, 427 museums, 43,000 libraries, 167 theaters ...

Only the direct damage inflicted on the economy and the population amounted to 679 billion rubles in 1941 prices, while the annual national income in 1938 was 105 billion rubles.

Plus the cost of the war and the loss of income as a result of the occupation - another 1890 billion rubles ...

Neither the mind nor the heart can grasp all this today, is not aware of it! Four years ago, there lived a happy, rapidly developing country that overcame severe storms and crises...

And now - piles of burnt bricks and twisted iron.

And all this had to be restored.

How?

How?

In 1945, only for building materials, the percentage of production by 1940 amounted to cement - 29.6%; for window glass - 45.1%, for brick - 18.6%, for lime - 33.1% ...

As for the industry of building machines and equipment, it was generally necessary speak in the past - bye - time.

IMMEDIATELY after the end of the war with Japan - on September 6, 1945, the Politburo adopted a Resolution on the formation of two Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars

THE USSR.

The first Operational Bureau - the State Defense Committee was formed on December 8, 1942, consisting of: Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and it directed the activities of the key people's commissariats for the economy. The Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, formed at the same time, consisting of: Molotov, Mikoyan, Andreev, Voznesensky, Shvern timer, although had the most important, but less ambitious tasks.

Now, instead of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee and the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, the overall management of the economy was entrusted to two Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars, but the essence and distribution of responsibilities remained approximately the same - one Bureau was key, the second less, so say key.

In the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of September 6, 1945, the Operational Bureau headed by Molotov was the first to go (Voznesensky - deputy, members: Mikoyan, Andreev, Bulganin and Shvern timer).

The Molotov Bureau was in charge of the work of the agricultural and food people's commissariats, the people's commissariats of trade and finance, as well as the Committees and Administrations under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ...

For example, the Molotov Bureau was in charge of the people's commissariats of justice, health care, the sea and river fleet, the Main Directorates of the Civil Air Fleet and Labor Reserves, the Northern Sea Route, the Committees for Physical Education, Architecture, Cinematography, etc.

The People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy were also registered for Molotov's bureau, but it was clear that they were written for Molotov simply "for solidity" - these two People's Commissariats were always personally controlled by Stalin.

The second Operational Bureau was headed by Beria (Malenkov - deputy, members: Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Kosygin), and this Bureau was in charge of "issues of the work of industrial people's commissariats and railway transport."

The following people's commissariats were recorded for Beria's bureau: ferrous metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, heavy industry, coal industry, oil industry, chemical industry, rubber industry, power plants, electrical industry, medium machine building, machine tool building, communications, aviation industry, tank industry, ammunition, weapons, mortar armament, shipbuilding industry, timber industry, paper industry, textile industry, light industry, construction, building materials ...

In addition, the Main Directorates of Military Construction, the Fuel Industry, Coal and Oil Supply, Glavkislород, Glavsnabless, Glavlesokhrana and the Committee for Geology.

In other words, all those leading industries were recorded for Beria's bureau, which, first of all, were to restore the country and ensure its growing development, the result of which was to be an ever-increasing national population welfare.

Moreover, it was Beria who, since the war, was better than anyone from the Politburo (except, of course, Stalin), was familiar with most of the people's commissariats from the "gentleman's set" offered to him by Stalin ...

And Beria also had an "atomic" Special Committee, which then included Academician Kapitsa, who recommended that Beria use foreign experience in laying a transatlantic cable when organizing "atomic" work ...

Do-ah-ah...

SAY: called himself a loader - climb into the back. Beria is neither a load nor a ginger was called - even without this, Stalin did not forget him.

On March 18, 1946, Beria finally became a full member of the Politburo - the Plenum of the Central Committee introduced him to the top party leadership at the same time as Malenkov. A 19

In March 1946, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR, where Stalin took the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Now Stalin had eight deputies for the Council of Ministers, in the list of which Molotov was the first, as always, but the second - not in alphabetical order - Beria.

However, already the next day - March 20, 1946, it became clear which of the first two deputies the general is more like a "wedding", and who is really fighting ...

On March 20, 1946, instead of the two previous Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the "Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR consisting of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers" was formed, and L.P. Beria, and his deputies - N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin.

According to the distribution of duties between the deputies of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 674 of March 28, 1946, the ministries of communications, ferrous metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, the coal industry of the western regions of the USSR, the coal industry of the eastern regions of the USSR, the oil industry of the western and southern regions were assigned to Beria USSR, the oil industry of the eastern regions of the USSR, transport engineering, the construction of fuel industry enterprises, internal affairs, state security and state control, as well as Glavgaztopprom ...

In total - a dozen of the most important ministries for Lavrenty Beria! The same amount was assigned only to Alexei Kosygin, but he was a "pure" business executive, and Beria - among other things, also the largest political figure, not counting the worries about the uranium problem...

Even Nikolai Voznesensky, who imagines himself an unsurpassed manager, had eleven positions ...

Voroshilov had, however, seventeen positions, but only five "ministerial", including the Ministry of Cinematography, as well as the Committees for Measures and Measuring Instruments, for the Arts, the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church, etc.

Andreev was in charge of agriculture, Mikoyan was mainly in charge of the "food" "block" ...

Kaganovich led two major ministries and the Committee for Architecture ...

Molotov was "registered" by the Ministry of Justice, the Committee for Higher Education, the Committee for Radio and Broadcasting and TASS.

Stalin controlled the Ministry of Armaments and, as a minister, the Ministry of the Armed Forces ...

POSSIBLE, the reader, getting acquainted with the list of ministries assigned to Beria on March 28, 1946, drew attention to the fact that at that time in the USSR there was not one ministry of the coal industry, but two: the coal industry of the western regions of the USSR and the coal industry of the eastern regions of the USSR.

One curious and characteristic episode is connected with this, not very durable, reorganization, told in his memoirs by the "atomic" Academician Khariton, who, in turn, was told about it by General A.S. Alexandrov.

Anatoly Sergeevich Aleksandrov worked with Beria since the war through the GKO line, since 1947 he was the deputy head of the PGU, and from 1951 to 1955 he led the Sarov KB-11, which developed atomic bombs.

So, in March 1946, when the Council of People's Commissars was reformed into the Council of Ministers, it was decided - most likely by Stalin himself - to divide the former People's Commissariat of the USSR coal industry into two ministries - the coal industry of the western regions and the coal industry of the eastern regions.

The first was to be headed by the former "general" minister V.V. Vakhrushev, the second - D.G. Onika. Beria had to share them - as the curator of the industry.

Beria, calling Vakhrushev and Onika to his place, suggested that they share everything, including personnel

and the social sphere, amicably.

After the appointed time, he called the freshly minted ministers again and asked if there were any mutual claims?

Vakhrushev said no (in fact, he had, of course, more opportunities during the division), and Onika protested - they say, Vakhrushev took the best personnel for himself, and sanatoriums, and so on ...

Beria's decision was instantaneous and systematically accurate: if so, let Vakhrushev take himself a ministry intended for Onika, and Onika - "Vakhrushev's" ...

This decision can be cited as an exemplary example in all textbooks on management, because Beria's logic was invincible:

a) if Onika slandered Vakhrushev, and the division was fair, then no one remains offended;

b) if Vakhrushev cheated, now he will pay for it;

c) if Onika was capricious, now he won't even dare to hint that he had bad "starting" conditions.

There was also an additional benefit here: the case, of course, became known in the administrative circles of Moscow, and along the way, everyone else was taught a substantive lesson about the fact that it is more profitable to be honest with Beria than dishonest!

The SYSTEM of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers has undergone reorganization more than once. So, on February 8, 1947, the Politburo Decree was adopted on the new organization of the work of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Eight branch bureaus headed by L.P. Beria, N.A. Voznesensky, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, A.N. Kosygin, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan and M.Z. Saburov.

At first, Stalin intended to have six bureaus (for agriculture, industry, fuel, transport, domestic trade and culture), but life itself forced to have a more fractional management of the economy.

At the same time, Stalin hesitated at first, to whom to give the bureau for industry - Voznesensky or Beria, to whom the bureau for fuel - Beria or Malenkov, and to whom the bureau for agriculture - Andreev, Voznesensky or Malenkov.

As a result, G.M. Malenkov headed the Bureau of Agriculture, N.A. Voznesensky - in metallurgy and chemistry, L.P. Beria - for fuel and power plants.

In addition, as the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, as well as the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow, which we will have a separate discussion later ...

(In parentheses, I note that the monitoring of the Ministry of State Security was carried out separately, along the Politburo line and was led by the secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Kuznetsov.)

However, already on February 27, 1947 - three weeks later - Beria's bureau (for fuel and power plants) was merged with Kaganovich's bureau (for transport and communications) into one bureau for fuel and transport, chaired by the unchanged Stalinist "Figaro" - Lavrenty Beria.

But with any structure of management of the post-war economy of the USSR, Beria's duties in the Council of Ministers of the USSR were paramount. This is clearly seen from what post-war projects, carried out, for example, only by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, went through Beria ...

I will dwell on this a little, since I have not touched on this topic before ...

THOSE who think that a number of major post-war peace projects of the USSR, to which the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was related, were carried out exclusively by "slave" labor and in "inhuman" conditions, is mistaken.

Here, for example, such a major project as the construction of the Volga-Don canal ... I will give its "terrible" statistics strictly according to the "democratic" collection of documents

"Stalin's construction of the Gulag. 1930–1953", published in 2005 in Moscow by the International Fund "Democracy" (Alexander N. Yakovlev Foundation):

"As of January 1, 1950, 15,397 civilians and 37,247 prisoners worked at Volgodonstroy, as well as: 80 excavators, 150 scrapers with S-80 tractors, 56 bulldozers, 10 dredgers, 960 trucks (including 50 dump trucks), 7 towing steamers, 22 barges, 19 boats, 67 S-80 tractors and 410 metal-cutting machines ... "

So, the White Sea Canal kyo is a thing of the past...

On November 2, 1950, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in a report to Stalin reported that in total 68,500 people were working on the construction of the Volga-Don waterway, of which prisoners - 53,800 people. At the same time, the amount of equipment for the construction of the canal itself, the Tsimlyansk hydroelectric complex and irrigation facilities was constantly increasing, and the main part of the work was carried out not under the "Dubinushka", but behind the levers of the machines, which is clearly seen from the standard levels of mechanization of work that were installed at Volgodonstroy: earthworks – 97%; preparation and transportation of concrete - 100%; concrete laying - 98%; mining of rubble stone - 100%; mining of stone and crushing it into rubble - 100%; gravel and sand mining 100 %; pile driving and installation of metal structures - 99%; construction of residential and industrial buildings - 90%; fastening of slopes and the bottom of the channel with reinforced concrete slabs - 50 %.

But how things were at Volgodonstroy with the statistics of "terrible" mortality - I again give a direct quote from page 121 of the collection of documents about the Gulag:

"For 1948-1952. 236,778 prisoners passed through ... camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, of which: 114,492 people were released, 1,766 died (0.746%. - S.K.), fled - 1123. The maximum number of prisoners fell on January 1, 1952 - 118,178 people.

What does the mortality rate of 1766 deaths in five years mean, that is, 353 deaths per year? This means less than one death per day in a city of almost 100,000, that is, below the natural mortality rate in Stalin's USSR and much lower than the mortality rate in "democratic" Russia, where in 2003 there were 16.4 deaths per 1,000 people, then there is - 1.64%.

God forbid that Vladimir Putin be provided with such mortality throughout the "democratic" Russia, which was in the early 50s of the "totalitarian" Stalinist Gulag!

However, in the post-war 40s, Beria did not lead the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but supervised it, and issues related to very large projects went through Beria directly, in particular: on railway construction in the North and the Far East, the construction of a forest port in the Igarka region on the Yenisei, a ferry crossing from the mainland to Sakhalin through the Tatar Strait ...

On the implementation of annual plans for the extraction of gold, platinum, silver, rare metals, cobalt, tin, etc. reports in the late 40s and early 50s, the reports of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs went to three addresses: Stalin, Beria and Malenkov ...

But Beria also made an outstanding contribution to the restoration and post-war development of the Soviet ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, especially in the first, most difficult years of the recovery period.

Beria was also responsible, among other things, for the restoration of coal mines, but oil has always been a separate article for Beria - here he himself has long become an expert, and better than many "pure" professionals ...

It would be necessary to dwell on oil in more detail ...

In a speech at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on February 9, 1946, Stalin spoke - as of the most important long-term task - of

the need to increase annual oil production to 60 million tons. At the same time, Stalin said that perhaps three new five-year plans, if not more, would be spent on solving this problem, and added: "But this thing can be done, and we must do it."

A simple calculation shows that under Stalin's directives, the Soviet Union was to produce approximately 60 million tons of crude oil by 1961. The then Minister of the Oil Industry, Baibakov (a figure of little respect for me personally), already much later than the murder of Beria, stated that such a plan was supposedly Beria's adventure and that it was Beria who irresponsibly provoked Stalin into the figure of 60 million tons - allegedly without consulting with experts.

However, let's figure it out...

On the eve of the war, the USSR produced 34 million tons of oil per year, immediately after the war - 19 million tons. And in 1960, when the name of Beria had long been cursed by the Khrushchevites, 148 (one hundred and forty-eight) tons of oil were produced in the USSR, not counting the fact that by this year natural gas production had increased 15 (fifteen) times.

So who better knew the possibilities and reserves of the oil industry - "Professional" Baibakov or "amateur" Beria?

But just as professionally, Lavrenty Beria delved into issues, for example, the mechanization of logging, timber rafting, the development of the paper industry - documents on this subject have been preserved in the archives to this day ...

And they survived - despite all subsequent anti-Beria purges and erasures of archives - because here the story of Beria's "cutting out" with a razor from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was repeated ... The main article about Beria was removed from the 5th volume of the TSB, and about numerous mentions of the name and merits of Beria in front of Russia were forgotten.

Yes, and it was impossible to remove all these references, except perhaps to order the name of Beria to be blacked out with ink, or to remove many volumes of the TSB from public and private libraries fully...

The same thing happened with archival documents ... They destroyed them, giving us the real, and not the demonized Beria, although there were many, but they destroyed, mainly, documents relating to his political activities.

With the activities of Beria in the field of economics, this turned out to be impossible - otherwise, the corresponding state archives would simply be devastated ...

BERIA also supervised all the major post-war hydrotechnical projects of the USSR, and not only through the supervision of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. For example, on July 5, 1951, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V.S. Rjasnyoy reports to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria on the progress of work on the construction of the Volga-Baltic waterway ... The estimated cost of construction was estimated at 2 billion 200 million rubles - Stalin's!

Here is just one of the areas of work:

"On the Volga slope of the Volga-Baltic waterway on the Kovzha River, the Belozersky Bypass Canal and the Sheksna River, instead of the existing 8 small-sized locks, two hydroelectric facilities are being built on the Kovzha River - Shumkinsky and Konstantinovsky, each consisting of a dam, a lock and a pumping station, and on the Sheksna River - Cherepovets hydroelectric complex consisting of a dam, a sluice and a hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 300,000 kW.

And on July 6, 1951, the Minister of the River Fleet Z.A. Shashkov reports to Beria in a detailed report on the transport use of the White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Stalin, the Mariinsky system, the Moscow Canal, the Rybinsk and Uglich locks on the Volga ...

Supervised Beria and the construction of Volgodon. June 13, 1946 Minister of the Interior

Affairs of the USSR S.N. Kruglov and the head and chief engineer of the Hydroproject of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the largest Soviet hydraulic engineer S.Ya. Zhuk sent a letter addressed to Stalin and Beria, which stated:

"According to your instructions (I draw the reader's attention to this "according to you ...", that is, the instruction came not only from Stalin, but also from Beria. - S.K.) The NKVD of the USSR at the beginning of 1941 developed a number of schemes for the water connection of the Volga with the Don . Having considered these schemes, you settled on the option according to which the Volga-Don Canal begins at the city of Krasnoarmeysk on the Volga and goes to the Don at the city of Kalach; further, the path passes along the Don River, the depth at which is provided by water releases from a large reservoir with a dam near the Kumovsky farm. Further development was interrupted by the war ... "

Now, after the war, design developments along the Volga-Don have resumed ... By the way, the postscript at the end of the letter was indicative: "The main indicators of the Volga-Don waterway were sent only to Comrade. Beria "...

On September 11, 1948, Kruglov and Zhuk once again report to Beria on the progress of construction, and Beria writes a resolution on this letter, which I quote in full - Beria's personality and business style are very clearly visible from it:

"By decisions of the Government of 27/II and 19/III-1948, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR allocated everything necessary to ensure work according to the plan for the current year and prepare for the construction of the Volga-Don Canal in 1949.

Meanwhile, preparatory work at Volgodonstroy is still going poorly, which due to the failure to take proper measures on the part of Glavgidrostroy.

Glavgidrostroy is fighting poorly for the implementation of these decisions of the Government.

You need to send Comrade Zhuk to the construction site to provide the necessary assistance on the spot. And comrade Rapoport (head of the Glavgidrostroy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from 14.01.49 concurrently and head of Volgodonstroy. - S.K.) to force him to deal with the technical issues of Volgodonstroy as a support. material and

The Volga-Don is one of the most important construction projects of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - therefore, you are personally obliged to deal with this construction site on a daily basis, helping Glavgidrostroy.

L. Beria.

Beria's instructions did not go particularly well, and on May 18, 1949, a secret Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1978-748s "On accelerating the construction of the Volga-Don waterway" was issued. The Decree was signed, as always, by Stalin, but it was undoubtedly prepared by Beria's "Council of Ministers" apparatus with the personal participation of Beria, who carefully read the materials.

But even after that, not everything was fine, and on October 31, 1949, another Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 4960-1909s "On strengthening the management of the construction of the Volga-Don waterway" was issued - even more "Beria" in style and spirit, that is, accurate , businesslike, specific both in terms of stating shortcomings and ways to correct them.

Among other things, the Resolution stated:

"... in the process of selecting management and engineering and construction workers for Volgodonstroy, the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (head of the Department, comrade Obruchnikov) Glavgidrostroy and Volgodonstroy (head of comrade Rapoport) appointed persons who did not inspire confidence (Raikin, Grinman , Curzon, Lyakhovetsky). For a long time, the deputy head of Volgodonstroy for general issues was not appointed ... there is no deputy chief engineer for hydraulic engineering

structures...", etc.

Take it ..., that is, officially - Stalin, outlined a number of measures in the Decree of the Council of Ministers ... In particular, **the Glavgidrostroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was transferred from Moscow directly to the construction of the Volga-Don** and merged with the Volgodonstroy department into the Glavgidrovolgodonstroy Main Department under the leadership of S. I. Beetle.

By the same Decree, N.A. Filimonov (like Zhuk, for the construction of the Volga-Don Canal in 1952, he received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor).

It is characteristic that in the Decree, officially signed by the head of the Government, it was written: "Save for Comrade Filimonov N.A. living space occupied by him in the city of Leningrad".

As you can see, Beria did not even forget about such a seemingly "little thing" - on a state scale! However, Beria was well aware that those from whom he demanded to "fight" for the implementation of the decisions of the Government, sparing no effort and time, are very sensitive to the fact that Stalin and Beria do not forget about such "trifles".

By the spring of 1952, work on the Volga-Don was being completed; on May 19, 1952, the Government Commission for the acceptance of finished structures of the Volga-Don waterway was approved. And on June 12, 1952, the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR S.N. Serov and his deputy I.A. Serov, in a purely business note addressed to Beria, reported on the progress of the first postings of ships through the new channel ...

Moreover, the Volga-Don was only one of the many daily "peaceful" concerns of Beria, except for the "defensive" "cases No. 1, 2 and 3", to which he daily owed - officially obliged! - Giving half of your working time.

When is it for women to roam and contain a harem? Perhaps, only the writers of tales about Beria are able to clearly answer such a question, since childhood they have been sure that rolls grow on birch trees, and milk flows from cows through pipes ...

The LAST, but not least, what remains for me to say here about the victories of Lavrenty Beria in the name of the economic power of Russia is to assess his role in the formation in the USSR of new, science-intensive, as they began to say later, branches of the economy.

As far as I know, this side of the post-war activities of Lavrenty Pavlovich was not **particularly** emphasized by anyone, including myself ... Somehow it was not previously realized **with all clarity** how much Beria personally did here.

And he did surprisingly a lot - personally, by himself ...

Beria oversaw the Atomic Project, work on Moscow's air defense and later on long-range ballistic missiles. And each of these projects was especially science-intensive. However, the greatest number of the most diverse problems was created, of course, by the needs of "atomic" work.

And in everything, **absolutely in everything**, significant problems related to the needs of the Atomic Project, Beria entered in the most thorough and attentive way. A daily huge stream of not empty stationery, but purely business papers went through it - incoming and outgoing.

Incoming he read, delved into them, underlined, imposed resolutions ... Outgoing, prepared taking into account his business instructions and decisions, he edited and signed.

All the numerous "atomic" Decrees and Orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR went through Beria, which were often signed, although in the name of Stalin, but actually endorsed by Beria - he had such a right delegated to him by Stalin.

The above fact does not detract from, of course, the importance and role of Stalin's personal participation in the Atomic and other defense projects - they were paramount,

outstanding. But by the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, Stalin's efficiency had declined, and the operational management of defense work, and in general the work of the economy, increasingly passed to Beria ...

So, in the end, everything closed on Beria and then, fertilized by his decisions and energy, returned to levels where the decisions were translated into a material result.

And here...

And here I must admit that I hesitated - whether to acquaint the reader with that rather dry "summary" of our main post-war "high-tech" achievements, where the organizing role of Beria turned out to be outstanding?

Much of what I nevertheless decided to report below can only be fully appreciated by a specialist. However, I hope that even people who are far from the problems of science, technology and industry will be able to understand and appreciate how difficult it was for Beria to understand and make decisions within the limits of his state duties on only one case entrusted to him - "No. 1", then there is - "atomic" ...

I will start with the problem of obtaining pure uranium, that is, obtaining not just metallic uranium, which in itself was the most difficult task, but **pure** uranium, that is, uranium purified from foreign impurities.

There is no weapon-grade bomb without pure uranium! And the purification of uranium is an extremely difficult technical task.

Smith's book, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, already known to the reader, reported that "this task was one of the most difficult for America and required the involvement of large specialists and a number of firms for a long time."

For example, pure argon and metallic calcium were needed, without which it is impossible to organize the production of uranium in metallic form. In the USSR, there was a small production of argon, but this argon contained a large amount of nitrogen and could not be used to melt uranium. The production of metallic calcium in the Soviet Union was not at all before.

Prior to World War II, there were only two calcium metal plants in the world: one in France and one in Germany. In 1939, even before the occupation of France by the Germans, the Americans, using technology obtained from France, built a third plant for the production of metallic calcium ...

No one was going to transfer modern technologies to Russia, which had begun its Atomic Project, and a new original technology for the production of high-purity metal calcium was developed by employees of the Uranium Combine and introduced into production there.

The industrial production of uranium fluoride was unthinkable without the production of pure fluorine, and there was no industrial production of fluorine in the country either, and it also had to be created!

Among the difficulties in obtaining pure metallic uranium is the fact that the content of impurities in uranium that inhibit or stop nuclear reactions ... is allowed at no more than millionths of a percent. Already insignificant fractions of harmful impurities make uranium unusable from a weapon position ...

Until 1945, the USSR did not have not only highly sensitive methods for determining impurities in uranium, but also did not have the necessary reagents for fine analytical work, and to obtain pure metallic uranium, very pure chemical reagents and reagents are required - more than 200 different reagents and over 50 different chemical reagents of high purity with the content of some elements not higher than one millionth and even up to one billionth of a percent (that is, 1 gram of impurities per 100,000 (one hundred thousand) tons of pure product! - S.K.)

There were more than a dozen firms in the United States engaged in the manufacture of chemically pure reagents and reagents. These firms included such concerns as Dupont de Nemours,

Carbide and Carbon Corporation, associated with the German concern I.G. Farbenindustrie".

Soviet chemists had to solve the problem of creating the production of many dozens of chemicals of an exceptionally high degree of purity, which had not previously been manufactured in the country, on their own.

In addition to the need for especially pure chemicals, the production of which had to be organized anew, a completely new apparatus was needed for all chemical processes.

Most of the materials commonly used in chemical engineering turned out to be unsuitable for these purposes - the usual grades of stainless steels are not here.

approached.

And the problem of new special materials! ..

In addition to fissile materials - uranium, plutonium, to create an atomic bomb, many other materials and chemicals are needed that were not previously produced in the USSR or were produced, but of unsuitable quality.

First of all, graphite of a high degree of purity was needed, such a purity that not a single industry of the Soviet Union knew.

The first domestic graphite products for industry - graphite electrodes - were made in 1936, but for the construction of a uranium-graphite nuclear reactor, graphite of a very high degree of purity was needed in the form of blocks of a certain shape. The total ash content in graphite should not exceed 0.02%.

A nuclear reactor is impossible without ultra-high purity graphite, and even the purest grades of graphite produced by the Soviet industry before 1945 contained up to 2% impurities, that is, 100 times more than necessary.

And in a fairly short time, as a result of persistent searches, it was possible to create an industrial technology for obtaining the purest graphite with an ash content of less than 0.01%.

It was necessary to reorganize the production of materials that were not previously produced in the country at all: pure beryllium oxide, pure thorium oxide, calcium chloride, calcium oxide, a number of acids of an exceptionally high degree of purity, special rubber and rubber products ...

To create atomic aggregates, it is necessary to have "heavy" water.

Ordinary water - the well-known "H₂O" contains a light hydrogen isotope - protium ... "Heavy" water also contains a heavier hydrogen isotope - deuterium. But the production of "heavy water" is a complex and energy-intensive process. During the war, the Allies managed to bomb a heavy water plant in Norway, which worked for the German nuclear project, and this was one of the reasons that the Germans did not have time to make their bomb ...

In America, all information about the production of "heavy" water was available many years before the start of work on the atomic problem, and in the Soviet Union it was necessary to begin this work with research on the study of methods for obtaining "heavy" water and methods of its control. It was necessary to develop these methods, create a cadre of specialists, build factories...

And all this had to be done in a very short time.

Is the READER tired?

But I've only just begun!

Here, for example, is the problem of precision instrumentation ...

Physicists, chemists, research engineers needed a variety of new instruments of high sensitivity and high accuracy...

The pre-war five-year plans - for the first time in the history of Russia, gave us domestic instrumentation, but after the war with Nazi Germany, the country's instrumentation did not recover from its consequences. Instrument-making plants of Kharkov, Kyiv and others,

previously occupied, cities were destroyed. The factories of Leningrad and Moscow also suffered during the war years and were not fully restored. It was necessary to quickly restore the destroyed factories and build new ones.

And the new requirements for the accuracy of instruments also created new difficulties - the industry had not previously manufactured such precise instruments. Many hundreds of devices had to be developed anew.

In the United States, a large number of firms were engaged in the design and manufacture of devices. Only 78 firms were engaged in the manufacture of instruments for measuring and controlling nuclear radiation in the USA, and long-term ties with instrument-making firms in Germany, England, France, and Switzerland made it easier for US specialists to design new instruments.

We do have...

Before the war, the instrument-making industry of the Soviet Union lagged behind in comparison with other sectors of the domestic economy - this industry was the youngest. Now, attempts to acquire devices abroad have met with direct opposition from US government organizations. Many US firms refused to accept orders from Amtorg, the Soviet foreign trade organization for US trade.

And for one nuclear reactor alone, it was required to install about eight thousand various kinds of instruments.

There was only one way out - to organize the development and manufacture of new devices in their own country. Among them there were a lot of completely new ones, working on completely new principles that had not previously been used in world instrument making.

From 1946 to 1952, instrument-making plants of the USSR produced 135,500 instruments of new designs and more than 230,000 standard instruments for the needs of the nuclear industry.

Along with the creation of instrumentation and various kinds of regulators, a series of special manipulators was developed and manufactured. The manipulator reproduces the movements of the arms and hands of a person and allows you to remotely perform subtle and complex operations.

It was necessary to create new brands of glass for chemical glassware and apparatuses, new brands of enamels, new materials for crucibles and molds for melting and pouring uranium, as well as new compositions of plastics resistant to aggressive environments...

The question of furnaces for smelting uranium was acute. There was nowhere to get such furnaces - vacuum furnaces were built in the USA, but the US government banned the sale of such furnaces to the Soviet Union. And the Soviet trust "Elektropech" created 50 different types of electric furnace installations.

The lack of the necessary vacuum technology for the entire range of tasks has also become a serious problem, and its solution is a major victory. Without vacuum equipment, the development of many important physical research and the operation of the most important engineering and physical structures is impossible.

Prior to the start of the Atomic Project in the USSR, the development of research work on vacuum technology was limited by a very weak base of two laboratories, and the need for vacuum equipment that arose was enormous: more than 3,000 vacuum gauges of various types were required for 1947 alone, more than 4,500 fore-vacuum pumps, high-vacuum diffusion pumps over 2000 pieces.

Special high-vacuum oils, putties, vacuum-tight rubber products, vacuum valves, valves, bellows, etc. were required.

And we did it too - ourselves! Our research institutes were able to create powerful high-vacuum units with a capacity of 10-20 and even 40 thousand liters per second. In terms of power and quality, Soviet high-vacuum pumps of the early 50s surpassed the latest American models ...

Is the READER tired?

Most likely tired. Tired just **reading** about all the things that needed to be **done**, and not done one after the other, but all at once, in parallel!

And what was the hero of this book?

Of course, it was not Beria who developed methods for obtaining, for example, pure beryllium oxide and projects for plants for its production, but those who did this had **only one** task.

And Beria needed to keep in mind the progress of **hundreds of** different cases - from the construction of barracks for workers at "atomic" facilities to the organization of fundamental research in the field of physics ...

Yes, along with the extensive development of research and experimental work in institutes, design bureaus and laboratories associated with the most pressing "atomic" tasks, that is, with the design and construction of nuclear reactors, isotope separation facilities, and, as a result, the creation of an atomic weapons, other promising tasks arose. The organization of experimental work on the study of high-energy particles and the reactions caused by them reached a new level.

At the initial stage of work in nuclear physics, we did not have the powerful accelerators needed to obtain high-energy nuclear particles, and research in the field of cosmic rays was expanded in every possible way. In Armenia, on Mount Alagez, at an altitude of 3200 meters above sea level, a station was built to study cosmic rays with a magnet weighing 55 tons, a high-altitude flight laboratory was created near Moscow to study cosmic particles at an altitude of 20–30 kilometers using balloons.

But these were measures, so to speak, "slim", palliative, and the problem of powerful accelerators also became a subject of concern for Beria's Special Committee. Already in February 1946, a decision was made to build the most powerful cyclotron in the world, which would produce protons with an energy of half a billion electron volts. The accelerator was supposed to serve all the main institutes and laboratories working in the field of nuclear physics.

By the time the design of the cyclotron began in the USSR, there was no experience and no data on how to implement such huge installations.

The American cyclotron at Berkeley with a magnet weighing 4200 tons was regarded in the world literature as one of the remarkable structures of our time, however, the Soviet cyclotron had to surpass the American one not only in the size of the electromagnet (the magnet of the Soviet cyclotron weighed 7000 tons) and in the energy of accelerated particles, but also in terms of technical excellence. In connection with the construction of the cyclotron, 69 major research projects were carried out. Design and design bureau of the Ministry of Design and Design of the Electrical Industry of the USSR, and the Leningrad Electrosila Plant became the main manufacturer.

velo special

The cyclotron (installation "M") was built in the area of the Ivankovskaya hydroelectric power station, 125 kilometers from Moscow by December 1949. The main building, which housed the electromagnet, was a monolithic reinforced concrete structure up to thirty-six meters high with walls two meters thick.

However, already in the spring of 1952, a decision was made to reconstruct the M installation to increase the proton energy to 650–680 million electron volts.

Today it is hard to believe that **something like this** and **at such** a time was committed on the same land, according to which the leading Kremlin Yeltsinoids now walk.

And that was not all!

In May 1946, Vladimir Veksler proposed to design a powerful synchrotron - an electron accelerator with a magnet weighing about 400 tons and an electron energy of 400–450 million electron volts, with particles subsequently being brought up to 900 million electron volts.

And on May 2, 1949, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the construction of a powerful ring proton accelerator - a synchrophasotron for an energy of 10 billion electron volts! Started by development under the supervision of L.P. Beria, the synchrophasotron was put into operation after the death of Stalin and Beria - on December 5, 1957. But this was also one of the victories of Beria - already posthumous ...

ANOTHER one of his, and also in many ways - posthumous, victory was the powerful development in the USSR since the beginning of the 50s of domestic computer technology.

As for the last decades - even before 1991, all ears buzzed to us about the alleged "clamping of cybernetics" in the 40s, which led, de facto, to the backlog of the USSR in the field of computer development ...

However, real work on Soviet computers began already in 1948 at the Energy Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and at the Institute of Electrical Engineering of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR under the leadership of S.A. Lebedev. December 4, 1948 I.S. Brook and B.I. Rameev received a copyright certificate for the invention "Automatic digital electronic machine".

On January 11, 1949, the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers was adopted on the development of two computers - Lebedev's BESM and Bazilevsky-Rameev's Strela. In 1952, Lebedev's Small Electronic Computing Machine (MESM) began to be practically used.

And they tell us that in the USSR, Stalin and Beria, computers were considered a bourgeois invention.

Since the spring of 1949, the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and Instrument Engineering of the USSR, in cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, began organizing the design and production of calculating, analytical and mathematical electronic digital machines, as the Minister of Mechanical Engineering and Instrument Engineering of the USSR Pyotr Ivanovich Parshin (1899–1970) reported to Beria on April 30, 1949 .

Parshin reported:

"... The great successes achieved in recent years in the development of pulsed electronics have created the prerequisites for the implementation of new computer technology - high-speed automatic digital machines capable of performing calculations at the rate of a thousand or more arithmetic operations per second ..."

The minister asked Beria to oblige the PSU "to take part in the preparation of technical specifications for the design of an electronic digital machine." This is what is now called "computers", needed for calculations of thermonuclear charges, and air defense systems, and dams of new hydroelectric power stations ...

Exactly one year before Stalin's death, on March 6, 1952, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued instructions "on the construction of a building to house high-speed mathematical computers and computational mathematical bureaus of the USSR Academy of Sciences."

Beria's flair for the new was developed at least no less than that of Stalin. Khrushchev, who killed Stalin and Beria, in this respect - as, indeed, in all other respects - did not stand close to them.

All our achievements in the field of nuclear physics, including the successes and discoveries of a fundamental nature, obtained by the end of the "Khrushchev" 50s, were based on the corresponding scientific and technical policy of Stalin and Beria, who understood that the new Russia should go here on an equal footing with world scientific leaders, especially with the USA...

The world's first nuclear power plant, the world's first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin", the second in the world - after the American "Nautilus" nuclear submarine "Lenin Komsomol" - all this was conceived and started by Stalin and Beria, and embodied in

metal when neither Stalin nor Beria had been alive for several years, when Stalin was slandered by Khrushchev "at the end" of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and Beria was completely defamed.

Beria was sincerely attentive to scientists and to their requests - both business and domestic. Khrushchev did not like scientists - the natural reaction was no longer the classic Molière "philistine in the nobility", but the newly appeared *partoplasmic* bureaucrat in power...

For example, Beria oversaw work on ballistic missiles with an understanding of the future, and Khrushchev's passion for missiles was purely amateurish.

Beria respected big people - to the same Sergei Korolev, but Korolev could never, under Beria, pursue the line that he considered right - Korolev, but which was often far from true objectively.

Khrushchev did not respect anyone, and even more so - independent people, humanly large. But, like any arrogant bureaucrat, Khrushchev was inclined to pretend that he "understood" what the professionals told him, although they were far from always right.

Beria was not deceived by the broadcast promises of the developers of new weapons systems, he quickly caught the weaknesses of certain projects, and the ignorant Khrushchev did not know how to object in essence and every now and then went on about the developers, and if he was cool with them, then it was stupid, out of pure "taste"...

Khrushchev did not know how to see problems correctly, and, say, while in the United States intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) already in the mid-50s had about half an hour and less readiness to launch, the first Soviet ICBMs had to be fueled with an oxidizer - liquid oxygen a dozen hours while maintaining launch readiness for only eight hours, because work on ICBMs using high-boiling rocket fuels did not at first progress with us as the situation required and domestic capabilities allowed.

Our first ICBM - the famous "royal" R-7, the "seven", on the development of which Gagarin flew into space, had oxygen-kerosene engines, but for military intercontinental missiles, although more expensive, toxic and much more difficult to operate, they were more suitable, but allowing long-term starting readiness and almost immediate start engines using nitric acid oxidizers and toxic hydrocarbon fuel - asymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), called in the USA

heptyl.

Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel, the future creator of the mighty family of R-36 ICBMs, was a supporter of high-boiling fuels, and Korolev was his opponent ... After the death of Beria, Korolev was supported by industrialists, and the military as well - after all, oxygen engines had already been mass-produced, were easier to operate and design ... However if Stalin and Beria were alive, all these tricks of the "Madrid court" would have led to nothing ...

What are Americans doing? On acid and heptyl? And if so, then you, dear comrades rocket scientists, master acid and heptyl for combat missiles ... And if you want to send a person into space on reliable engines - we do not interfere with you, but first solve the priority defense tasks!

Actually, the last major decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on long-range missiles of February 13, 1953, adopted under the leadership of Beria while Stalin was still alive, just oriented rocket scientists to a high-boiling oxidizer - nitric acid with nitrogen oxides, used on a long-range missile R-12.

But Khrushchev was not able to make the right choice - he simply did not have there was neither knowledge, nor grip, nor the scale of Beria ...

Beria knew how not to waste time on trifles when it was justified, but after the first real successes of the Atomic Project began to force nuclear scientists to count a penny.

(And not only, by the way, nuclear scientists! So, on June 5, 1953, in response to a letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Pavel Meshik - on December 23 of the same year, Meshik will be shot at

"Beria's case," Lavrenty Pavlovich regarded as an ill-conceived and unreasonable request of his longtime colleague to increase the staffing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.)

Khrushchev, even in his "memoirs," did not hesitate to admit: "It costs millions to launch a rocket. Now I can't specifically name how much, not because of secrecy, but simply *I don't know* (bold italics are mine everywhere. - S.K.), but these are **huge** funds.

Yes! As Chekhov wrote: "The sea was big" ...

For Beria, such "quantitative" assessments were impossible - he himself did nothing vague did not tolerate and did not allow, and brought up subordinates in the same spirit.

Parallels can be continued, but is it worth it?

Chapter 7

1947–1952 Monument for the ages: "skyscrapers" over Moscow

IN THE BEGINNING of 1943, Lazar Kaganovich, fulfilling Stalin's order, was still in Tbilisi and wrote from there to his daughter Maya, an architect by profession:

"Dear and beloved Mayusya!

Thank you for ... a detailed description of the celebration of Zholtovsky. Despite some of his oddities, he certainly deserved the order and honoring the anniversary ... I wanted to write to him, but not the situation ... "

Ivan Vladimirovich Zholtovsky turned 75 on November 28, 1942 - he was born in 1867. He received the title of academician of architecture in 1909 and could, having left for Europe after the revolution, unlike pillar "counts" and princes, not vegetate in a restaurant "a la Russe", but make good money with his craft, not only for bread and butter, but also on black caviar "a la Russe".

However, Zholtovsky remained with the people and implemented his best projects already in Soviet period of creativity.

To make it clearer what follows, I will immediately remind the reader what place Aleksey Shchusev (1873–1949), four times winner of the Stalin Prize, occupied in Russian and Soviet architecture ... Before the revolution, he managed to build the Kazansky railway station in Moscow, since 1913 he taught art at Stroganov - industrial school. In Soviet Russia, Shchusev also became known for the project of the Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin, the building of the NKVD on Dzerzhinsky Square, the Moscow metro station "Komsomolskaya-Koltsevaya" ...

So, further Kaganovich wrote:

"That Shchusev made some reservations (meaning Shchusev's speech at the anniversary of Zholtovsky. - S.K.), this is quite natural, because in addition to the element of jealousy, there are fundamental differences. Zholtovsky is a fanatical follower of the classics, while Shchusev is an eclecticist, he takes a little from everyone, but most of all he is a baroque. I must, however, say that the building built by Shchusev IMEL (Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. - S.K.), for which he received the Stalin Prize, is remarkable both externally and internally, it is clear that Shchusev is being rebuilt. He gave powerful granite columns to 5 floors, and inside a wonderful location and decoration - rich (marble) and modest. But **oddly enough** (bold italics mine. - S.K.), in this building one can see the influence of Zholtovsky and his consistency. Shchusev, of course, did not do this consciously, but he is a businesslike and practical man; when he was convinced that Soviet (with a capital letter from Kaganovich. - S.K.) architecture does not abandon the best elements of the old heritage and that classical forms are applied to life, he also applied his remarkable abilities ... "

By the way - what is Lazar Kaganovich! From the current "democrats" he gets, although

less than the "fiend" and "executioner" Beria, but also, as they say, receives the full program: "ignorant", "satrap", and often - and "executioner" ... But God forbid such "ignorance" to the current inhabitants of the Kremlin walls, while it knew the "iron" Stalin's people's commissars.

I remembered Kaganovich's letter insofar as it can be seen here interesting plot twist...

Kaganovich constantly, all his life, was engaged in self-education and was a man of deep thoughts and a precise look ... Therefore, he caught the unusualness for the "traditional" Shchusev of the architectural solutions adopted in the building of the Tbilisi branch of IMEL, but saw in it the influence of Zholtovsky ...

But - Zholtovsky?

As, I hope, the reader remembers, the reconstruction of Tbilisi was carried out with the active participation of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and Beria's style in the new look of the Georgian capital manifested itself clearly and quite definitely. So could Beria bypass such an important element of the architectural renovation of Tbilisi as the IMEL building?

Don't think...

At the same time, as Kaganovich noted, Shchusev was, on the one hand, an eclecticist, and on the other hand, as the same Kaganovich noted, he was a businesslike and practical man ... And besides, Shchusev was so jealous of Zholtovsky that even at the anniversary could not resist polite hairpins addressed to the hero of the day.

No, it doesn't look like Shchusev really experienced the influence of Zholtovsky while working in Tbilisi - they were each their own head.

But Shchusev could not but listen to the opinion of Beria, if only because Beria was, after all, the customer...

Of course, if Beria, like Agafya Tikhonovna from Gogol's "The Marriage", wished to have a building in the style of Le Corbusier, but with columns of all classical orders alternating along the facade - Corinthian, Ionic, and Doric, and the portico suggested "depicting in the best possible way" in the Empire or Rococo style, it is unlikely that Shchusev would have listened to such wishes ...

But Beria was an architect and had a taste - we can judge this not only by Tbilisi, but also by how closed "nuclear" cities were built from the very beginning, to the general plans and development of which Beria could not be indifferent either ... Therefore, the assumption that Beria could constructively influence even such a large and proud architect as Shchusev will not be unacceptable.

Beria had a construction and architectural education, and he received it in one of the most, perhaps, the strongest - in his class - educational institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia, at the Baku Mechanical and Construction School. This school was one of the few centers of technical education in the Caucasus, if not the only one. In any case, according to the data for 1913, in the Caucasian educational district of the Ministry of Public Education there was only one secondary technical school - most likely, this was Beria's "alma mater".

The school had a little over 400 students, about 100 per course. For comparison, in 1900-1913, only 1,360 civil engineers and architects graduated from universities in Russia, also about 100 a year. In other words, Beria, who even received a secondary construction education, was a member of a very small professional group in Russia, and the level of his training could not be low - even regardless of the fact of the undoubted talent of young Lavrenty.

At the same time, the rapid construction in already pre-revolutionary Baku gave the novice architect many reasons for reflection and self-education. "Oil" Baku grew by leaps and bounds: from 1863 to 1897, the number of Baku residents increased from 14,000 to 112,000 people. And although the main new population - oil workers huddled in barracks on the outskirts,

urban construction in Baku developed rapidly - luxurious mansions and palaces of oil industrialists appeared in the center, country residences were built, and the "middle class" in Baku was not without money ... Therefore, mass urban development was carried out at a rapid pace and was significant.

All this, of course, contributed to both the development of construction and architectural education in Baku, and the development of intelligent neophytes who are formed in the Baku School.

HOWEVER, everything said above is just a kind of saying ... The main thing will be said below.

In 1947, at the suggestion of Stalin, a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the construction of eight high-rise buildings in Moscow.

The Resolution also formulated the requirements for their architecture:

"Proportions and silhouettes ... of buildings must be original and their architectural and artistic composition must be linked to the historical architecture of the city and the silhouette of the future Palace of Soviets. In accordance with this, the designed buildings should not repeat the samples of multi-storey buildings known abroad ... "

The crown of Soviet high-rise architecture was to be the building of Moscow State University on the Lenin Hills - by November 1951 it was already in
mostly built...

Residential buildings were to grow on Vosstaniya Square and on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment; on Dorogomilovskaya embankment and on Kalanchevskaya street (Komsomolskaya square) - hotels "Ukraine" and "Leningradskaya"; and in Zaryadye, on Lermontovskaya Square at the Red Gate and on Smolenskaya Square, there are three administrative buildings.

In total - eight, and in the high-rise building on Smolenskaya Square the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR was to be located, and at the Red Gate - the Ministry of Railways.

Each of the buildings and their very purpose was a symbol and a beacon.

Moscow State University is the height of education...

Magnificent residential buildings are a landmark for all builders of the USSR. Landmark not so much technical - you can't build a "high-rise building" in the regional center, how much moral ...

Hotels - the high hospitality of the new Moscow ...

The buildings of the ministries are the high greatness of Russia as a mighty world power ...

Each building had its own architects - the color of Soviet architecture.

The appearance of these buildings in the capital of the USSR brought to life a new, optimistic-sounding word "skyscrapers", and this also had a deep meaning. Our "skyscrapers" could not be called "skyscrapers" in any way ...

"High-rise buildings" were designed by Posokhin, Rudnev, Minkus, Chechulin, Polyakov, Dushkin, Mordvinov, Chernyshev, Gelfreich, Abrosimov, Khryakov... Everyone was a personality, everyone had their own architectural principles... However, in all projects it was striking that all of them - with the undoubted originality of their authors, they were undoubtedly and strikingly similar in their architectural appearance - slender, logically growing from the surrounding lower stone massifs, crowned with towers with spiers ...

In full accordance with the requirements of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the silhouettes of the buildings did not repeat any skyscraper known abroad, they were original, but completely linked to the historically established architecture of Moscow, the architectural and compositional center of which was, of course, the Kremlin ...

All Moscow "skyscrapers" were similar to the Kremlin towers, and not only in silhouette, but also in an amazing combination of rigor, grandeur and lightness, aspiration
up.

The height of Moscow buildings reached 275 meters, and with low cloudiness they completely "scraped" the sky and clouds ...

But these were not "skyscrapers" ...

The skyscrapers of New York, both the very first and the modern ones, delight primarily with the brilliance of purely engineering solutions and technologies, but not with architecture. This is so because the very appearance of skyscrapers was not caused by bold architectural ideas, but by the need to make the most of every square foot of expensive land in the center of large cities.

That is, the idea of skyscrapers was generated not by creativity, but by huckstering.

The Soviet "skyscrapers" are an underlined space.

If we continue this thought, then we can recall Kalininsky Prospekt, Novy Arbat, rebuilt already in the Brezhnev era. Flat-headed wits called him "the false jaw of Moscow" ... Well, some people also made fun of the "skyscrapers" a lot, and even now they make fun or shrug their shoulders contemptuously.

But let's compare the impression of skyscrapers exaggeratedly elongated, crowded in Manhattan, not only scraping the sky, but also obscuring it from people due to extreme crowding, and the impression of free-standing, high-altitude "parallelepipeds" of Novy Arbat emphasizing the sky above them ...

I think there is a difference here.

Let's go back to 1947...

In MY place, I already reported that on February 8, 1947, the Politburo Decree was adopted on the new organization of the work of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, according to which, among other duties, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria was entrusted with the supervision of the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow.

First of all, high-rise buildings were meant, although the new mass multi-storey large-block construction using in-line methods and techniques also did not escape Stalin's attention - he rightly believed that post-war Moscow should not spread like dough from kneading, but be built up with 8-14-storey buildings. houses.

Since the beginning of the 1950s, surprisingly much has been done in this regard, and even on the streets far from the center of Moscow, multi-storey buildings began to appear, which greatly decorated the capital. And all this was done not without the participation of Beria ...

However, further I will only talk about "skyscrapers" - in their history, Beria's personality manifested itself most clearly.

Conceived as **an integral ensemble on the scale** of a huge **city**, eight high-rise buildings created a bright image of post-war Moscow. They have become not only its decoration, but also a symbol - just remember the official emblem of the 1980 Moscow Olympiad.

Looking ahead, I note that in the 2000s, attempts were made to stylize a number of new buildings of post-Soviet Moscow under the "Stalin-Beria" "skyscrapers", however, the implementation of these projects simply once again emphasized the greatness and bright essence of that era against the background of today's pale sickness in all spheres of society.

The laying of high-rise buildings in Moscow took place on September 7, 1947 - in the days celebration of the 800th anniversary of the city. Each construction site was attended by one of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Construction of a complex of buildings of the Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov opened in full force at the end of 1948 and was completed by September 1, 1953, when the new building of Moscow State University for the first time accepted students.

By that time, Lavrenty Beria was, most likely, secretly and extrajudicially shot.

As Colonel-General-Engineer Komarovskiy reports in his book "Notes of a Builder", the MSU Construction Department was headed by the most experienced practical builder Alexei Voronkov and the talented engineer Sergei Balashov, but the participation of

Komarovsky was also active in this project - as the newly appointed head of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets, Komarovsky was assigned to oversee the construction of Moscow State University and a high-rise administrative building in Zaryadye.

But to whom did he "owe" this?

Aleksey Komarovsky (1906–1973) himself refers to a conversation in mid-1948 with Voznesensky, then chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, but there is no doubt that the initiative for such an appointment belonged to Beria, who knew Komarovsky perfectly and from the best side. Since 1944, Major General Komarovsky became the head of the Glavpromstroy of the NKVD - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and remained in this position almost until the end of 1951, when he was - also "at the suggestion" of Beria - appointed head of the Glavneftespetsstroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Since 1945, Komarovsky was in parallel in the position of one of the deputies of the "atomic" First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, worked a lot under Beria's hand in the Atomic Project, and it was for this that in 1949 he received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

In his book, published by the Military Publishing House in 1972, Komarovsky does not mention Beria, of course, not a single word. But he was known to Beria, I repeat, perfectly, and since the construction of the Moscow State University complex turned out to be a particularly difficult task and at first it didn't go very well, Beria "threw" the "protégé" another "non-dusty job".

However, in one place of Komarovsky's book, it is, without a doubt, about Beria:

"All further design work was carried out by the management designing at a completely exceptional pace simultaneously with the development of the construction of Moscow State University.

In many cases, the drawings went directly to the production on paper, since the government (read: "Beria" - S.K.) trusted us to approve all technical solutions and projects without intermediate instances ... "

Here one can quite guess the style of Beria - the one and only, and if repeated, it doesn't matter - only Beria's subordinates and associates.

BUT THERE IS one question that, as I understand it, no one can answer accurately and unambiguously today. And this question: "Who gave a single idea for all eight projects of high-rise buildings?"

Any of the leading Soviet architects?

But they - both those who were not involved in the projects, and those who were involved in them - were completely independent thinking people and would hardly have agreed to be guided by other people's ideas, even objectively and magnificent, in the development of such an epoch-making topic ...

In the article "High-rise buildings", placed in the 9th volume of the TSB, signed for printing 3 December 1951, it was said:

"In high-rise buildings, in accordance with government guidelines (sic! - S.K.), a closeness to the traditions of Moscow architecture is combined with a bold desire for new images, imbued with the thought of the present and future of the country of the Soviets. Sculptural completeness of multi-tiered ledge volumes, picturesque silhouettes, rich plastic processing of facades bring high-rise buildings closer to historical architectural monuments of Moscow. With the Palace of Soviets (at that time this project, although formally, still existed. - S.K.), high-rise buildings will be united by a combination of majestic calmness and balance of the masses common to their architecture with the rapid dynamics of the vertical development of volumes ... "

All this was true and good, but who owned the general idea?

How could eight different teams of architects simultaneously and independently from each other to come to one!?

At the same time, seven teams would hardly have been able to accept the idea of one, because everyone wanted to excel. And with the final project of the Palace of Soviets by Iofan, Shchuko and Gelfreich, the projects of all the "skyscrapers" had - in the end - a very relative similarity.

At the same time, the same Boris Iofan (1891–1960) was in uniform after the war, in 1947–1950 years, according to his projects, a complex of the Oil and Mining Institutes was built in Moscow ...

Vladimir Shchuko (1878–1939) died before the war...

Vladimir Gelfreich, who at the end of the 40s was barely over sixty, continued, however, to work and was the author of the project for the building of the USSR Foreign Ministry on Smolenskaya Square. But Gelfreich did not give a common pattern for everyone!

The article in the TSB, however, hinted at some impersonal "instructions of the government", but the government is also a collective of specific individuals. And there, who was the first to come up with the idea to repeat the silhouettes of the Kremlin in the high-rise buildings of Moscow (this is immediately felt in the guise of "high-rise buildings")?

After all, someone, this brilliant idea, should have come to mind first - whether an architect or a member of the government!

So to whom?

Stalin?..

In principle, this is not at all excluded - Stalin was a universal genius, polyphonic, he knew how to feel subtly and thought originally not only in politics.

The modern historian of architecture D. Khmel'nitsky, who has been living in Germany for a long time, writes in the book "Architect Stalin" that there are many strange things in the very history of the emergence of "high-rise buildings" - the literature does not mention at all who and when developed the layout of high-rise buildings on the general plan Moscow ... At the same time, Khmel'nitsky, although he is not very loyal to Stalin, believes that it was Stalin who was the author of both the original urban planning idea and the actual author of the architecture of high-rise buildings, and further explains that since Stalin was not "petty conceited", then and did not claim official authorship ...

Perhaps so, but then, most likely, the TSB article would still say: "... on the instructions of the great leader, Comrade Stalin," etc. Stalin really did not suffer from vanity, but how many others had it in abundance, in including - and in the editorial office of the TSB ...

But here - in the text of the TSB article, the specific author of the idea was not identified.

And how is Comrade Beria?

After all, he was the only architect among the members of the government and the only government member among architects.

So wasn't Beria the first to come up with the idea?

And if it was not he who did this, but one of the architects who communicated with him, then Beria could well immediately, on the fly, evaluate this idea and bring it to Stalin. And he also appreciated it on the fly and made it a guide for everyone who it was decided to involve in the design of high-rise buildings ...

Or maybe the idea came to the mind of the first Stalin, and he shared it with Beria, and Beria immediately supported her warmly?

No, no matter how you think about it, Lavrenty Beria was already involved in the general plan of the Moscow "skyscrapers" to some - and no small - measure.

Of course, all of the above is nothing more than a hypothesis, a guess, however, in my opinion, The hypothesis is entirely correct...

In any case, an undoubted historical fact is that Beria officially oversaw the design and construction of "skyscrapers", and he did not know how to do anything formally, carrying out "general interference in the affairs of his subordinates".

D. Khmel'nitsky, who loves Beria no more than Stalin, nonetheless explicitly declares that, "apparently", thanks to Beria's brilliant organizational skills, by 1953, that is, in the shortest possible time, seven out of eight buildings were built. Khmel'nitsky calls them

"skyscrapers", but here, presumably, his acquired "Europeanism" manifested itself - not "skyscrapers", but high-rise buildings were erected in Stalin and Beria's Moscow!

About how Beria specifically worked with their designers and builders, at least one reliable evidence has been preserved ... In Ivan Ivanovich Chigirin's magnificent book in almost everything, Dirty and White Spots of History. About the mystery of the death of I.V. Stalin and about some circumstances of his reign" stories are given on this account by Viktor Mikhailovich Abramov, chief engineer of the project and chief engineer of the construction of a high-rise building at the Red Gate.

In 1951, Abramov turned 43 years old, and during the construction of his "high-rise" he used an extremely daring innovative method of temporarily strengthening the "quicksand" soil under the foundation - he simply froze it.

But it's easy to say: "I simply froze"... Earthen massifs are not a chicken leg, unique, large-scale technologies for freezing soils and appropriate equipment were required here!

The huge building was built with a significant **calculated** deviation from the vertical (a kind of analogue of the Leaning Tower of Pisa!), And after defrosting the ground, it had to slowly, slowly swing (!) In the opposite direction and occupy a strictly vertical position.

Only an engineer can understand the whole originality of Viktor Abramov's idea, but only, as I guess, a civil engineer (personally, I am a charge engineer, which means something else) can fully understand the whole riskiness of *his* idea.

However, everything ended brilliantly, and this and other building decisions of Abramov were later included in textbooks.

So, on April 14, 1951, on the eve of May Day, Abramov invited Beria to his place to give a task: a spire with a five-pointed star should be installed on the building at the Red Gate for the holiday.

Many years later, V.M. Abramov spoke to I.I., who knew him well. Chigirin that the conversation was friendly and correct, without a hint of threats, and "more like a request from a person who really wants to give people a gift for the holiday."

Abramov later met with Beria many times and never felt any fear, and when, after the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich, he heard "shocking stories about Beria", he was "much surprised" by them.

Abramov told Chigirin that in communication Beria was a polite, businesslike person, without a noble nobility. But he was very punctual and exacting in the implementation of decisions. If you can't do something on time - report back, tell me how you need help.

At the same time, Lavrenty Pavlovich read construction drawings well, delved into construction problems from the summer, and, according to Viktor Mikhailovich, he and Beria, "like engineers," "spoke the same language."

In 1949, the authors of the projects of all seven high-rise buildings were awarded the Stalin Prize - even before the completion of construction.

But it was not far off - the "Beria" "skyscrapers" were built at the "Beria" pace. Perhaps it would not be superfluous to report here that on the territory now occupied by Moscow State University and in Zaryadye, there used to be old houses, and all the resettled people had to be provided with new comfortable housing with all communications, infrastructure, roads and other things ... One such residential area was built in near Lobnya station, the second - in Tekstilshchiki, and the third - in Cheryomushki, then a village 5 kilometers from Moscow, which became a new urban-type settlement in the Leninsky district of the Moscow region ... Over time, Cheryomushki entered the capital, and the name "cheryomushki" in Khrushchev's times became a household name for all new residential areas in various cities of the USSR.

However, in reality, this cheerful, once full of joy and hope, name is connected, as we see, with the work for the peoples of the USSR of Lavrenty Beria! The main monument

Beria for centuries - man-made, but, alas, nameless, its high-rise buildings have become in Moscow.

But he never emphasized this merit in any way, and before advertising (there is no talk of self-promotion at all!) He was not eager. After his arrest, the Executive Director of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Pomaznev wrote in a note to the Central Committee dated July 2, 1953:

"Beria considered high-rise buildings to be his brainchild. Once I heard him say [that] others would have been photographed ten times against the background of these buildings, and here we are building, and nothing ... "

So, even disloyal to Beria, urgently and petty slandering him, Pomaznev involuntarily noted Beria's personal modesty.

In the same slander against Beria dated July 2, 1953, Pomaznev wrote:

"As for the distribution of apartments in a high-rise building on Kotelniki, I reported that there were about 1.5 thousand requests, and 110 apartments. He offered to do for each (! - S.K.) a request for a certificate and report ... Comrade Komarovskiy, who was in the reception room, was immediately summoned (the same one. - S.K.), at which I was told that all talk about refusing to operate the university was stopped (by the Administration of Affairs CM USSR. - S.K.). On this point, I argued with him, arguing that cleaning the latrines at the university is not suitable for the Office of Affairs. He told me that Ponomarenko, even if he asks for this business, they will not give him, because this building is equal to the capital of Dupont and other American billionaires ... "

Well, Mayakovsky already said: "The Soviets have their own pride, we look down on the bourgeoisie" ... Now, more than twenty years after it was said for the first time, after the war, after the success of RDS-1 and the construction of "skyscrapers", Beria had even more reason to feel a sense of legitimate pride for himself, and for the state, and for its new architectural symbol!

LONG and well it was said by Sergei Yesenin: "Big is seen at a distance..." This is how it happened with the Moscow Stalin-Beria "skyscrapers"... In the history of high-rise urban planning, they turned out to be a separate and, if you think about it, the most striking, humane and instructive chapter.

The first skyscrapers (the Russian "skyscraper" is an exact copy of the English "skyscraper") were built in Chicago in the 80s and 90s of the 19th century.

Since then, skyscrapers have only grown and grown skyward. In 1995, a two-tower (88 floors in each tower) skyscraper "Petronas" with a height of 450 meters was erected in Kuala Lumpur. In engineering terms, this is, of course, an outstanding achievement, and architecture - two round ribbed "candles" is impressive, but ...

That's just it, that there is and "but ..."

Petronas is able to surprise, is able to delight ...

And admires.

But to warm the soul?

But this one is more difficult.

Brilliance of thought - please!

And for some reason there is no warmth of sincere feeling.

Why?

Modern skyscrapers are designed to be "iconic", as they have now adapted to say, signs of prosperity, they are called so - "prestige-buildings" ...

Stalin-Beria "skyscrapers" also, it would seem, have a similar semantic load, but in reality there are two, as they say in Odessa, big differences ...

Architecture is aptly called "frozen music". And if so, then the Soviet "skyscrapers" are great symphonies. And the highest "prestige buildings" are not

more than spectacular hits.

In a sense, the difference between Soviet "skyscrapers" and capitalist skyscrapers accurately expresses the fundamental difference between the goals of socialism and capitalism.

The goal of socialism is a free, comprehensively developed and educated, and therefore - liberated person.

The goal of capitalism is profit.

Today, total kitsch dominates the life of the world, that is, deliberately, emphatically bad, undeveloped, primitive taste, which is deliberately instilled in billions of people so that they do not learn to be people ...

After all, a developed person is mortally dangerous for the world's Golden Elite. He *thinks* and, thinking, sooner or later will come to the idea that humanity not only can, but must do without all sorts of "elites", and especially without their "golden" variety.

A man of good taste will never wear a suit littered with cheap "holographic" gilding, and the savage will look at such a robe with lust.

Something similar, savage, is happening in high-rise architecture today, and the Soviet Stalinist-Beria high-rise buildings are opposed to this - by the very fact of their existence.

Not arrogant skyscrapers, but proud high-rise buildings...

In 1943, Kaganovich wrote to his daughter from Tbilisi:

"Here we will end the war victoriously, the great suffering of construction will come - restoration of mean, barbarous, wildly destroyed cities and villages. Years of gigantic, creative construction work will go by, tens of thousands of houses, structures new factories, parks, gardens ... and here the great historical role of Soviet architects will be to give socialist cities and villages.

All architects need to prepare now, today we think only about victory, we are looking for ways to destroy the enemy, but today gives birth to tomorrow, and tomorrow after the victory is a gigantic Stalinist construction ... "

Any person with a mind and heart will immediately catch the difference between the thoughts and feelings that worried Kaganovich and the aspirations of those who conceive and build "prestige buildings".

Moreover, just like Stalin's People's Commissar Lazar Kaganovich, millions and tens of millions of people thought and felt Stalin in the USSR ... And among them was, of course, the great "foreman" of socialism Lavrenty Beria.

"I erected a monument to myself not made by hands...", Pushkin wrote, but he was a poet and could immortalize himself with a word.

Beria was not a poet - although he was a creative, feeling nature. He could immortalize himself only by a deed, and if by a word, then only by one that immediately becomes a deed. And the "skyscrapers" that rose above the capital of the Victorious people became not only the personification of the high human hopes of millions of people, but also a man-made monument for centuries to one of those who raised these skyscrapers over Moscow, Lavrenty Beria.

Although today no one, in fact, from those who admire the Moscow "skyscrapers", and does not guess.

Our Troubled Time has brought to life many ugly, caricatured phenomena. So, in 2004, a certain residential complex "Triumph Palace" was built in the anti-Soviet capital of anti-communist Russia ... A huge ledge building outwardly repeats the contours of the Stalin-Beria "skyscrapers", but ideologically and aesthetically correlates with them, like the Mona Lisa in the Louvre and its image on T-shirt of a pimply youth, like an opera and a soap opera ...

Well, each time has its own symbols.

Chapter 8

After 5.03.53. Betrayed by his

In the PREFACE to this book, I wrote that Beria went from victory to victory all his life and suffered only one defeat, and it cost him his life ...

Well, now the time has come to talk about it, starting with the fact that the fall of Beria was a foregone conclusion by death, or rather, by the murder of Stalin. There are a number of reliable books about this tragic moment in our history, of which I especially recommend to the reader the old book by Yuri Mukhin "The Murder of Stalin and Beria", the recent book by Ivan Chigirin "Father", his earlier book about the death of Stalin, which I have already mentioned, and also his own "Why Stalin was killed" ...

The assassination of Stalin by Khrushchev - at first physical, at the turn of the winter and spring of 1953, and then moral - in the winter of 1956 at the end of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, created the initial preconditions for the assassination of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1991 - in the winter of 1992. The arrest, and after some time the murder of Beria, became the second act in the future drama of Soviet socialism, immediately following the first - the murder of Stalin.

Beria was betrayed by his own people, but one cannot help but wonder - were all of these formally "their own" even after Stalin's death so kind of their own?

Sometimes it turns out that much, if not everything, in the fate of states and even humanity depends on several people, and even on one person. So it happened with Stalin's USSR - without Stalin, he seemed to be getting stronger and stronger, but in reality he was getting weaker and weaker.

And there were two reasons for that...

On one I will say here very briefly, on the second I will dwell a little longer.

The first reason was the oblivion by the top "Khrushchev" and then "Brezhnev" leadership of the USSR of the obvious fact that as socialism progresses, especially the world successes, the capitalist camp will intensify and intensify subversive work within socialism, and the forms of this work will become more and more to innovate and improve, and the goal of all this will be the same - the fall of the USSR and the destruction of socialism and its achievements, especially in the formation of a free spirit of man.

The second reason was the absolute novelty of the socialist order of life, the unprecedentedness of the society that the peoples of Russia began to create under the hand of Stalin, while only Stalin fully realized that the strengthening and development of a new, socialist, order of relations between people is a task as fruitful as and the hardest...

The proof of Stalin's political and civilizational foresight was his last work, published in the autumn of 1952, "On the question of the economic problems of socialism in the USSR", and the proof of the political and civilizational myopia and even blindness of both his formal successors and the peoples of the USSR was that that after Stalin's death, this work of his, the pinnacle of all previous world social analysis, was immediately forgotten in the USSR and later even subjected to ridicule.

There is no other such example in world history when one person, the leader of a nation, would be the embodiment of historical necessity so completely and accurately. As a similar figure, one can only talk about our own Peter the Great, but Peter, with all his genius, was born on the throne, he received the highest power and the opportunity to transform Russia by birthright.

And Stalin acquired this right in the most difficult situation of the rise to the opportunity to transform Russia from the most social "bottom". Stalin was not born a Leader, but became one because life itself showed and proved that Stalin has no alternative if Russia wants to develop and have a future.

In the 70s and 80s, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, who knew Stalin as he knew little who said:

"Stalin never kowtowed to anyone ... This is an original person, by the way. Moreover, it must be taken from time to time, from time to time, it was different ... Post-war - a different Stalin. Pre-war is different. Between thirty-two and forty years - the other. Until the thirty-second year - quite different. He was changing. I saw at least five or six different Stalins ... "

And to the question - depending on what did Stalin change? - Kaganovich replied: "From work tension. From the tense situation. From the tension of the struggle ...

Kaganovich said this very precisely - about different Stalins at different periods of his life. But the whole life of Stalin after the revolution, that is, his life as a statesman, this is the history of the USSR. Therefore, we must also talk about several of Stalin's USSR, and it cannot be said that the USSR was different at different times just because Stalin changed. No, on the contrary, Stalin changed and was different at different times because the USSR was changing, although the country changed primarily under the influence of Stalin's ideas and will ...

But the opposition to these ideas and this will was enormous and very dangerous insofar as it was multi-layered: it existed both within the top leadership and in the grassroots anti-Soviet minority of society ...

Speaking of the latter, it must be borne in mind that it was really **a minority**, and **an absolute** minority, but in a vast country even **three percent** of the population - That's about **five million** people!

That's how difficult it was, and in short I can say this...

When socialism in the USSR gained strength, and this happened when the majority of the population, and especially the young, most active generations, believed in socialism, it was Stalin who realized that the further strength of socialism would depend on whether stable and effective feedbacks between Power and the absolute majority of the People.

He saw the solution in the alternative nature of direct elections under the new Constitution of the USSR of 1936. If an ordinary engineer, a collective farm foreman and a secondary school teacher were to be included on the same ballot with the first secretary of the regional party committee, and only one had to be elected, then the party leader of the region would be elected only **if he enjoyed** respect and authority over at least half of the region's population...

As a result, the "leaders" who were "sitting" and snickering would be automatically removed from the Power, and the Soviet power would be exercised and developed only by the leaders it needs and immensely, sincerely devoted to it.

On March 1, 1936, Stalin gave an interview to Roy Howard, chairman of the American newspaper association Scripps-Howard Newspapers, owner and editor of the New-York World's Telegram and Sun daily newspaper and head of the largest newspaper and magazine concern, which owned the majority of the agency's shares " United Press. On March 5, 1936, Pravda published this interview.

Among others, Howard then asked the following question:

- A new constitution is being developed in the USSR, providing for a new electoral system. To what extent can this new system change the situation in the USSR, since only one party will still run in the elections?

Stalin replied as follows:

- We will adopt our new constitution, probably at the end of the year ... As already announced, under the new constitution, elections will be universal, equal, direct and secret. You are embarrassed that only one party will take part in these elections. You do not see what an electoral struggle can be under these conditions. Obviously, the electoral lists in the elections will be put forward not only by the Communist Party, but also by all kinds of public non-party organizations. And we have hundreds of them...

And further, explaining how he understands universal, equal, direct and secret elections, Stalin said the most important:

- It seems to you that there will be no electoral struggle. But it will be, and I foresee a very lively electoral struggle. We have a lot of institutions that do not work well. It happens that one or another local authority is unable to satisfy one or another of the many-sided and ever-increasing needs of the working people of town and country. **Have you built or not built a good school? Have you improved your living conditions? Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our work more efficient, our life more cultured? These will be the criteria by which millions of voters will approach candidates, rejecting the unfit, deleting them from the lists, nominating the best and nominating them ...**

This was said and **prompted** by the Leader of the people - directly, clearly, in the main newspaper of the country.

On December 5, 1936, the Stalinist Constitution of 1936 was adopted, and preparations began for the first direct (previously they were not direct and unequal for workers and peasants) elections to the new supreme body of state power - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In the summer of 1937, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held, where a member of the Politburo Commission formed on May 26, 1937 for the preparation of a new electoral law, Yakov Yakovlev (Epshtein), recalling that the elections would be universal, equal, direct and secret, stressed that the elections - in full accordance with the already existing Constitution, they should also be alternative!

Alternative!

Later, it became the norm to have only one candidate on the ballot, although the Constitution allowed for several. It was then that everything began - the first elections were just coming, and according to the Constitution of 1936, "all public organizations and working people's societies enjoyed the right to nominate candidates for deputies of any Council: communist party organizations, trade unions of workers and employees (and they, if we count the branch trade unions, were more than a dozen! - S.K.), cooperative organizations, youth organizations, cultural societies ... ", as well as general meetings at enterprises, collective farms, state farms and military units!

Yakovlev said:

- The Constitution of the USSR gives every public organization and society the right to nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This article is of great importance; it was introduced at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin. Its goal is to develop and expand democracy. This article provides genuine democracy in elections.

And then Yakovlev concretized the general thesis:

- The district election commissions are obliged to register and put on the ballot for the respective district all candidates for the Supreme Council, without exception, who are nominated by public organizations and workers' societies ...

At the same time, samples of ballot papers with several names were already being prepared.

A number of modern researchers believe that it was the latter fact that aroused influential regional party "leaders" such as Khrushchev, Postyshev and Eikhe, and they allegedly provoked Stalin into a repressive operation in 1937, which also captured 1938 ... As a result, the elections in 1937 were not held on alternative basis.

With all the legitimacy of such a conclusion, it cannot be recognized as the only one that explains the reasons for the mass repressions of 1937-1938. It is correct, but incomplete, and it must be supplemented, firstly, in the part that the opportunity to nominate an alternative candidate (s) not only frightened the party selfishness, but also activated the entire spectrum of anti-state and anti-social forces - from churchmen and former kulaks to Trotskyists and "Right"...

Stalin could not, of course, not foresee this, but the threat turned out to be more significant than it seemed at first, and all sorts of *eihe*, it must be admitted, it was inflated ...

Of course, the anti-Soviet Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not become possible from this threat - the absolute majority of the people were sincerely for Stalin, for socialism and Soviet power. But the noisy "opposition" to the new country was also not needed - the time came not for discussions, but for coordinated work, especially since there was already the smell of a world war.

Secondly, the disclosure of the rather extensive military conspiracy of Tukhachevsky in May 1937 also played a role. And from this conspiracy, threads stretched to the Trotskyists and the "rightists", and this circle was expanding and expanding - not in the fiction of the NKVD, but in reality.

I think, stunned by the opening picture of an unexpected betrayal of seemingly his own, Stalin decided to conduct a preventive repressive operation, and she began to open an abscess after an abscess both in the "tops" and in the "bottoms".

That is, the real "descent" of the compressed "spring" was primarily military and civilian Tukhachevsky, yakirs and oboreviches ...

What about mistakes and omissions?

Well, let Molotov answer for me. In 1964, after the removal of Khrushchev, he sent several very interesting and extensive letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU, in one of which he wrote directly:

"We were cutting wood, and chips flew.

Were there any mistakes? I repeat once again that they were. And I consider the most important of the mistakes of Stalin and the entire Politburo of that time to be the indisputable fact for me that they *overestimated* to some extent *the quality* of our state and party apparatus, overestimated our own revolutionary consciousness and conscience. They relied on us, and we, in no small number, were infected with elements of careerism, settling personal scores, and, often, the most ordinary political myopia.

The above are amazingly sincere and accurate words, but we must not forget that the Land of Soviets was then only twenty years old, and more recently Mayakovsky wrote: "My country is a teenager ..."

Could a society that is only aware of itself, only creating, *groping* for itself, not make mistakes even in extremely serious things?! And this confusion of "we" and "they" is very revealing in Molotov's text ... After all, by Molotov's "we" one often has to understand "they" and, conversely, by "they" - "we" ... And this is explained by the fact that Molotov understood all the complexity of those processes when sometimes in the same person the high, ideological and petty, selfish struggled, and the first did not always win.

For all that, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, of course, did not deny the inevitability and necessity - in the words of Molotov himself - "a merciless and difficult struggle to destroy the agents of capitalism, the agents of war in our own country."

On December 12, 1937, the first elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held. As already mentioned, there are no alternatives. The idea of the failed alternative elections did not become known to the masses, but some of its echo was heard in Stalin's speech at the election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on December 11, 1937, published the next day in Pravda.

He then said this:

"Comrades, I would like **to give you advice**, advice from a candidate for deputies to his voters... If we take the capitalist countries, then there are some peculiar, I would say rather strange relations between deputies and voters. While the elections are going on, the deputies flirt with the voters, fawn over them, swear allegiance, make a bunch of all sorts of promises. It turns out that the deputies' dependence on voters is complete. Once the elections have taken place

and candidates have turned into deputies, relations are changing radically. Instead of dependence on voters, their complete independence is obtained. **For four or five years, that is, until new elections, the deputy feels completely free, independent from the people, from his voters.** He can go from one camp to another, he can turn from the right road to the wrong one, he can get entangled in some machinations of a not entirely necessary nature, he can tumble as he pleases - he is independent.

“Can such a relationship be considered normal? No way, comrades! This circumstance was taken into account by our Constitution, and it passed a law by virtue of which voters have the right to recall their deputies ahead of schedule if they start to feint, if they turn off the road, if they forget about their dependence on the people, on the voters.

At least to the cities where the most conscious part of the voters lived, fresh Pravda reached the next morning, so Stalin's speech turned out to be some kind of hint to people who were going to go to the polls, direct advice to the people through the heads of the emerging "partoplasm".

But then it was not this "partoplasm" that determined the essence of the processes taking place in the country.

The second scheduled elections to the Supreme Soviet were to be held in December 1941, but in those days, as later, there was no time for elections ... However, the very idea of introducing real feedback through alternative elections was not archived by Stalin ...

The READER, who thought that I had gone quite aside from the topic of Beria, is wrong. Here everything goes one by one!

By 1952, there was no longer a broad *political* base for dangerous political conspiracies against Soviet power - in order for it to reappear, it took the enemies of Russia about forty years of painstaking "selection" and subversive work within the USSR.

However, a very dangerous *“nomenklatura”* base was formed for Russia, consisting of that part of the party and state apparatus, which turned into officials with pitcher snouts and a fishy soul. After all, the new society was still very young, imperfect, and besides, during the war, the Soviet government lost several million young, active and educated builders of socialism, and the resulting voids were filled by far from always worthy.

Stalin (and I'm sure Beria too) saw all the potential danger of the situation. At the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, Stalin - through the mouth of his personal secretary A.N. Poskrebyshev - said very formidable words. Here is what the head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks said at the congress:

“Unfortunately, we have among the party and Soviet workers (sic! Household workers are not mentioned. - S.K.) those who for some reason are sure that it is not they, but someone else who is obliged to comply with the laws, and that they themselves can bypass the laws, violate or apply them at their own discretion, according to the principle: "The law that went where it turned, it went there." From such a very strange understanding of the laws, there is only one step to ... a crime. <...> Some leaders for some reason believe that only their subordinates are allowed to criticize, and subordinates, you see, have no right to criticize their superiors. This ... has nothing to do with partisanship. The leader... who protects himself from criticism, knowingly digs a gulf between himself and the masses...

Criticism and self-criticism are not respected only by people with a bad conscience, they are either violators of party and state discipline, or despicable cowards, or pitiful townfolk unworthy of bearing the high rank of party member ... "

Of course, Poskrebyshev is always emphatically inconspicuous, nothing like

I would not say my initiative! And that was not all - even more meaningful words followed (bold italics mine. - S.K.):

"There are ... cases when some noble officials, abusing their power, inflict punishment for criticism, directly or indirectly subject their subordinates to repression and persecution. ***But everyone knows how severely our Party and its Central Committee punish such nobles, regardless of their ranks, titles, or past merits ...*** "

So the Word was spoken.

Through the mouth of Poskrebyshev, Stalin did not threaten, did not frighten. He warned. But he warned seriously, in a Stalinist way. That is, firstly, with restraint - that's why he instructed to say what was said to another. Secondly, it is weighty, recalling that with Comrade Stalin words are followed by deeds.

And there was no doubt that the whole selfish "partoplasm" - both sitting in the hall and operating outside its walls - understood Stalin correctly. Of course, executions did not threaten her now, but no one wanted to simply part with the warm leadership chair. And the case for some people went exactly to that ...

Moreover, it smelled of resignation both for the Minister of State Security Ignatiev, who is close to Khrushchev, and for Khrushchev himself ...

That is, Stalin was doomed - the only question was when exactly the Khrushchevites would risk eliminating him. And Stalin himself determined the date of his death - on Monday, March 2, 1953, an extended meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was to be held, the decisions of which would change a lot for many ...

However, on March 2, the poisoned Stalin was already dying. Officially his death was recorded on March 5, 1953.

Stalin fell, and on March 9 his state funeral took place...

And Beria?

Well, could not be doomed to the slaughter after the death of Stalin and his most active and original ally, who does not tolerate *paper shifters* of any kind: party and Soviet apparatchiks, trade union "leaders", who imagined themselves to be top military, polished "foreign ministers" and "foreign traders" who tasted "Europe" and "Americas"?..

On March 15, 1953, the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened, which approved personnel appointments made in connection with the death of Stalin.

Before the XIX Congress, the composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was as follows:

Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Stalin, Khrushchev (all members of the PB since 22.3.1939); Beria, Malenkov (members of the PB since 18.3.1946); Bulganin (PB member since 18.2.48); Kosygin (member of the PB since September 4, 1948).

After the 19th Congress, instead of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was formed, and within it also the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, which became something like the abolished Politburo, included Stalin, Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov and Khrushchev.

Andreev, Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan dropped out of the top management "team" - their business potential for Stalin was exhausted.

On March 5, 1953, when Stalin's death had not yet been announced, at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instead of Stalin, and his first deputies: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich.

Voroshilov became the formal head of state, replacing Shvernik, "recommended" by the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Molotov was again appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR instead of Vyshinsky, Bulganin again became Minister of War instead of Marshal Vasilevsky under the first deputies Marshal Vasilevsky and Marshal Zhukov.

Mikoyan again headed the entire trade sector in the form of a unified Ministry domestic and foreign trade.

The former Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Saburov, headed the new super-Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, and Pervukhin, the united Ministry of Power Plants and the Electrical Industry of the USSR.

Kosyachenko became the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

In the sphere of party leadership, there was actually a return to the old Politburo of the Central Committee, because the Presidium of the Central Committee was reduced from 25 members with 10 candidates for the Presidium to 11 members with 4 candidates.

The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were approved on March 5, 1953: Stalin (already actually deceased), Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin.

In fact, instead of Malenkov, the party was headed by the secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev. It was deemed "necessary" that "comrade Khrushchev N.S. focused on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Beria headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, merged with the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. The former Ministry of Internal Affairs remained the first deputy of Beria, the old one - still pre-war, the "frame" of Beria Kruglov. Before the NKVD, however, he worked in the Central Committee for Malenkov, so he could also be considered his "cadre". Khrushchev warmed up the former MGB Ignatiev in his Central Committee.

By the beginning of the spring of 1953, Stalin had already completely put together for himself all the elements of the political "mosaic" - both external and internal.

He became convinced that the "cold war", proclaimed by Churchill and continuously expanded by Truman, was beginning to reach its systemic peak. Moreover, for the first time in world history, neither side could transfer the war of the two world camps from the "cold" phase to the "hot" phase without the risk of getting - in the language of later times - unacceptable damage.

Both sides already had nuclear weapons, and on November 1, 1952, the United States tested in the Pacific Ocean the world's first thermonuclear device "Mike" with a capacity of 10 megatons, that is, 10 million tons of TNT equivalent. True, it was a structure weighing tens of tons, but even without a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb, America greatly outstripped Russia in terms of the number and total power of its nuclear arsenal. On November 16, 1952, in the King test, the United States successfully detonated a transportable atomic bomb with a TNT equivalent of several hundred thousand tons, that is, they already had **atomic** bombs of such power that Kurchatov and Beria promised to provide only in **the hydrogen** bomb RDS-6s. Her test was scheduled for August 1953.

One way or another, a "nuclear stalemate" arose, and the most likely and advantageous for the West - Stalin understood this, became not a "hot", but a "cold" version of the gradual destruction of socialism due to internal subversive work in the camp of socialism, directed and coordinated from outside.

"Bombs" are not atomic, not hydrogen, but ideological, propaganda.
Plus - the "fifth column" ...

There was a struggle between World Good and World Evil for the minds and souls of people on the planet, and Stalin had already considered the first serious Stalinist blow in *this* war and was ready to deliver it on March 2, 1953.

Deprive the enemy of the peoples and freedom - imperialism, its internal agents in the USSR, and deprive it not by purges on the model of 1937-1948, but by quickly and decisively ridding Soviet society of the degenerated and selfish part of the leadership.

To deprive self-seekers and hoarders of the opportunity to influence society - that was the plan of this Stalinist blow. Of the executive chairs had to be scrubbed

petty tyrants, bureaucrats, slobs, mediocrity and grabbers.

And among them would automatically be many of the already existing or potential members of the "fifth column".

The unexpected death of Stalin mixed up all the cards and redrawn all plans as Stalin and his associates.

And it quickly became clear that only Beria had a conscious program for the development of Russia without Stalin. A little more than three months remained before his fall, but the history of Beria's Hundred Days is the history of his continuous initiatives. He had specific proposals in all the most important areas, that is, in the field of public administration; economy; defense policy; domestic national and national policy; external politicians.

Almost all proposals required action and, therefore, could not help but to annoy Beria's more inert and less talented colleagues.

On March 26, 1953, Beria proposed amnesty for about a million people from among very specific categories of prisoners, namely: those sentenced to up to 5 years; convicted - regardless of the term of punishment - for official, economic and some military crimes; women with children under 10 and pregnant women; minors under the age of 18; elderly men and women and patients suffering from severe incurable ailments.

I will note in brackets that such a contingent of those released could not in any way generate powerful wave of violence.

By the way, this initiative was not only humane, but also rational. From many of those whom Beria proposed to free, one could not expect special labor accomplishments, but they had to be supported and fed.

Beria proposed to generally soften the criminal law in terms of economic and other less dangerous crimes. This was also reasonable - why pass through the "universities" the conclusions of not very stumbled and potentially law-abiding citizens?

On May 13, the new Ministry of Internal Affairs submits another voluminous note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where, among other things, it was said:

"T. Malenkov G.M.
<...>

At present, in the Soviet Union, passport restrictions apply to 340 regime towns, localities, railway junctions, as well as to the border zone along the entire border of the country with a width of 15 to 200 kilometers ...

Thus, if you look at the map of the USSR, you can see that the whole country is full of secure cities and various restricted areas where it is forbidden for citizens with a criminal record and who have served their sentences to live.

Under the current situation, citizens who have served their sentences in places of imprisonment or exile and thereby atoned for their guilt before society continue to experience hardships and are doomed to ordeal ... ".

On May 20, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a resolution was adopted that approved the draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, developed by Beria and removing passport restrictions.

Even before that, Beria set about a new, simply revolutionary in a sense, major reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, fundamentally changing the essence of the activities of the ministry, which by that time was not only "power", but also industrial. But on March 17, 1953, in a note to the Council of Ministers, Beria proposed to transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to other (purely industrial. - S.K.) ministries the main production and economic

management, construction departments, industrial enterprises with all their industrial and construction divisions, office premises, subsidiary farms, research and design institutions, with material resources ...

That is, Beria intended to curtail the economic activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to focus on such tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were most characteristic of him systematically.

Moreover - **the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria refuses the Gulag** - the Minister of Justice Gorshenin receives it into his jurisdiction. On March 28, 1953, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the transfer of labor camps and colonies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR" was adopted.

Only special camps and prisons remain for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where "especially dangerous state criminals sentenced to imprisonment: spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyists, rightists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, white émigrés...".

On March 21, 1953, Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with proposals to stop the construction or liquidation of 20 large facilities, "the implementation of which in the near future is not caused by urgent needs of the national economy," such as a tunnel under the Tatar Strait from the mainland to Sakhalin.

This saved manpower and resources more needed elsewhere.

There is something that needs to be clarified...

The curtailment of a number of projects on the initiative of Beria is sometimes presented as a rejection of Stalin's ambitious projects, of Stalin's "economic megalomania, thickly mixed with economic stupidity." Like, while the "dictator" was alive, swaying at it was tantamount to suicide, but after his death ...

All this is not so ... Beria, not for the sake of formality, noted that it was proposed to curtail those projects whose implementation *in the near future* is not caused by urgent needs of the national economy, but ... But Stalin, surprisingly, almost never made mistakes in his plans, and many of those projects that Beria curtailed could be reasonable in the future.

So, Stalin was very determined to develop railway communications in the North as much as possible, moreover, in a latitudinal direction. One of these projects was the Salekhard-Igarka railway.

Beria before the war through the NKVD, after the war through the Council of Ministers, was well acquainted with this construction and better than anyone was aware of the technical complexity of such construction in permafrost conditions. But the idea was with a great perspective, so Stalin was right, insisting on the road, and Beria, who temporarily turned it off.

I think that over time, Beria would have returned to this project, but Beria was killed, and after decades not a single railway was built in the USSR in the entire boundless Far North.

It's a pity...

As for Beria's initiatives in the spring of 1953, I have by no means completed a brief description of them, and some of them were completely amazing! ..

SAY, over the years, the veneration of portraits established in the country has become more and more like icon veneration. And on May 9, 1953, at the initiative of Beria, the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the design of columns of demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state festive holidays" was adopted. The resolution ordered the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit a draft resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers within two weeks, based on the following:

“... refuse to decorate columns of demonstrators with portraits, as well as buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on public holidays ..., cancel the practice of proclaiming appeals addressed to demonstrators from the government rostrum.”

As soon as Beria was arrested, this decision was immediately canceled!

But it was like that - a detail ... More significant and more dangerous for the “partoplasm” was the fact that in the field of public administration Lavrenty Pavlovich took a clear course towards transferring the center for managing economic and economic activities, including large-scale defense projects, from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Actually, all the most promising defense, for example, work has already been carried out within the framework of the activities of the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers.

Could Khrushchev and the regional party secretaries like this?

Nor was Beria's line to eliminate distortions in the national policy of the Center in Western Ukraine and Belarus and in Lithuania aroused no greater enthusiasm. In another note to the Central Committee, he wrote, referring to Western Ukraine, that “the senseless use of repression only causes discontent among the population.”

At the same time, Beria considered the most important task to rely on loyal national cadres in these three “hot” western regions.

A major general of the NKVD, a former intelligence officer Pavel Sudoplatov, who knew nationalism like the back of his hand, after the death of Stalin was involved by Beria in the preparation of analytical notes with a detailed analysis of the mistakes of party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against the nationalist underground in Ukraine and Lithuania. And Sudoplatov later wrote that Beria believed: locals should be put in leadership positions, and visitors should be appointed as deputies.

“... He was concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for whom socialist ideals would be truly close,” Sudoplatov reported in 1997!

Beria always lined up priorities and tasks very accurately. Western Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States were the youngest “Soviet” territories in the USSR, besides, the nationalists were especially active and dangerous there. Therefore, in relation to the situation there, Beria emphasized the creation of such national personnel that would work for the ever-increasing and comprehensive integration of regions with the USSR ...

And, say, for the eastern republics, the task of keeping the national personnel already existing there in the all-Union orbit became urgent, and Beria puts forward a rich idea of introducing, in addition to the union orders, the republican orders of the great people of the national republics - in Azerbaijan Nizami, in Uzbekistan - Navoi, etc. .

However, these were internal, “domestic” affairs ... But Beria was no less active in the field of foreign policy - for example, he insists on normalizing relations with Iran and Yugoslavia, on curtailing the war in Korea ...

He also puts forward the idea of refusing to speed up the construction of socialism in the German Democratic Republic. And later he got especially for Germany, but I will talk about this separately ...

The LAST major, quite systematically developed, but never implemented, idea of Beria was his intention to reorganize the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

After Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested, “offended” by him (he was demoted to the post of head of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Lviv region), General Strokach accused the former “boss” of saying at one of the meetings after his return to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, addressing Meshik: “We need good workers, Chekists, and not people who only know how to chat from the stands: “Lenin - Stalin.”

The typical partocrat Ignatiev flooded both the central and peripheral offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with such “workers”, and now Beria was cleaning the “Ignatiev” “stables”. Let's say

he was later blamed for the mass recall of legal foreign intelligence residents from abroad. But after all, many of them did not know not only the language of the host country, but not a single foreign language at all!

Yes, it was necessary to change many, many things ...

Having got rid of production activities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to Beria's plan, was to become an effectively functioning integrated law enforcement agency for the protection of state and public security, the protection of the state borders of the USSR, the protection of public order, the fight against criminality, while maintaining fire safety duties, registration of acts of civil status, state geodetic control, etc., including "performance of special tasks of the government of the USSR."

The task of "selecting, training and retraining operational personnel, educating the entire personnel of the Ministry in the spirit of selfless devotion to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party, honesty, truthfulness and high discipline" was not forgotten either ...

Such a Ministry of Internal Affairs could - in its natural development - become a structure that very effectively serves the interests of society - something like the People's Commissariat of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin) that never became a serious force, whose active work Lenin dreamed of.

Beria's son, Sergo Beria, cannot always be regarded as a source of reliable information, but I believe him when he claims that his father "as a specialist, believed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should inform ministries and departments, help them in solving certain specific issues."

Sergo Beria wrote:

"Having enormous potential, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republics could become analytical bodies and work in the interests of the national economy. The party apparatus, which always knew everything, never gave a complete picture of what was happening. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs was capable of such an objective analysis.

"You don't have to chase with a gun, but think with your head," my father said.

Everything here is very similar to the truth, because it is reasonable. It was more convenient for the regional party apparatus to give the higher bodies only positive, polished information. And the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the contrary, were interested in submitting "to the top" not just complete objective data on the situation in the region, but, above all, "negative" - for this they were put in order to be the "sovereign's eye" ...

Beria took care of the case, but the very first false official accusation that was made against Beria after his arrest was "an attempt to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party."

WHY was Beria so active, why did he literally gush with proposals, business notes? ..

I will express my thoughts on this matter, but first I will draw the reader's attention to this for what...

If you think about it, you can understand that the very fact of Beria's enormous activity most convincingly proves his complete absence of any intentions to carry out some kind of "coup".

First, a potential conspirator will behave before the conspiracy prepared and carried out, quieter than water, lower than grass. Why tease the geese in vain?

Beria behaved in exactly the opposite way.

Secondly, if Beria were preparing a coup, then the sensible line would be to withhold all initiatives until Beria becomes head of state. After all, absolutely all of Beria's initiatives had a clear potential for creating universal popularity among the people for those who put forward and implement these initiatives!

Beria, on the other hand, passed everything through the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, and everything new and positive that began in the country turned out to be impersonal - within the framework of the concept of "collective leadership".

And so everything would go "to the credit" of the "faithful successor to the work of the great Stalin, Comrade Beria."

The main thing is: Beria could not but understand that in the country that we had by 1953, no open **personal** coup is possible! The country was no longer the same, it would not have accepted and tolerated any single "usurper", at least in the person of the armed part of the people.

Another thing is **the collective** coup carried out on the sly, carried out by the majority of the leadership **against one** person - as Khrushchev did in relation to Beria. Such a coup could be successful, which actually happened.

Another confirmation of both Beria's innocence in Stalin's death and his lack of plans for a "conspiracy" is the testimony of L.P.'s widow. Beria - Nino Beria. In July 1990, in an interview with the Georgian newspaper 7 DGE, she stated:

"I knew my husband: he was a man of practical mind and understood that after the death of Stalin it was impossible for a Georgian to become the head of state. Therefore, probably, he went to meet the person he needed, such as Malenkov.

That's how it was! And all versions of the conspiracy are either idle chatter, or malicious slander.

But if Beria was in no hurry to arrive at a certain "H" hour, then why was he so irresistibly, diversely and continuously initiative?

What - it was impossible, perhaps, to be a little more restrained, to be less assertive and diverse?

But that's just it, that a man of action organically cannot work at half strength ... Beria always worked at full strength, and in the fifties, as an economic and operational leader, he began to outgrow Stalin. And when Stalin was gone, those ideas that Stalin would have held were "flooded" from Beria, as they say ...

After all, much had accumulated after the war that had to either be changed or cancel...

And here the question arises by itself: would Stalin approve, if he rose from the coffin, everything that Beria proposed and managed to do without Stalin?

Personally, my answer can be one - yes!!

Moreover, the more carefully I peer into that critical period of our history, the more often I come to the thought - weren't many of the initiatives that Beria had to put forward already conceived and considered by Stalin?

Isn't it because it was so difficult for others to reject these initiatives because Stalin's comrades-in-arms - who guessed, and who knew that everything, or almost everything that Lavrenty offers, is the realization of Stalin's own intentions?

In support of this version, I will give here only one consideration ...

About a week after Beria's arrest in Moscow, without an announcement in the press, from July 2 to July 7, 1953, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, where no kind word was said about Beria, but not tubs, but tanks were poured on him with dirt and lies ...

One of the accusations was the alleged intention of Beria to carry out almost the restoration of capitalism in the GDR ...

Beria really looked at the situation in the GDR soberly - more soberly and more correctly than the leaders of the GDR themselves, and looked skeptically at the prospects for forced socialist development of the GDR. He believed that even if there was a Federal Republic of Germany fed under the Marshall Plan and America financed the economic and social development of the FRG, successful socialism in the GDR was possible, but with

smart and very gradual policy of the leadership of both the USSR and the GDR ...

Molotov then bit the bit, but Beria had a certain
an authoritative like-minded person, although he could no longer support Beria ...

And this like-minded person was none other than ... Stalin. On April 7, 1952, Stalin signed a note from the Government of the USSR to the US government on the issue of a peace treaty with Germany. And even earlier - on March 10, 1952, in a note addressed to the USA, Great Britain and France, the Stalinist Soviet Union proposed to work out a peace treaty "with the direct participation of Germany in the person of the all-German government" after free all-German elections and with a guarantee of the subsequent neutrality of Germany (that is, non-inclusion of a united Germany in NATO).

I will give, however, one more consideration in favor of the version of the "Stalinist" origin of Beria's post-Stalinist initiatives.

Today there is every reason to assert that if Stalin had held on March 2, 1953 that Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which he could not hold, then at this Presidium not only Ignatiev would have been removed from the MGB, but Beria would have received a new appointment - to a joint with MGB Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Beria became the minister of the united Ministry of Internal Affairs after Stalin's death, but he would have become him even if Stalin had survived!

Who, if not Beria, was once again to rake other people's sins?!

And if so, could Stalin and Beria fail to discuss - at least in general terms, basically - the ways of reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the nature of its activities? And, at least, Malenkov could not but participate in such discussions ...

And Khrushchev...

And Bulganin...

The journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office recorded a number of confidential conversations in late 1952 - early 1953 in a narrow format: "Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev", "Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev", "Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin" ...

So, on December 15, 1952, Stalin held a meeting on MGB issues ... From 20.30 to 21.35 he had Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, secretaries of the Central Committee Mikhailov, Brezhnev, Aristov, MGB Ignatiev and his deputies Ogoltsov, Goglidze, Rjasnoy and Pitovranov ...

But at 21.35 all the "youth" left, and the first "four" remained with Stalin until 23.00. What was the conversation about, if not about how the MGB should be reformed, and so on?

Stalin held the last two meetings in his life in the Kremlin office on 16 and February 17, 1953 with three: Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin ...

But there were also Stalin's Kremlin apartment, and a nearby dacha, where Stalin not only lived, but also worked ...

By the way, while working on the book, I phoned Richard Ivanovich Kosolapov, a prominent Soviet social scientist and philosopher, and asked his opinion - could Beria's post-Stalinist initiatives have been discussed by him with Stalin?

And such an authoritative expert on that era as Professor Kosolapov replied that such an assumption has a right to exist and, moreover, is true.

One way or another, but the state activity of Lavrenty Beria was abruptly, unexpectedly and treacherously interrupted on June 26, 1953, when he was arrested in the Kremlin, and, according to a number of historians, he was killed in his mansion.

About the latest version - a little later, but now I will say that, perhaps, it is quite symbolic and characteristic of the life and fate of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria that on his last "sovereign" day, which became the day of his fall, he managed to sign his last officially registered government document...

It was the Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532rs on the approval of the design assignment for the construction of the plant "SU-3" of the plant No. 813, including

"reconstruction of workshops for the revision of machines and instrumentation, as well as cultural and community construction with a volume of 7.3 thousand m3 with a total estimated cost of 406 million rubles. in prices introduced from July 1, 1950.

Beria lived, working for the power and prosperity of the Big Country, and left, authorizing another project that enhances its power, but, as it turned out, already without it.

Then the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee began, which was the last for him and at which a decision was made - obviously with the participation of Beria - on the formation on the basis of the 1st and 3rd GU under the USSR Council of Ministers of the new "atomic" Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR.

And this was certainly the last "farewell" to that case No. 1, in which Beria played such an outstanding and exciting role...

As you can see, until the last hours of his public life he was a creator, and his last actions as a statesman were directed to the future.

Then he was arrested.

Yes, Beria - there can be no doubt about this in an objective analysis - was arrested in the Kremlin by a group of military from the air defense forces and placed in a basement bunker in the building of the Moscow military district of air defense ...

From there, he sent three letters to the Central Committee - June 28, July 1 and July 2, 1953. The first two were addressed to Malenkov, and the second was extensive, and already the text contained separate appeals also to Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, Pervukhin and Saburov ...

Yuri Mukhin and after him a number of other researchers who are quite loyal to Beria's memory consider these letters to be fake, and the Georgian biographer of Beria, Zaza Tskvitaria, in his good book "Beria without ji", evaluates these letters from the bunker as not of great interest ...

But this is sadly false.

The letters are undoubtedly authentic and deserve the closest attention and analysis. Apart from Beria, no one would have been able to write such letters, including a huge letter dated July 1.

And the point is not even in style - it's just that this letter contains many such specific details that only Beria himself and his addressees - Malenkov, etc. could then know. So, the letter of July 1 is the fruit of the "collective mind" of the entire Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU?

Forgive me, but Stalin's former employees did not reach such insanity - even Khrushchev.

Already these three letters refute all the assurances of Sergo Beria and others about the alleged the place to be stormed in Vspolny Lane of Beria's mansion, during which he was killed.

I should note that in that collective "Beriad", which today has books of about a dozen authors, I especially single out - for the quality of the analysis, the book about Beria by Alexei Toptygin. One of the reasons is that I got acquainted with his book - it just so happened - already after my first, "capital" book about Beria was almost finished, and was simply amazed at how similar both books were in structure, although they were written completely

regardless...

Unfortunately, Toptygin was not able to completely free himself from some of the typical anti-Berian clichés and, having himself vividly and convincingly shown the human good quality of his hero, did not dare to declare it directly and clearly. But Alexei Toptygin's analysis, as a rule, is good ... And he, in turn, declares that "the presence of Beria's letters written after June 26 refutes the version of Sergo Lavrentievich Beria" ...

Today, however, we have an accurate documentary refutation of this version ... In 1999, the International Fund "Democracy" published a collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953", which also contains an uncorrected transcript of the "Anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which took place from July 2 to July 7, 1953.

In my "capital" book about Beria, I devoted a lot of space to the analysis of this transcript,

but it was not a great pleasure to do this - many participants in the Plenum put themselves in a very unsightly light - people with seemingly well-deserved and glorious names ... Suffice it to say that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov initially stated for twenty minutes that on May 9, 1953, he called Beria "comradely", and explained: "We were still comrades then ...", and a little later he began to assert that "since Beria arrived in Moscow (that is, in August 1938. - S.K.), the atmosphere has *deteriorated* ... He poisoned the atmosphere, he intrigued ... "At the same time, Molotov blamed Beria exclusively for the fact that they stopped holding plenums "and that" the congress dragged on for 13 years "...

It is precisely in Molotov's documented speech that we find evidence that Beria was arrested in the Kremlin during a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU ...

Molotov said then, on July 2, 1953:

"... When on June 26 the entire Presidium sat and accused Beria for two and a half hours of all his sins (and there are many), we asked him to explain what other fundamental questions he had in mind to solve when deciding on the signing of the Secretary of the Central Committee under the protocols of the Presidium. To this he replies: maybe we need to draw up an agenda. So is this the real question?

The question, perhaps, was not fundamental, but this statement by Molotov puts a very definite and final point in the question of the fact of Beria's arrest in the Kremlin! Molotov said all this to a trusted circle, as they say, not for publication ...

There was no need for Molotov to misinform the plenum ...

And when was Beria killed?

Officially, the investigation into the case of Lavrenty Beria and his associates, Lev Vlodzimirsky, Sergei Goglidze, Vladimir Dekanozov, Bogdan Kobulov, Vsevolod Merkulov and Pavel Meshik, who were involved in the same case with him, was completed in December 1953, and about this, as well as about their execution On December 23, 1953, an extremely short message appeared in all the central newspapers.

There is no doubt that Beria's accomplices were actually executed on December 23, 1953 - this is also confirmed by the acts of cremation of their corpses.

According to Beria, there is no such document. Not in his multi-volume case and not a single protocol confrontations with accomplices.

So was there an investigation into the Beria case **in terms of Beria himself**, or was he extrajudicially killed already in the first days after the arrest?

The exact answer to this question was made impossible by the Khrushchevites themselves ...

Previously, political leaders in the USSR accused of state crimes were convicted in open political trials. Stalin was not afraid to present the enemies of the people to the people and show that they deserve condemnation.

In the case of Beria, everything was different, and one can accurately name the date only of his civil execution - it took place on August 8, 1953.

On this day in the Kremlin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kliment Voroshilov, signed, and the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Nikolai Pegov, countersigned his signature on the resolution of the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet, which took place from August 5 to 8, 1953.

It read:

"As a result of the uncovered criminal anti-state actions of L.P. Beria aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests of foreign capital, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

decides:

Approve the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the deprivation of L.P. Beria

powers of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, removing him from the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR with the deprivation of all the titles and awards assigned to him and transferring the case of criminal actions to L.P. Beria for consideration by the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Actually, such a decision of the supreme power showed its growing legal and intellectual incompetence.

If Beria's guilt was proved so obviously that he was publicly overthrown from the heights of state power into the abyss of state crimes, then why was there any further investigation in the form of an upcoming trial?

And what kind of court could there be if Beria had already been condemned by the highest body of state power?

But if by August 8, 1953, Beria's guilt was only established and the "investigation" in his "case" was only "conducted" and was "finished" only in the late autumn of 1953, then on the basis of which Beria was sentenced to civil - so far - execution already in August 1953?

On August 8, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, within the framework of the law, could authorize, in addition to the removal of Beria from government posts, only investigative measures in the case of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, suspending his deputy powers. But to deprive him of these powers, and even more so of all titles and awards, before the trial, where his case was transferred "for consideration"?

Your will, but something is not right here ...

Therefore, most likely, in July 1953, Beria was interrogated for some time, but after Beria's official auto-da-fe at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he, having a "fig leaf" of the Decree of the Presidium of the Armed Forces, was shot just in case.

On the one hand, after that it was easier to break his comrades-in-arms, and on the other hand - what the hell is not joking ... What if things for the Khrushchevites would not go in the most successful way, and living Beria could become a threat ...

So it's better to shoot him - since the Supreme Soviet of the USSR itself executed him, albeit by civil execution ...

Afterword

Victory after defeat: by death, death is trampled ...

DICTIONARY Ozhegov tells us that "defeat" is "failure in war, struggle, defeat." Does what happened to Lavrenty Beria after June 26, 1953 look like defeat?

Alas, yes! He fought - not for personal power, but for the strengthening, strengthening and confident development of Russia, and in this struggle he was defeated.

So what kind of victory for Lavrenty Beria after June 26, 1953 can we talk about? Victory - according to the same "Dictionary of the Russian Language" by Ozhegov - is "success in the struggle for something, the implementation, achievement of something as a result of the struggle, overcoming something."

And yet, in full accordance with this interpretation, we have the right to talk today about the emerging and more and more convincing victory of Beria, as about **overcoming** the lies that were built around Beria!

Khrushchev believed that he had completely defeated him in late June and early July 1953, finally and irrevocably.

Khrushchev betrayed Stalin and Beria and involved Beria in betrayal at the beginning - in the 53rd year and then Stalin - in the 56th year, other former associates of Stalin and colleagues of Beria ...

Khrushchev thought he had won.

But is it possible to talk about Khrushchev's victory today - when even spiritual grandchildren and

great-grandchildren of the slushy Khrushchev "Thaw" will not say a kind word?

The Khrushchevites didn't even delete Beria, they didn't erase him from our history, they tried to cut him out of history, tear him out - **"with meat"!**

And Beria today returns to the history of Russia. And the sincere, genuine and non-scandalous interest in him is growing and growing today, just as from a certain moment interest in Stalin began to grow more and more.

The wind of history has already swept away a lot of rubbish, with which, after Stalin's death, his majestic figure was covered, and Stalin stands before the new generations of the peoples of Russia in all his gigantic historical growth.

And next to him, the figure of Beria is more and more clearly visible. He stood next to Stalin during his lifetime, and now again - decades after his death - he takes his rightful historical place next to Stalin.

And who now remembers Khrushchev?

And if he remembers, then how?

And more and more people know Beria better, and fewer and fewer people believe the lies about him ...

So what was the last, eighth, posthumous, victory of Lavrenty Beria provided with?

Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote: "My verse will break through the vastness of years with labor, and will appear weighty, roughly visible ..."

Well said, right!

Lavrenty Beria was not a poet, but a politician and statesman, but the lies erected around him also break through **labor!**

All his life, Beria worked, achieved outstanding success, but he had a goal always the same: the power and flourishing of the sixth part of the Earth with the "short name" "Rus"...

Or rather, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was united by Great Rus'!

What has been said is not a beautiful phrase and does not overlap in terms of false pathos ...

This is true.

Beria was not a regular speaker, although he had to speak a lot - when he was in charge of the Transcaucasus. He did not like to "speak beautifully," but he knew how to say it very well ... In his speech at a mourning meeting on the day of Stalin's funeral, the refrain strikes:

"He who is not blind sees that our Party, in difficult days for it, is even closer its ranks, that it is united and unshakable.

Whoever is not blind sees that in these mournful days all the peoples of the Soviet Union, in fraternal unity with the great Russian people, have rallied even more closely around the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party ... "

Of the three speakers then, two of whom, Molotov and Malenkov, were Russians, only the Georgian Beria did not forget to say about the Russian people.

Actor Vyacheslav Grishechkin, who played (more precisely, portrayed) Beria in Alexei Pimanov's telepasque "The Hunt for Beria", said in an interview: "Creating this image, I was guided by Stanislavsky's parting words: "Playing evil, look for good in him, the more terrible the image will be. ". And I tried to show not a monster, but a man made of flesh and blood ... "

How boring it all is: "monster", "playing evil, look for the good in it, the more terrible ..." Isn't it better to look for the good in yourself, and then, perhaps, it will become clear that the "good" should not be looked for in the slandered Beria - in him, Good was the essence of nature, and in genuine villains and monsters, on whom the current vile and terrible times are so rich ...

How many times have they told the world that Beria almost shot great physicists in "packs" and, in any case, threatened to shoot genius scientists through one ... But even Felix Shchelkin, who is not very kind to Beria, is the son of an outstanding physicist, three times Hero of the Socialist The work of Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin, writes in his book

"Apostles of the Atomic Age," that his father said: in the eight years that Beria was in charge of the Atomic Project, not a single employee in the industry was arrested.

No one!

Beria was not, of course, an angel, but he was a large and benign person, for whom the content of what he does, and not the form, is important ... I don't remember now who it was said about that he absolutely did not care about the impression he made, but that is precisely why he invariably made a very strong impression. The same can be said about Lavrenty Beria...

Not an angel?

Yes...

Fervor, emotions often broke through in him, he could not be restrained in his tongue ... However, there was no pettiness, malice, pettiness in him and there was no arrogance ... Former platoon commander of the Kremlin regiment Viktor Gusev served at the Borovitskaya outpost - the main travel point of the Kremlin. In 2007, in his interview with the Nizhny Novgorod editorial office of the Arguments and Facts weekly, he recalled how Beria and Malenkov once entered the outpost. He shook hands, asked how the service was going, and wished him success.

A seemingly small detail: when Beria left, no one rushed to open the door for him. door, although then, according to Gusev, "many tried to serve in such cases."

With Beria, such "numbers" did not work - as already mentioned, there was neither arrogance, nor narcissism, nor lordliness in him ...

There were NO "Beria" crimes either - there were absolutely necessary repressive measures due to the urgent historical necessity, and even then - as minimal as the logic of the great and unprecedented struggle between the Good of the working majority and the Evil of the privileged minority allowed ...

And there were no crimes - there are only insinuations and vulgar fables. So, for example, Beria is credited with the murder of Aghasi Khanjyan, the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, who committed suicide. This plot was independently investigated in our time by several people at once, not all of whom were loyal to Beria. In my first, "capital" book about Beria, I myself devoted a separate chapter to the analysis of this gossip, "The Saga of Khanjyan's "murder" ...

So what?

And nothing, absolutely nothing!

Didn't kill Beria Khanjyan...

Or, for example, the eviction of Chechnya, which was organized and carried out - yes, personally by Beria ... So there was no objective need for this when the Germans were still not so far from Chechnya and far?

And besides...

And besides, let's think about where the most sick and bloody point in Russia is now, if not in Chechnya, in post-Stalin and post-Beria Russia, again returned to the Chechens?

The mediocre would-be rulers "corrected" this "Stalin-Beria crime" and what did you get? Blooming Chechnya, engaged in peaceful construction, or something else?

And what else can we get there?

And if in modern Crimea, cleared in 1944 of the Tatars, who almost without exception supported the Nazi occupiers, at some point it also smells of blood, then who, if not the Tatar nationalists - the descendants of the "victims of totalitarianism" evicted by Beria, returned to Crimea, will be guilty of that?

After the revolution, one of the first serious tasks for Beria was his appointment in October 1920 as Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers.

Improving the life of workers - this was absorbed into the soul forever, and the principles learned in young Soviet Baku, became for Beria, without exaggeration, second nature.

Here are some examples...

The new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Beria, gets acquainted with the apparatus of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD ... As Pavel Gromushkin, legendary in Soviet intelligence, recalled, when he saw a very thin girl, Beria immediately asked - isn't she sick? And, having received a negative answer, he nevertheless gave the order to the head of the GUGB Merkulov to send the girl to a sanatorium - let her, they say, feed herself.

A major Chekist Pavel Sudoplatov makes a serious mistake, and during Beria's report, he begins to have a severe headache. Beria immediately sends Sudoplatov home, and the next day he sends lemons to his house, brought by Beria as a gift from Georgia.

A talented young man Oleg Lavrentiev, a recent front-line sergeant, who correctly pointed out a possible version of a hydrogen bomb during his military service, and now - freshman of the Physics Department of Moscow State University, invited to the chairman of the Special Committee of Beria. He wants to personally see - what is the growing replacement for atomic luminaries? And the very first question to an extremely chubby guy: "Do you have a toothache? Maybe you need to be treated?"

Let's explain the question - Lavrentiev's cheeks were then like a hamster's. But if Beria were not *automatically* attentive to people, he would begin to care - is everything in order with the teeth of some student there?

Physicist Julius Khariton, the future three times Hero of Socialist Labor, long-term Scientific Director of the Nuclear Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16, and then the Chief Designer of the "atomic" KB-11, asks for a vacation. Beria authorizes, but at the same time, ***on his own initiative***, gives an additional instruction: "Provide good treatment."

This is not work "for the public," it is a need, ingrained in the flesh and blood, to delve into the interests of those for whose sake the Soviet state is called to exist. That is why it can be argued that if Beria had not been killed and multinational Russia had developed with the participation of Beria, then it would have become an inviolably strong society with a strong and ***priority*** social policy.

Lavrenty Pavlovich could arrange a dispersal for the director of an "atomic" enterprise, who neglects social issues, and then, having arrived at plutonium plant No.

This, too, is a feature of a business character.

I will refer to the book about B.G. Muzrukov, published several years ago in the series "Life of Remarkable People". It contains such memoirs of an employee of the plant No. 817 (PO Mayak) from 1948 to 1960, Yu.A. Gusev.

"After the execution of L.P. Beria, I plucked up courage and turned to Muzrukov with a question: what kind of person was Lavrenty Pavlovich, how did he solve the problems of the work of the plant? Boris Glebovich told me the following story. Before one of Beria's next visits, in 1951, Muzrukov received a call from Moscow to the plant and was told that the day before, at one of the Minatom enterprises, Beria had dismissed the director for inattention to the development of the social sphere of the facility. B.G. Muzrukov, having met L.P. Beria, also suggested questions from him, primarily in the social sphere, but he asked to show the production first. Then, on the way to the hotel, he saw a construction site and asked: "What is this?" Boris Glebovich explained that there would be new houses here. And Beria said: "This is good" ... "

This, then, is how Muzrukov saw Beria - ***as a person*** - already after tubs of dirt were officially poured on the "LP". However, the real, real Beria was the way Muzrukov described him.

Beria did not know how to lisp - he, as I understand it, was deprived of cheap sentimentality

clean. But to take care of people and, if necessary, *to sympathize* with them, Beria knew how and that was how he brought himself up.

In 2003, the Minsk publishing house "Belarusian Encyclopedia" published a book by Fyodor Dmitrievich. Popov "The Atomic Bomb and the KGB". The author got to the "object 550" (KB-11, base No. 112, the Volga office of Glavgorstroy), that is, to the nuclear weapons development center in Sarov-Arzamas-16, in 1954, when Beria was already officially ostracized.

And now the operational commissioner of the "objective" department of the KGB, Captain Popov, introduces himself to the head of his department, Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Bronnikov, and a detailed conversation begins about the "atomic" history of the "object", about the former Sarov desert, about the features of the operational situation, and so on.

The following is a direct quote:

"Bronnikov noted that Kurchatov, Khariton and Beria played a decisive role in the development of the atomic epic. "If not for them, the atomic bomb in the USSR would hardly have been tested in 1949," he said.

This is an episode of 1954 (fifty-fourth!) Years, that is, the time when Beria was on at the highest level declared the agent of international capital ...

The same F.D. Popov writes:

"The wide deployment of activities in KB-11 in its main profile was strictly regulated by the availability of housing ... Many specialists huddled in an overcrowded monastery hotel, which was previously used by pilgrims of the Sarov monastery.

The situation with housing changed dramatically after the intervention of Beria. On his instructions, under the Office No. 880 (for the construction of a "facility" in Sarov. - S.K.) ... a specialized unit for housing construction was created. In 1948–1950 many residents of Arzamas-16 celebrated housewarming. For three years, more than 200 residential buildings were occupied. They were different - and semi-detached cottages, and Finnish prefabricated panel boards, and multi-apartment stone and cobbled. Next to the old monastic buildings stood three- and four-story houses. The monastery itself with temples, chapels, a bell tower, cell houses and a refectory turned out to be in the very center of the object "...

Comments required?

On JUNE 29, 1953, Beria's future widow, Nino Teimurazovna Beria, wrote letters to Malenkov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. Their handwritten originals were preserved in the archives, and in 2012 the texts of the letters were published (except for the letter to Kaganovich) in the collection of documents "The Politburo and the Beria Case".

The texts largely coincided, but there were some differences that did not change the general essence.

Below I will give extracts from these letters, starting with a letter to Malenkov ... "Hat" addressing in all letters was the same, but a specific addressee was highlighted especially ...
So:

"Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

G.M. Malenkov

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme

Council of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov

Deputy Chairman

Council of Ministers of the USSR V.M. Molotov

Deputy Chairman

Council of Ministers of the USSR L.M. Kaganovich
From Nina Teimurazovna Beria

Three days ago my son and his family were taken away, and I don't know anything about them. I was left alone because I was told that L.P. Beria was detained by order of the government (I note that if Beria had been killed during the mythical assault mansion, then the wife knew about this assault. - S.K.)

I am a member of the CPSU, I have a higher education (candidate of agricultural sciences), I am politically literate and have been the wife of L.P. Beria. Like all Soviet people, I believe that L.P. – Your comrade-in-arms and friend in the cause of building communism and in the struggle against external enemies and their agents within our state. On this basis, I allow myself to turn to you with a request - to give me half an hour in order to call me and talk to me. I am not a stupid person, and therefore I take it upon myself to boldly assure you that, having lived with L.P. thirty years under one roof, sharing human joys and sorrows with him, I know him well... <...> I beg you, call me! L.P. brought me up in love and respect for you, and I can only talk with you (N.T. Beria asked for a meeting with the others, but the last phrase is only in a letter to Malenkov. - S.K.) ...

If L.P. made some irreparable mistake, which caused damage to the Soviet state, then I have nothing to talk about, and I ask you to give me the opportunity to share his fate, whatever it may be; nothing can convince me that he could deliberately betray the Leninist-Stalinist ideals and principles, and, therefore, I must also be punished accordingly.

I only ask you to spare my son Sergei ... "

From a letter to Khrushchev:

"... I am L.P. I know very well both in grief and in joy, I know his human weaknesses and, consequently, the weak spot from where the enemy and slanderer could approach him. I'm not a stupid person, I understand what's what; therefore, perhaps I will be able to shed light on some events that compromise him ...

... If Lavrenty Pavlovich made an irreparable mistake in something and caused damage The Soviet state, and, therefore, there is no need to call me, I ask you - let me share his fate, whatever it may be. I am devoted to him, I believe him as a communist, despite all the small rough edges in our married life - I love him. I will never believe in his conscious malicious intent against the party, I will not believe his betrayal of the Leninist-Stalinist ideas and principles. Therefore, I don't deserve any mercy! I only ask you to spare my son Sergei...

<...>

I have been brought up by the Party, Soviet society and my family in deep respect, love and devotion to you, and this gives me the courage to address you with such letters.

Nina T. Beria.

From a letter to Voroshilov:

"... Living with L.P. married for decades, I can say that I know all of his a life laid down wholly and completely for Soviet power. I know his human weaknesses, because a wife can see her husband both sick and angry, in sorrow and joy, in a bad and good mood. I know what weak spot the enemy and the slanderer has found to denigrate him. So please call me and talk to me for a few minutes...

If L. Beria has already made an irreparable mistake, which caused damage to the Soviet country, and his fate is sealed, give me the opportunity to share his fate, whatever it may be. This will be the most humane and human decision regarding me; at the same time, it will also be a well-deserved punishment by me, since

I will never believe anyone that L.P. betrayed the cause and ideas of Lenin - Stalin..."

From a letter to Molotov:

"... If Lavrenty Pavlovich made an irreparable mistake in something and caused damage to the Soviet state, and, therefore, there is no need to call me, I ask you to allow me to share his fate, whatever it may be. I am devoted to him and believe him as a communist, I treat him as [to] a person who gave his whole life for the good of the Soviet Motherland. I love him, despite all the little rough edges of our married life; I will never believe in his conscious malice towards Leninist-Stalinist ideas and principles. In that way, I don't deserve any mercy...

<...>

I remain in deep respect and devotion to you

Nina Teimurazovna Beria.

It was, of course, excruciatingly difficult for Nino Beria to repeat herself over and over again, but in each letter she still finds turns that differ at least slightly from one another - I ask the reader to pay attention to this and read each similar passage carefully, comparing them ...

And in each letter, not only the pain of a loving wife and the dignity of a smart woman are visible. women, but also complete conviction in the devotion of the husband to one thing - work for the sake of the Motherland.

Soon the author of these letters was also arrested, and after a six-month investigation, accused of an anti-Soviet conspiracy, on January 7, 1954, she wrote a letter to Khrushchev, which I quote below from the 2000 collection of documents "Rehabilitation: how it was. Documents of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other materials "(in 3 volumes, volume 1. March 1953 - February 1956)":

"... I declare with all responsibility ... after a six-month imprisonment and investigation in my case, that I have never met a person who declared to me in any form dissatisfaction with the Soviet government ...

<...>

A really terrible accusation falls on me that for more than thirty years (since 1922) I was Beria's wife and bore his name. At the same time, until the day of his arrest, I was devoted to him, treated his social and state position with great respect and blindly believed that he was a devoted, experienced and necessary person for the Soviet state (he never gave me any reason or reason to think otherwise not a single word)..."

What spiritual fortitude! 48-year-old Nino (she died in 1991, 86 years old) has been under grueling investigation for half a year, she is repeatedly poked in the nose by her husband's "betrayal", and she still finds the strength to defend him ...

In the letter of the widow Beria there is a lot of "information for thought", including - and on the "women's" topic:

"Based on his useful activities, I spent a lot of work and energy in caring for his health (in his youth, he was ill with lungs, later with kidneys). During our life together, I saw him at home only in the process of eating or sleeping, and since 1942, when I learned ***from him*** (bold italics are mine everywhere. - S.K.) about his adultery, I refused to be his wife and lived since 1943, at first alone, and then with her son's family. During this time, I suggested to him more than once, in order to create normal conditions for him, to divorce me in order to marry a woman who, perhaps, will love him and agree to be his wife. He refused me this, arguing that ***without me he could for a certain time***

get out of the rut of life. I, believing in the power of human habit, stayed at home so as not to disturb his family and give him the opportunity, when he wants it, to rest in this family. I came to terms with my shameful position in the family so as not to negatively affect his performance, which I considered directed not by the enemy, but necessary and useful (So in the text. - S.K.).

I did not know anything **about his immoral acts towards the family**, which I was also told about during the investigation . She considered his betrayal of me, as a wife, to **be accidental** and partly blamed herself, because in these years she often went to her son, who lived and studied in another city ... "

So... There were no dozens or hundreds of "victims of the sexual maniac Beria", there were no "orgies"...

There was a woman from whom Beria - according to his son Sergo - had a daughter. It seems that this was exactly what Nino Beria wanted to convey in words to her husband's high-ranking colleagues in June 1953, and what she had to inform them in writing in January 1954.

I HERE think - well, who prevented those who had the same duties to the party, the state, society as Beria, to live and work the same way as he? That is, to give all the strength of your mind and soul to the entrusted task, all your time, finally - damn it!

If a big one is big in terms of opportunities and social position, a person lives the way Lavrenty Beria lived, he necessarily goes only from victory to victory - as Beria did.

But how many live like this?

Many of his colleagues worked alongside Chekist Beria in Transcaucasia, including his chiefs. Let's say - Ivan Pavlunovsky ...

Born in 1888, a Bolshevik since 1904, in the organs of the Cheka from 1918 to 1928, then at first Deputy People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and since 1932 - Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry Ordzhonikidze, head of the Main Military Mobilization Directorate of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

It would seem - what a scale, what tasks! .. Just work!

And Pavlunovsky took up conspiracies.

As a result: arrest, investigation, execution.

Or another Chekist chief of Beria - Stanislav Redens ...

Born in 1892, a worker, fought with the Haidamaks, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine delivered valuables to Moscow, in the organs of the Cheka since 1918 ... He was Dzerzhinsky's secretary, then worked in Ukraine, in Moscow - in the Supreme Council of the National Economy. In 1928 he replaced Pavlunovsky in Transcaucasia, after a year and a half he left for Minsk, worked there - did not work, after two months he left for Kyiv and later returned to Moscow again.

And he also got involved in anti-Stalinist conspiracies, although there was no end to the work ...

Their deputy Beria all this time was pulling the strap of the real leadership of the KGB work in the Caucasus. Moreover, if you remember, he was engaged not only in it, but also in operational economic issues, even when he worked in the Cheka-GPU.

And if we compare the same Orakhelashvili and Beria, who replaced him at the head of Georgia? ..

Who prevented Mamia Orakhelashvili and his wife from working for the glory of their native land and for the benefit of all the peoples of the USSR, as Beria, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, did later?

But Orakhelashvili had more experience, and for a long time - authority ... And Stalin knew him from his old pre-revolutionary work ...

No, instead of work and work - laziness of spirit and thought, ambitions, claims ... And in the end - through disagreement with "Koba" - participation in a whole bunch of conspiracies of disgruntled "old fighters".

This chain of comparisons can be continued. Let's say they would be just as active and

clean before the task assigned, like Lavrenty Beria, the people's commissars of internal affairs of the USSR Yagoda and Yezhov, and there would be no need to replace them, and later - to arrest, interrogate, shoot.

And Molotov?

If Molotov had delved into the issues of tank building during the war the way Beria did, Stalin would not have handed over the tanks to Beria's curatorship ... And Beria would not have had to take on the issues of the production of weapons and ammunition if Voznesensky had pulled them in full force ...

Stalin assigned the atomic problem to Molotov at first. And what is the result? Eventually the atomic scientists themselves asked for Beria's arm, and only then things went smoothly.

Why?

Yes, because Beria was not only an outstanding leader and organizer of any business entrusted to him, but he was also a great worker, busy with business as much as the job required. And all the cases entrusted to Beria took all twenty-four hours a day, if not more!

There is no doubt, not only about Beria that can be said - any major organizer objectively has, in principle, the same workload.

But how many, not in principle, but *in fact*, load "above the roof" not only subordinates, but also themselves? And how many are able to intelligently load at least subordinates, setting them really necessary and correct tasks?

Beria knew how.

MAYAKOVSKY once wrote down bitter lines: "So life will pass, as the Azores sail through the islands ...". He wrote this on board a transatlantic liner, when the Azores were really visible on the horizon ...

In a bitter moment of life - and, as I understand it, Beria had oh, how many of them! - Beria could remember these lines of Mayakovsky, applying them to himself ...

With the only difference that he had never seen the Azores, or the Bahamas, or any other exotic islands...

He even saw his wife most often "only in the process of eating or sleeping." Before "sexy" "violence" was to him - in the almost round-the-clock "squirrel wheel" of the Epoch?

Although...

Although I compared his life with the "squirrel wheel" unsuccessfully. A different image is needed here, because Beria, in his business whirlwind, did not run in place, but flew and flew forward, into the future.

Front-line soldier Yulia Drunina has a very unfeminine and strong poem that begins like this:

I was lucky at the beginning of my life
I do not take offense at my fate -
In forty-one I was thrown into the saddle,
In the forty-first, in the seventeenth year ...

Beria era "threw into the saddle" in the eighteenth. And he flew through the era - through her sweat, blood and dust.

After all, he was not alone then living like this - then everything living and active in the new, unprecedented before Russia lived and felt like that ...

THERE IS a wise (however, they are all wise) oriental parable about the blind men, to whom brought the elephant, and then asked him to describe.

One blind man, having stumbled upon his leg, said that the elephant is like a column ... Another, who caught the tail, compared the elephant with a rope ... The third, who felt the trunk, decided that

the elephant is like a boa constrictor.

Today's political blind people - and genuine blind people (to this day, oddly enough, there are such), and, especially, crafty political "blind people" in quotation marks, deliberately closing their eyes to historical truth, imagine Stalin's great USSR exclusively in the form of "gigantic gulag..."

How vile, petty and deceitful all this is!

And when you watch television anti-Stalinist and anti-Beria attempts of various kind of milky, then such an idea involuntarily comes to mind ...

It seems that all these minions are not only trying to create in people an appropriate idea of the activities of Stalin and his "team", but they themselves - due to their own worthlessness - represent the activities of the Stalinist leadership as something like a gangster gathering on thieves' "raspberries" ...

Like, Stalin only thought about how to arrest someone else, shoot, poison, drive somewhere where not only Makar did not drive calves, but even Evenks - reindeer ...

But everything was different...

Otherwise with Stalin, otherwise with Beria ...

There was a huge, daily, or rather, **daily** state work on a huge number of topics and directions in the life of the state. Not a single leader of the Western, capitalist world, not a single president of even the largest transnational corporation, not to mention the presidents of the largest capitalist states, was even close to being loaded as Stalin was in the most active period of his activity, and Beria in the period of his work in Moscow from the first to the last day!..

They carried out - **daily** - a huge amount of work, and they succeeded only because they devoted all their time to public work. They did not have hobbies, entertainment and leisure in the sense that is usually given to these concepts.

Their only "hobby" was the construction of a great Russia, existing for the prosperity and well-being of its peoples, as well as giving an example and guiding a just idea to the peoples of the world ...

It was well said: "Some work to eat, others eat to work" ... Both Stalin and Beria always belonged to the latter. They fell asleep with the thought of what would have to be done tomorrow, and woke up with the thought of what had to be done today...

OF COURSE, Stalin was more versatile than Beria, more difficult than him - after all, Stalin was a genius, and a rare genius ...

And he changed - as Kaganovich wisely noted.

Beria also changed over the years, of course. But - as I understand it, he changed less ... Except that after many years in the highest all-Union government posts (although, how many of them he had there - only fifteen fleeting years!) He became more ironic, accumulated reserves of skepticism and became - what is there - a bit more cynical.

After all, his life did not pass in paradise, and he was not always surrounded by titans of thought, but he had to work, including with them ...

As Comrade Stalin once put it: "I have no other members of the Union of Soviet writers"...

It took all the leaden abominations, all the vileness and mediocrity of the last two decades of Russian history, to make clearer the pettiness and pettiness of some of its figures, and the large scale of others ...

So, it is unlikely that Beria himself, working for the socialist Power ten to fifteen hours a day, guessed what a deep and great example and lesson he would give us with his life, living many years after his death. But this is so - it makes sense to think about the example of Beria, and there is something to learn here! ..

Beria should be of interest to us today not only as an example of a bright fate - a bright

not by moving along parallels and meridians, but by the nature of the completed deeds.

And it can and should be not only an example of a brilliant organization today.

Beria today should be of particular interest to us in that his activities, as a focus, have gathered smart, far-sighted and promising approaches to a complex of national problems in a huge multinational state.

As a representative of a small, but with a long history, the people of the USSR, Beria understood better than any other Great Russian the importance of its geopolitical "Ukraines" for a large country, but he also understood the importance for the peoples of the "Ukraines" of an alliance with the great "titular" Russian nation.

This union should be equal in the sense that each part of the social "mechanism", which - unlike the usual, inanimate mechanism - is alive, must understand well and forever that any part of it is important for the normal, effective operation of the entire "mechanism" . !

Without some parts, the "mechanism" stops immediately, without some, some kind of time and somehow work, but it will not work **efficiently and steadily !**

If we today integrally evaluate the losses of the Russian Federation - we mean not the current geopolitical bastard and castrato, but the RSFSR - only from the deadening or destruction of former capital investments in the union republics, from how much had to be palliatively replaced by newly established production facilities in the Russian Federation, or simply give up something, it will turn out that we are all together - Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Tajiks, Armenians and Moldovans - in these twenty-odd years they simply let it go to the wind, **blew**, material, **already created**, values hardly less than a trillion ...

Yes, not a trillion, but a trillion gold rubles, of the "green" paper products of the US Federal Reserve System!

Not weak, huh? as some say...

After all, this is about the same amount as we lost during that war - for the Great Patriotic War!

Working in Moscow, Beria naturally solved all-Union tasks. But after all, he worked in Georgia in such a way that the results of his work were important and useful not only for Georgia, but also for all of Russia, the entire USSR!

And, having begun to work in Moscow and having matured, gaining ever deeper statesmanship over the years, he realized - perhaps even not so much at the level of theory - Beria was not fond of theory, but practically - that as the national republics of the USSR develop, they need to be controlled from the Center not with a stick, not with a carrot, not with a party directive or supervision from the Center, but due to the maximum integration of the "Ukrainian" peoples of the USSR with each other, but above all with the great Russian people.

He realized that true integration should be ensured not only by the presence on the territory of the republic of certain enterprises of union significance, but, above all, - the creation and development in all the republics of such national cadres who would be brought up in the spirit of sincere devotion both to their national Motherland and to the great Motherland, the Great Country - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ...

The wedge of small-town, "kishlak", "chuvyachny" or "sharovary" nationalism it is necessary to knock out a full-fledged socialist national self-consciousness with a wedge.

National, but - socialist, unifying by its very nature!

Perhaps Lavrenty Beria himself did not understand this as clearly as it is stated above, but he acted in this vein, and if he had not been killed, he would have led the Great Country in this direction.

Or maybe he understood all this - who knows? In any case, today it does not bother us to re-read from time to time, at least, his speech at the XIX Congress of the CPSU (b) - CPSU, which, together with his speech at Stalin's funeral, turned out to be a political testament

Beria ...

I repeat: I don't know - did he himself think so clearly?

But we, comprehending the phenomenon of Beria, should extract from him this essence, which in it certainly is.